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100TH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

COMPILATION OF SPEECHES

VOLUME 3

(MAY 5, 1987–JULY 31, 1987)

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Phase three of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting concluded on July 31. The next phase is scheduled to begin September 22 and is targeted to conclude by November 20.

During the past phase the West tabled a major security proposal-WT. 129-which calls for further confidence and security building measure (CSBM) negotiations to address verification issues and go beyond the arrangements for comprehensive information exchanges and on-site inspections that were worked out at the Stockholm CSBM Conference last fall. The security proposal also calls for the establishment of complementary troop reduction talks within CSCE, but not contingent upon other CSCE matters. It identifies the 23 participants by name and stipulates that they should determine among themselves "the agenda, procedures, and organizational modalities for this negotiation." This part of the NATO proposal is based on the December 1986 Brussels Declaration, in which the allies and France announced willingness to accept a Warsaw Pact proposal that would expand troop reduction talks to cover Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic.

During the last phase the United States delegation called for increased respect and promotion of individual human rights and for the unrestricted flow of people, information and ideas. The Commission is pleased to provide you with a complete compilation of the U.S. delegation speeches during the latest round of the Vienna Follow-up Meeting.

We hope you find this information useful.

Dennis De Concini
DENNIS DECONCINI
Co-Chairman

Steny H. Hoyer
STENY H. HOYER
Chairman

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PLENARY STATEMENTS

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Meeting

May 5, 1987
Vienna, Austria

We return to Vienna for a long and intensive stage of our meeting. Ahead of us is a schedule that provides the flexibility for the painstaking and detailed work of negotiating and drafting a final document. That document is critically important. It should highlight and strengthen the obligations of the Helsinki Final Act, particularly those obligations - as in the human dimension - where implementation has been weak. It should give impetus to both the security and the cooperative aspects of the Helsinki process. It should set the date and place for the successor meeting to Vienna, and should provide for a limited number of intersessional meetings on key topics. It should be a substantive document and a balanced one.

As we turn to detailed work on our final document, however, we must not lose sight of an element of the Helsinki process that is even more important than words on paper - performance on the ground. As we don our eyeshades, pick up our pencils, and adjust our spectacles, let us not forget that there is one aspect of the CSCE house that is worth more than its lease or its furniture - its inhabitants. Whether the people who live in the CSCE house do better or worse in their lives is the ultimate test of the value of the Helsinki process. For that reason it is important from time to time in these plenary meetings to make an evaluation. Today I want to look once more at the remarkable and dynamic phenomena of "glasnost" and "perestroika" in the Soviet Union, and to examine their effect so far on people.

In the short time since we last assembled in Vienna, much has happened in the bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Shultz led a large American delegation to Moscow for probing discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev, Prime Minister Ryzkhov, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. Difficult but productive talks were held on the issue of intermediate range nuclear forces; and we are now engaged in thorough consultations with our allies on the implications of those talks. The Secretary received a comprehensive account of "perestroika" from the Soviet leaders, and was able to describe American priorities, including human rights, in turn. Also during our recess, a major delegation of American Congressmen, including the Vice Chairman of the U.S. Vienna Delegation, Steny Hoyer, visited Moscow and conferred with Mr. Gorbachev and four of his Politburo colleagues.

It is clear that changes continue to affect major areas of Soviet life. A new historical play touches the heretofore taboo figures of Trotsky and Bukharin, two major Soviet revolutionaries about whom more is known by Westerners than by the Soviet people themselves. And as of last Friday, May 1, thousands of Soviet citizens will be able by a new law to sell their services privately. While it is too much to hope that this development will lead to large-scale private enterprise in the Soviet Union, it can certainly demonstrate that, as many have discovered since the days of Adam Smith, incentives enhance productivity.

There has also been some progress in the human dimension of the Helsinki Final Act. Here I would like to examine as specifically as possible the major categories, with the objective of welcoming what has been accomplished but also recognizing how much still remains to be done. A reasonable perspective, based on facts as we know them, can only assist our work here in Vienna.

First, over 100 Soviet political prisoners have been released. The American human rights organization Helsinki Watch has been able to document 131 releases since the first Supreme Soviet decree was signed at the beginning of February. Yet this figure does not compare favorably to the 280 prisoners who Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasimov said on February 10 were either released or under review. By contrast, the Polish government released nearly all its 200 political prisoners in two days last September. And the number of those released pales beside the 550 who are specifically known to remain in prison, or the estimate of 1000 still jailed made by ex-prisoners, or the many more who are undocumented, uncounted, and nameless. Whatever the real number of prisoners of conscience, those released form only a small percentage of it. All of these prisoners are incarcerated for offenses which would not cost them an hour's freedom in the vast majority of the countries represented here. That is a measure of how far the Soviet Union still has to go.

Moreover, as new data become available, so too do disturbing trends become apparent. Prisoner releases have not been unconditional. Prisoners have been required to sign statements regarding their future conduct. At least 12 have been returned to labor camps for refusing to sign. In addition, in the largest category of political prisoners - the 242 believers who have been imprisoned for seeking to exercise their religious rights - there have been no releases at all. And of the 119 who are being held in psychiatric institutions, only a handful have been freed. Twelve Helsinki Monitors have been released by Supreme Soviet decree, but 26 remain in prison or labor camp. And in the dreaded Perm Labor Camp No. 36-1 - where 20 prisoners of conscience, including eight Helsinki Monitors, are being subjected to conditions as severe as anywhere in the Soviet Union - there have been no known releases. Six of those eight are members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Monitoring Group; the Ukrainian group is thus being subjected to harsher conditions than any other Helsinki group. Ten political prisoners have died in the Perm camp in the last three years, a measure of the danger for those being held there.

Lest there be any question about the criminality of the prisoners of conscience condemned to the Perm camp, let me recall the story of one of them. Mart Niklus is a 52-year-old Estonian, by profession an ornithologist, who was sentenced to ten years of special regimen camp and five years of exile for circulating samizdat and listening to the Voice of America. His lawyer asked for dismissal of these and other charges on the grounds that Niklus's actions were fully consistent with the Soviet Constitution and the Helsinki Final Act. Andrei Sakharov, who has expressed to the representatives of several CSCE participants his fears for the fate of the Perm prisoners, said of Niklus that one has only to meet him, "an ornithologist and a true scientist, an absolutely honest and sensitive person, to appreciate the full cruelty and injustice of his sentence."

We can be thankful that there have been no recent political arrests. But the continuing travail of Mart Niklus and of the hundreds - perhaps thousands - like him reminds us that "glasnost" has so far had little overall effect on most Soviet citizens who have been brave enough to speak out for their rights and those of others.

Second, the picture on Soviet emigration is improving but mixed. Jewish, German, and Armenian emigration all rose sharply in March. The Jewish figures for April were even better, marking a rise from 98 in January to 146 in February to 470 in March to 717 in April. Here too perspective is necessary. Even if Jewish emigration for the rest of 1987 continued at the March-April rate, the yearly total would be only 7,000, less than one-seventh of the peak year of 1979. Moreover, almost all Jews who are emigrating seem to be drawn from the approximately 11,000 documented refuseniks, and even some of those have been turned down again. Very few new applicants are being approved or even processed; and virtually none who lack first-degree relatives abroad can even get their applications accepted. In light of this growing data base, I am compelled to revise the statement I made April 10 that Soviet authorities did not seem to be taking a rigid view of their new legislation on entry and exit. In fact, as far as new applicants are concerned, the law is being applied with no discernible flexibility at all. Is it the intention of the Soviet authorities to close the door on emigration, except for close relatives, once the backlog of current refuseniks has been dealt with? If so, then any claims of liberalized emigration will be revealed to be a sham.

Behind the statistics it helps, as always, to look at the people. There is no sign that the shameful official intimidation of all who apply to emigrate has lessened. Prospective emigrants continue to face job dismissals, social ostracism, and official harassment. In addition, the secrecy disqualification for emigration continues to be used and abused. Lev Elbert has not seen a secret since he completed his military service in 1972. Aleksandr Lerner ended his classified work in cybernetics 18 years ago and Ida Nudel was fired from her work in hygiene and infection control in the food industry 15 years ago. Vladimir Slepak, a radio engineer, has done no sensitive work since 1969. And Naum Meiman, a 76-year old mathematician who lost his wife Inna in February, has done nothing of a classified nature for over 30 years. These facts lead to one conclusion - that secrecy is the pretext, not the reason, why these people, many with close relatives abroad, are forced to wander perpetually between a world they cannot leave and a world they cannot enter.

Perhaps a new level of callousness, or absurdity, was reached just last week, when Benjamin Charny was again refused an exit visa to join his brother in the United States, where he wants to receive treatment for cancer and for a heart condition which has caused two heart attacks. Despite the merit of his case on humanitarian and even legal grounds (it meets the strictist criteria of the new Soviet legislation), the Deputy Chief of the Moscow Office of Visas and Registration told Charny just eight days ago that he should not reapply until 1995 when by actuarial probability he will be dead. The reason for refusal was Charny's work as a mathematician on the Soviet civil space program in the 1960's. Charny ceased this work 18 years ago; meanwhile, in 1981, a colleague who had done the same work in the same office was allowed to emigrate. The irony and tragedy of this case speak for themselves.

Third, there has been some progress, though not enough, in reunifying Soviet citizens with their families in the United

States. Eighty of 135 family reunification cases have been resolved since President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev first met in Geneva. But since then the list has continued to grow with new cases until it is about the same size as at the time of the Geneva summit. In the same period, twenty-two Soviets have been allowed to join their spouses in the United States, but 11 are unexplicably prevented. And negative action continues even in this time of "glasnost." In January, officials gave Svetlana Braun hope that she could join her husband Keith, but ever since this young couple has been kept in limbo. Yuriy Balovlenkov, whose "secret" work was no more mysterious than computer programming, is entering his tenth year of separation from his American wife and two children. Soviet officials in Vienna and Moscow have been willing to discuss with Andrea Wine her work as representative of a coalition of divided spouses, but they did not prevent her husband Viktor Faermark from again being refused an exit visa in March.

Fourth, if a society is to be "open," then surely it should be open to the free flow of communication with foreign countries. Yet the continued jamming of Western radios, including the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe, continues. Many of us had hoped that the unjamming of the BBC's Russian language service would be the harbinger of a genuine opening to information transmitted by foreign media. Instead, it seems to be a lonely exception to a rule which stands as a stunning contradiction of "glasnost." Indeed, the jammers taken off the BBC are now being directed against Radio Liberty. Moreover, restrictions on mail and telephone communication have continued throughout this period of "glasnost." Parcels disappear, letters are lost, phone calls are blocked or interfered with, and registered materials disappear. The only openness practiced in this area is the continued openness of private and personal correspondence to the censor's scrutiny and disposal.

Fifth, religion in the Soviet Union remains unfree. Believers are not allowed to organize bible study groups, conduct religious classes for children, perform charitable or social activities, or make contact with foreign believers of the same faith. Government regulation of religion means that many religious groups fail to be registered and thus cannot practice legally. The sphere of authorized activity remains limited to ritual functions. During Secretary Shultz's visit, Soviet authorities assured American officials that at least recognized denominations will be allowed to open more places of worship, import bibles and prayer books, and maintain contact with co-religionists abroad. Such steps would unfortunately not affect unregistered faiths nor establish the independence of religious activity in general. Nevertheless, they would be significant and welcome. We will watch with interest to see if they are actually taken.

In all these categories, therefore, there are significant remnants of a closed society. They continue to resist the impulses toward greater openness which have marked Mr. Gorbachev's stewardship. Indeed, they have so far shown themselves stronger than those impulses. Whether they will yield, or whether still stronger impulses are necessary, is a matter of conjecture. But objective examination of the evidence available at this moment leads to the conclusion that, when measured by the standard of the Helsinki and Madrid documents, the Soviet Union remains in substantial violation. For that reason the Western countries have put forward a comprehensive set of proposals that cover every area of the human dimension to which I have referred today.

I hope, however, that the Soviet Union will not wait for the completion of a Vienna Final Document before it takes substantial steps toward compliance with its obligations. Waiting would only condemn this Vienna meeting to a long and sterile existence. The time to step up the pace of performance is now.

Performance is one test of a country's seriousness in meeting its obligations. Institutionalization of performance is another. Performance can be ephemeral when the incentives which produced it fade. Prisoners can be rearrested. Emigration rates can be driven down as well as up. Jamming can be re-imposed just as fast as it can be lifted. Mechanisms to institutionalize performance would therefore increase trust. An illustrative list, by no means exhaustive, could include the following:

-- Declaration of amnesty for all political prisoners, as called for by Academician Sakharov and many others. It has been done without danger in other countries of Eastern Europe and would eliminate an entire class of Helsinki violations in a single sweep.

-- Abolition of the articles of the Criminal Code which are used for political arrests and trials, and assurance that other articles - such as drug possession - will not be substituted. The infamous Articles 70 and 190 have not been used in Moscow, Leningrad, or Kiev since late November. Why not abolish them altogether?

- -- High-level assurances that emigration will not be restricted to the former refuseniks and first-degree relatives who today appear to be the only beneficiaries of the rising rate. Emigration for all should be permitted to rise to and to remain at, significant levels.
- -- A secrecy rule for emigration which, if it must exist at all, should be reasonable and fair. Mr. Gorbachev told his U.S. Congressional visitors two weeks ago that he stood by his statement in Paris in 1985 that a five-to-ten year waiting period was sufficient, though he left a loophole for "exceptional cases."
- -- A commitment to resolve all, not just some, divided family cases. As noted, the Soviet Union has recently taken steps to reunite some divided families, but new refusals continue, so that the number of unresolved cases at any moment remains high. The best solution is to resolve issues on the spot so that families are not separated in the first place.
- -- Abolition of the psychiatric hospitals run by the Ministry of the Interior or at least their transfer to competent medical authorities. Even the criminally insane have a right not to be treated with drugs that are obsolete or dangerous. The fact that such drugs are used on perfectly sane political dissenters makes the existence of such hospitals an outrage.
- -- A high-level declaration or decree that "glasnost" extends to openness of communication, including each citizen's unhindered access to information from foreign media. An end to radio jamming and to the exclusion of the foreign press would be the logical accompaniment.
- -- Freedom of travel for medical reasons. A patient's right to seek medical treatment and second opinions wherever he chooses is well-established in the West. In fact, while serving in the American Embassy in Moscow, I helped to administer a program by which visiting American patients could avail themselves of the first-rate eye surgery available in Moscow.
- -- Legislation to ensure that, if religious activity

> must come under government regulation, at least all believers must be given the broadest scope for free observance and perpetuation of their faiths.

The perspective here presented remains an unclear one. The Gorbachev leadership has undoubtedly made the Soviet Union a different and more hospitable place than it was two years ago. Yet there is an understandable tendency to exaggerate progress. Promises are not performance; objectives are not achievements. "Glasnost" and "perestroika" represent an encouraging process; but they do not - at least not yet - describe considerable accomplishments. The Soviet Union, like T. S. Eliot's Tiresias, is "throbbing between two lives." The freer and more humane life of the promise has not replaced the rigid and repressive life of the Soviet past and present.

To quote Eliot again:

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the shadow.

If the Soviet government can dispell that shadow, it will earn the admiration of all who live by the commitments of Helsinki. But it has yet to do so. The shadow remains.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting

Implication of the Czech Decision to Uphold Jazz Section

Plenary Meeting

May 15, 1987
Vienna, Austria

Mr. Chairman:

My delegation wholly associates itself with the remarks of the Belgian delegation regarding the Jazz Section. Once again, a highly regrettable outside event reminds us of the seriousness of our work. We are disappointed that the Czechoslovak court chose to uphold the sentences imposed on the Jazz Section leadership. By doing so, the Czechoslovak government missed an opportunity both to correct a clear injustice to the defendants and to reverse a direct contravention of the Final Act.

In condemning the original sentences, my government stated that the trial of the Jazz Section was obviously orchestrated to limit independent cultural activities in Czechoslovakia, activities that are fully consistent with the cultural and other rights and freedoms of the Final Act.

This past week, we have heard some delegations, including the delegation of Czechoslovakia, characterize cultural proposals as "easy", and label other proposals regarding human rights and human contacts "difficult". They argued that cultural proposals provide more points of convergence. I would reply that human rights and human contacts issues are not at all difficult for the vast majority of countries here. After the decision upheld by the Czechoslovak court, how can it now be asserted that the cultural field affords readily found common ground? Clearly, there is little commonality of views between our delegation and the Czechoslovak government and other like-minded governments on the essential principle of cultural freedom, a principle from which all serious cultural initiatives must flow.

We are beginning in earnest the meticulous work of drafting. No one can say that our important work will be easy, but then, nothing worthwhile ever is. A number of the proposals in the fields of human rights, information and culture are directly relevant to the repressive treatment accorded the Jazz Section and its efforts on behalf of cultural freedom.

Mr. Chairman, the Jazz Section's fate is a sobering reminder that as we shape or strike words on paper and search for the essential ingredients of a substantive and balanced Vienna document, we must not forget events and problems occurring in the world around us. Any final document must address first and foremost these problems and concerns.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
To The Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting

Plenary Meeting

May 26, 1987
Vienna, Austria

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INFORMATION FIELD

This morning, I would like to discuss some positive and negative developments in the field of information which have a bearing on a number of proposals under consideration at this meeting.

Over the past weekend, the Soviet Union ceased jamming most or all of the language services of the Voice of America broadcast to the USSR and the Baltic states. There were periods - from July 1963 to August 1968, and again from September 1973 to August 1980 - when the Soviet Union ceased jamming the Voice of America. Last December, I therefore asked why the new Soviet leadership could not take such a step again in the spirit of its newly-proclaimed self-confidence and openness. The reduction of jamming which we have just noted is a welcome step by the Soviet Union toward compliance with the Helsinki provisions on freer dissemination of information of all kinds, including information broadcast by radio.

But the effect of this step forward by the Soviet Union is damaged by a step backward. Evidently, the jamming stations once trained on the Voice of America have been redirected against Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and possibly other Western radios. In any case, other radios - including Deutsche Welle, Radio Israel and most of the BBC's services to the Soviet Union - remain jammed.

I cannot confirm what our Czech colleague has just said about Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. It is necessary to make sure that there are results. Predictions cannot stand alone. As of now, Radio Liberty is jammed in the Soviet Union.

Helsinki Final Act implementation should not be regarded by signatory governments as something that is to be switched on and off or redirected at will for political reasons. Like repressive legislation, jamming transmitters, even when not in use, stand ominously in place. Jammers which have been turned off, can be turned back on, as happened against the Voice of America in 1968 and 1980.

The commitments we all have made in the information area and in other fields are politically binding and clear in intent. Jamming must cease across all frequencies. And institutional changes must be made to ensure that jamming does not begin again. Only then can the Soviet Union - as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia which also continue to jam - be said to have met their obligations under the Final Act and other international instruments. As with cutbacks in emigration, as with political arrests, and as with other delinquencies involving Helsinki commitments, in the information field as well it is necessary to set in place mechanisms which safeguard compliance from arbitrary political motives.

We have noted - and we welcome - a Soviet step toward greater openness in the information field. Americans have always been free to tune in to Radio Moscow. Now, for the first time in seven years, Soviet citizens are able, in their own languages, to listen to news and official views from the United States. We hope this step will lead to bolder efforts to promote openness.

Mr. Chairman, recent developments of a disturbing nature in the field of information have occurred in the German Democratic Republic and in Romania.

I fully associate myself with the critical remarks of Ambassador O'Keeffe during last Friday's plenary concerning GDR attempts to intimidate Western journalists, including a member of the Associated Press.

And, in Romania, eight journalists assigned to report on the Gorbachev state visit were detained upon arrival at Bucharest Airport. Seven ultimately were refused entry and sent out of the country. Romanian officials informed the correspondents, most of whom had travelled to Romania before, that they were unwelcome because of the nature of their past reporting. Two of the eight correspondents represent American publications, the Washington Post and Time magazine. The others represent media from five other CSCE participating States: Switzerland, Austria, Spain, Norway and the United Kingdom.

The issue here is not the prerogative of a country to issue or deny entry visas to journalists or to anyone else. In fact, several of the detained correspondents are citizens of countries from which Romania does not require travellers to obtain visas. The point is that journalists were impeded in the legitimate pursuit of their professional duties due to the content of their stories. The Romanian delegation here has said much at this meeting about journalistic responsibility. It is the responsibility of a journalist to report accurately, not to report what Romania wants to hear.

Under the Final Act, Romania itself has accepted responsiblities regarding treatment of journalists to the effect that - now I quote from the Final Act - "the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will neither render journalists liable to expulsion nor otherwise penalize them." We cannot accept the proposition, as was expressed by the Romanian representative in the H Drafting Group yesterday, that his government has the right to determine whether an individual journalist is giving an accurate picture of his country or not. That is not openness; it is closed-ness.

As we contemplate technological leaps into satellite communications, we cannot afford to forget that there is much groundwork to be done to implement existing and basic information commitments. The developments I have mentioned today serve to underscore the need for Western proposal WT. 56 and related provisions of Neutral proposal WT. 44A, both of which seek to improve working conditions for journalists and to remove remaining obstacles to the reception of radio broadcasts.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Meeting

June 5, 1987
Vienna, Austria

Today is a particularly appropriate day to talk about cooperation in Europe. This day, June 5, marks the 40th anniversary of a speech by Secretary of State George C. Marshall at Harvard College's commencement ceremonies in 1947. That summer Europe lay in ruins after World War II, and economic and political insecurity dominated the European landscape.

General Marshall was a leader among a generation of American public servants who recognized that our own political, economic, and ultimately military security rested in joint action with the states of Europe. He realized that the United States could be neither safe nor prosperous without a stable and prosperous Europe. He also recognized that the United States in and of itself could not recreate such a stable and prosperous Europe out of the wreckage left by the war -- but we could help Europe help itself.

With the aid of statesmen such as Dean Acheson, Charles Bohlen, and George Kennan, General Marshall -- together with President Truman -- worked with the American Congress to implement a plan to assist the European recovery. The scheme was simple but ambitious. The United States invited all the states of Europe to meet and decide what they needed to rebuild their societies and economies. The United States would undertake to supply as much of the material assistance as it could in order to finance the plan.

The Marshall plan was pan-European in its conception. One of the chief architects, George Kennan, recalls in his memoirs: "I thought the Europeans could get together on a satisfactory program; if they couldn't, there was nothing we could do for them anyway. As for the Russians: we would simply play it straight. If they responded favorably, we would test their good faith by insisting that they contribute constructively to the program as well as profiting from it. If they were unwilling to do this, we would simply let them exclude themselves. But we would not ourselves draw a line of division through Europe."

The rest of the story is well known. Representatives of all the states of Europe gathered to discuss the American offer. Most of the governments represented accepted the proposal, and worked out financial and economic projects which would put their economies on the road to recovery. However, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov led the Soviet Union and several other states out of the conference and rejected the offer. One of those states, Czechoslovakia, initially accepted the offer, but later withdrew from participation.

The plan worked well. The economies of those states which took part stabilized and improved rapidly. Within a short time much of Europe enjoyed a stability and well-being which seemed only an unrealistic dream in early 1947.

I do not mark this anniversary simply to praise General Marshall. Instead, I want to point out the meaning of the Marshall Plan for cooperation in Europe. We did this together. Europe would not have recovered as quickly without the help of the United States. But the United States would also not have enjoyed the peace, stability, and prosperity it did after the war without the partnership of a healthy Europe.

As we look to the future in our work here, we can be guided by the memory of 1947. We can have the vision and boldness to recognize where cooperation is necessary and possible. We can seek areas where our mutual efforts can really make a difference. And we can recognize, as George C. Marshall's generation recognized, that the individual security of each of us is tied inextricably to the stability, well-being and prosperity of us all.

Today I would also like to turn to a subject which my delegation has discussed at some length at this meeting -- political prisoners, prisoners of conscience. Representatives of the Soviet Union have several times at this meeting raised the cases of several alleged political prisoners in the United States. One individual who has received particular attention is Leonard Peltier, an American Indian currently serving a sentence at Leavenworth Penitentiary for murder. The Soviet delegation here has referred to Mr. Peltier a number of times. They have asserted that Peltier has been jailed for his political beliefs, and that he has been deprived of his rights and mistreated in prison. The Soviet Union has also made a number of demarches on Peltier's behalf in both Washington and Moscow.

In light of the interest and publicity the Soviet Union has given this case, I would like to offer some background information . Leonard Peltier belonged to an organization, the

American Indian Movement (AIM), dedicated to protecting the rights of American Indians. His particular branch advocated secession of Indian lands from the state of South Dakota. On June 26, 1975, at the Oglala Sioux Indian Reservation at Pine Ridge, South Dakota, two FBI agents, Jack R. Coler and Ronald A. Williams were shot and killed as they approached an enclave of houses known to be inhabited by supporters of AIM. Coler and Williams had intended to serve warrants on four men suspected of holding visitors on the reservation against their will.

As a result of the shooting, on November 25, 1975, a federal grand jury in Rapid City, South Dakota, indicted four members of the American Indian Movement, including Leonard Peltier, on charges of premeditated murder. Peltier was arrested in February, 1976, in Alberta by Canadian authorities, who denied his appeals against extradition and his application for asylum in Canada, which were based on political grounds. The Canadian Justice Minister, who reviewed the case, stated that he believed that extradition was justified because the charges were not politically motivated.

Peltier was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a life term for each of the two murders. In June, 1979, he escaped from the Federal Correctional Institute in Lompoc, California. He was recaptured and sentenced anew for escape. He is currently in prison serving these terms.

Seven years after he went to jail, in late 1983, Peltier went on a hunger strike, claiming that he was being deprived of his religious freedom. At that time, violent outbreaks in the prison, during which two corrections guards were fatally stabbed, had necessitated restrictions on group activities in the prison. Prisoners at Peltier's facility were nevertheless allowed access twice a week to the spiritual advisor of their choice: Christian chaplains, a rabbi, a Muslim Imam, and a American Indian medicine man were all available. However, some of Peltier's demands could not be satisfied in a maximum security prison: for example, to have communal religious observances, and to keep a medicine bag which could not be searched and a tomahawk. When taken to the prison hospital, Peltier ended his hunger strike.

Recently, a TASS reporter requested permission to interview Peltier in prison; permission was granted and the interview took place. Later, on April 28 of this year, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was visited by four Soviet ophthalmologists, who said they had information that Peltier is going blind, and is being denied adequate medical care. They offered to send a team of Soviet ophthalmologists to the United

States to assist in his treatment. Soviet opthamologists also approached the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, Jim Wright, during the visit of the Congressional delegation which he led to Moscow April 14-18 of this year. Mr. Wright asked Steny Hoyer, Chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe and Vice Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to this meeting, to look into the matter of Mr. Peltier.

My delegation inquired of our own authorities and learned that Leonard Peltier began to suffer from blurred vision in November, 1986. Prison officials took him to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, for examination. He was given a attery of tests including a CAT scan, and was checked by a consulting ophthalmologist as well as the prison opthalmologist. Both physicians agreed on a diagnosis, which was later confirmed by another physician, the former chief of ophthalmology at the University of Kansas.

Mr. Peltier's right to privacy under the U.S. privacy act prevents me from releasing details of his medical condition without his consent. I can say that the doctors apparently found him to have a serious, irreversible condition which has caused almost complete loss of sight. He is receiving non-addictive, preventive medicines aimed at preventing further deterioration of his condition. There is no known cure for this ailment, nor any other treatment.

We think that we have done everything reasonably and humanly possible for Leonard Peltier. We are surprised at the Soviet Union's continuing interest in Peltier, given the nature of the crimes for which he is in prison. However, in the spirit of our own proposal on persons in confinement, WT-39, we are willing to bend over backwards to ensure that any individual, no matter what he has done and what his punishment, receives just and humane treatment.

We know that Soviet medicine has made great strides in treating certain diseases and conditions of the eye. For example, the Soviet physician Svyatoslav Fedorov is famed around the globe including in my own country for the procedures he has developed for restoring and protecting peoples' sight. While we think that we have done all that is possible with current scientifi knowledge to treat Peltier, we cannot exclude that medical expertise and insight such as Dr. Fedorov possesses might be able to help.

We have always believed that medical knowledge and advances should be shared, that sick people have a right to a second opinion. We have stated many times our conviction that travel should be facilitated for people with urgent medical needs. That is an important provision of our proposal WT-24.

Of course people convicted of real crimes must be in a separate category. Leonard Peltier has been convicted of serious crimes, and we do not propose to release him from prison. However, I can announce today that, as a result of efforts by Congressmen Wright and Hoyer and this delegation, the U.S. government is willing to have a Soviet doctor or doctors visit Peltier in a prison medical facility and examine him, should he desire and consent to this. Our presumption and hope is that the Soviet Union will send a physician or physicians with appropriate expertise who will offer whatever medical advice is warranted after the examination is completed.

We have nothing to hide, and we are doing -- and will continue to do -- our best for Leonard Peltier. Still, we will be glad if Soviet medical experts can help him. Perhaps this might provide an impetus toward improving the conditions of many other persons in confinement in a number of the states represented here, not just my own.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Meeting

June 12, 1987
Vienna, Austria

The United States Delegation has stressed many times that the work of this Vienna meeting cannot be insulated from the outside world. Proposals made at this meeting must be evaluated with an eye to whether they deal effectively with actual and important problems in the real world. Assertions here must be tested against actions elsewhere, particularly actions by those who do the asserting. Progress claimed must be measured by performance achieved.

If this necessary connection between words and deeds is not maintained, then our work in Vienna risks becoming trivial, irrelevant, and useless. That is why it is valuable from time to time to pause and ask ourselves how well what we are hearing at this meeting corresponds to what is happening in reality. I propose today to take a partial inventory of certain events that have happened in the past week alone. These events are not encouraging. They cast a cold light on much of what we have heard in this plenary, in the drafting groups, and in press conferences from the Vienna Conference Center.

First, Eastern delegations, including that of the German Democratic Republic, have introduced and extolled many proposals at the Vienna meeting involving cooperation in information and culture, and increased contacts among youth. Yet the picture seen this past weekend in East Berlin is entirely different from the impression conveyed by these Eastern proposals. East German youths were discouraged by the Wall--an inhibition to contacts if there ever was one--and by a massive police presence from enjoying rock concerts held on the Western side of the same city. Journalists seeking to cover the events were intimidated and physically abused by police. And, distorted and tendentious accounts of the events have been issued by the official press agency in attempts to justify what occurred. It would be difficult to find a more graphic case in which reality stands in stark and disappointing contrast to the promises and proposals we have heard here.

Second, earlier in our meeting I noted the creation of the first new Helsinki Monitoring Group in the Soviet Union since 1977. It is called "Helsinki 86" and is composed of Latvian human rights activists dedicated to applying the principles of the Helsinki Final Act to their native Latvia. On the evening of June 8--this Monday--the leader of Helsinki 86, Linards Grantins, was arrested outside his apartment in Liepaja, Latvia. We do not know if he has been charged or his current situation. We do know that June 14--this Sunday--a peaceful demonstration is planned at the Latvian Monument of Freedom in Riga to commemorate the anniversary of the mass deportations of Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian men, women and children by Soviet authorities in 1941.

Western proposals at this meeting--such as WT-38 on the contribution of individuals and groups to the Helsinki process--deal with such problems as are graphically illustrated by the arrest of Linards Grantins. Yet in the unprecedented volume of Eastern proposals we look in vain for similar attention to such real-world problems. In fact, it is difficult to resist the impression that this vast bulk of Eastern proposals is designed, at least in part, to obscure the existence of such problems and to divert the attention of our Vienna meeting from them.

Third, fellow delegates will remember the case of Rimma Bravve, the young Soviet woman with advanced ovarian cancer who, after several years of effort, was finally permitted to emigrate to join her mother and sister in the United States. Rimma's sister-in-law Sophia is also a cancer patient in Moscow; she suffers from thyroid cancer. On June 8, this Monday, Sophia was told that she and her two-year-old daughter could join Rimma in the United States but that her parents could not accompany her. The reason given was that her father had had access to secrets, despite the fact that he retired from his work as a civil engineer in the construction industry nine years ago. Sophia now cannot emigrate because her health is too poor to care for her child alone, and Rimma and her husband are totally occupied with Rimma's advancing cancer.

The story of this family's treatment by Soviet authorities would be absurd if it were not tragic. Last fall the Soviet delegation in this plenary meeting and before the press announced--a month too early, it turned out--the decision to let Rimma emigrate. I therefore have no hesitation in bringing to the attention of our meeting this latest chapter in the history of bureaucratic harassment of this unfortunate family. There are numerous Western and Neutral/Non-Aligned proposals calling for significant improvement in the reunification of families. Evidence of their urgency could hardly be more clearly portrayed than in the nightmare experience of the Bravves.

And fourth, last night I received a telephone call from Naum Meiman, the 76-year old widower of Inna Meiman, who died of cancer in the United States in February. As many will remember, Naum Meiman is a respected, retired professor of mathematics who has heart disease and a pre-leukemic problem in his bone marrow. Naum called to tell me that he had just been informed by a Soviet doctor that he needs an urgent operation on his prostate--a procedure that will require more than a month in the hospital. In the Soviet Union, as in many other countries, family members normally provide much of the care for patients in hospitals. Naum has no family in the Soviet Union. His only child is a daughter living in the United States. For over a decade he has been prevented from emigrating to join her, a flagrant violation of the family reunification provision of the Helsinki and Madrid documents. Now, with a difficult operation impending, Naum told me last night that he felt alone and in despair.

The official reason why Naum Meiman cannot emigrate to join his daughter in America is that the Soviet authorities claim that he did important classified work 32 years ago. In an appeal to this conference dated May 18 of this year, Naum described this situation as follows:

> "Refusing anyone permission to emigrate on the pretext of "secrecy" is a most effective method of blocking emigration, since the Soviet Union has no due process of law for complaining or appealing against refusals. It is not even known who, at what level, or on what basis a sentence is handed down dooming a person to the fate of a refusenik for many years. Refusals are issued only orally, without any time limit indicated. The whole situation is typical of a mysterious secret court and is by no means compatible with the broadly proclaimed spirit of glasnost....
>
> "More than 32 years ago, at the dawn of the atomic age, I did certain classified calculations for long-dead Academician Landau in the Institute of Physical Problems of the Academy of Sciences. These calculations were of a very auxiliary nature, and have long ago lost all sensitivity and significance. I transferred to work in another institute in 1955, and as officially certified, never had any further contact with sensitive work."

In his appeal to the Vienna meeting Naum quotes a letter from Andrei Sakharov to the Federation of American Scientists on August 19, 1977. It reads in part:

> "All calculations in which Meiman and Goldfand took part were of a conventional character. Divulgence of the information they had access to would never be of substantial importance. It is now more than twenty years since they participated in secret work. Goldfand and Meiman, without a doubt, possess no information which might be classified as secret."

Naum also cites a certification in the fall of 1976 by Academician Aleksandrov, then President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, that at that time, more than ten years ago, he possessed no classified information.

Naum Meiman's travail exactly encompasses the period in which the Helsinki Final Act has been in effect. His case illustrates why it is vital to honor the humanitarian commitments of Helsinki and the strengthened commitments of Madrid. It shows why the proposals on family reunification before this meeting are so important. If WT-9, introduced by Austria and Switzerland, were followed, Naum's case would be on the road to resolution. The same would be true if Western proposals WT-22, WT-23, and WT-24 were in force and observed. Naum Meiman's case also underlines the importance the United States attaches to the institutionalization of progress in human rights. If improvements in human rights give rise to new loopholes, such as "secrecy" as a ban to emigration, then new violations are simply replacing old ones.

We have heard much praise of "glasnost" at this Vienna meeting, some of it from Western delegations including my own. We will continue to welcome the positive products of "glasnost." But in the Soviet Union there are contradictory realities which deserve to be set against the steps toward a more humane approach. One can imagine what Linards Grantins, the Bravve family, and Naum Meiman must think of "glasnost" in light of their own experience. And these examples are drawn from just a week's worth of events; they are not unique. Let us remember that openness must have a comprehensive and continuing effect on the individual citizens of our countries if it is to be genuine.

Also this week, the leaders of seven major industrial nations, including the President of the United States, met in Venice. They had a full agenda embracing subjects from the economic state of the world to terrorism to AIDS. Nevertheless, they gave extraordinary emphasis, in a final statement, to human rights. They said that significant and lasting progress in human rights is essential to building trust between our societies. And they stated: "Much still remains to be done to meet the principles agreed and commitments undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act and confirmed since." The week's events which I have just described--together with the events of other weeks--underline the truth and the importance of that statement.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

NATO Ministerial Statement at Reykjavik

Plenary Meeting

June 19, 1987
Vienna, Austria

Today I would like to comment briefly on United States' views concerning the NATO Foreign Ministers' Statement at Reykjavik.

The principal section of the Reykjavik Statement dealing with CSCE is paragraph 9. No doubt everyone present here has taken note of that paragraph, but I should like to draw special attention to it. This is an authoritative statement of Allied Foreign Ministers which reads, in part, as follows:

> "In our endeavor to explore all opportunities for an increasingly broad and constructive dialogue which addresses the concerns of people in both East and West, and in the firm conviction that a stable order of peace and security in Europe cannot be built by military means alone, we attach particular importance to the CSCE process. We are therefore determined to make full use of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Vienna.
>
> The full implementation of all provisions agreed in the CSCE process by the 35 participating states, in particular in the field of human rights and contacts, remains the fundamental objective of the Alliance and is essential for the fruitful development of East-West relations in all fields..."

The NATO Ministers have thus recognized again that observance of human rights commitments is essential to a stable order of peace and security. That is why the United States has consistently, within the framework of CSCE, stressed the necessity of balance between human rights and military security. And that is why we have emphasized that negotiation of a conventional stability mandate cannot be achieved without close attention to the observance by each participant of human rights obligations.

The last 8 communiques of NATO Foreign Ministers have explicitly reflected the commitment of the Alliance to pursuit of a realistic and constructive East-West dialogue. CSCE, the Allies recognize, is in the mainstream of that steadily intensifying dialogue. And within CSCE, significant improvements in the field of human rights and human contacts will continue to be essential to fullest realization of East-West relations.

With respect to the other section of the Reykjavik Statement relating inter alia to military security questions within the framework of the CSCE process, my delegation fully supports the statement of our Italian colleague Ambassador Traxler, in the plenary meeting of June 16. The Reykjavik Statement provides a solid, agreed foundation for action -- as Ambassador Renard of France has properly emphasized.

I note that the Reykjavik Statement has been widely welcomed across Europe as a positive step toward progress on particularly challenging European questions. In this regard, I also take note of the remarks of June 16 by the representative of Czechoslovakia, Ambassador Kadnar, who welcomed what he called "positive aspects" of the Ministerial Statement, including the Allied commitment to dialogue.

As noted in the Reykjavik Statement, NATO's High Level Task Force on conventional arms control is pressing ahead with its work on the two draft mandates to be tabled here in Vienna. This means that in the near future we will come forward at this meeting with a formal proposal concerned with building upon and expanding the Stockholm confidence and security building measures.

On this occasion I would also like to respond to allegations by Ambassador Kadnar that somehow the United States has not properly complied with CSBMs commitments accepted by all of us at Stockholm. Contrary to those allegations, the decision of U.S. authorities to change exercise plans originally set forth in our annual calendar has been carried out entirely within the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm Document. As the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Eickhoff, pointed out in this body on June 16, the Stockholm Document made ample provision for just the kind of changes effected in U.S. planning. Within the "S" Group, the United States Delegation has already explained in some detail the rationale for other recent U.S. actions relating to initial experience with implementation of the Stockholm CSBMs, which have been questioned by Ambassador Kadnar. Our delegation will be returning to these questions in the "S" Group, where they mainly belong and where they can be properly and comprehensively examined.

Before closing, I would like to emphasize the American view that, in the wake of the Reykjavik Statement, we are now on the threshold of pivotally important and promising aspects of our work. With the prospect ahead for a further deepening of the CSCE process with respect to military security questions, it becomes all the more important to redouble our collective efforts to achieve a commensurate deepening of the other dimensions of CSCE activity -- in particular with respect to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Ultimate success in Vienna will require progress across the full scope of our agenda.

As we move more intensively into the drafting stage of our work, the United States Delegation will continue to do its part to contribute to a timely and substantive result. We reject any allegations that we or any of our partners are pursuing delaying tactics. There must be no delays -- only determined, careful, and constructive work. We must not miss the rare opportunity before us to deepen East-West relationships -- a goal to which we have pledged our best efforts in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document and to which the NATO Foreign Ministers have just committed themselves anew.

REMARKS BY
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN C. WHITEHEAD
AT THE
JUNE 23, 1987 CSCE PLENARY MEETING
VIENNA, AUSTRIA

I have come to Vienna to represent the United States at an important international conference dedicated to fighting drug abuse - a scourge which affects people in all the countries represented in the CSCE process, as well as the international community as a whole.

I am glad, in addition, to be able to bring this Vienna CSCE Follow-up meeting warm greetings from President Reagan and Secretary Shultz. They believe strongly in the ideals of the Helsinki process, as Secretary Shultz emphasized to the delegates at the opening session in November. This morning I would like to present the views of the United States Government on CSCE in general and on the course of this Vienna meeting.

From the very beginning the United States Government has given its full support to the Helsinki process, and we continue to support it fully. In our view, CSCE fulfills four important objectives:

-- First, CSCE provides both a forum and a process for examination of the major issues between East and West.

-- Second, CSCE focuses squarely on the individual citizen of the 35 participating states. This human element is never lacking in CSCE, whether the issue be freedom of movement, expression, or conscience; the rights of prisoners; the right to self-determination; the role of citizens in public life; business and scientific contacts; access to information; or security from the threat of war.

-- Third, CSCE embodies a security process that involves all 35 of us. While each specific negotiation requires appropriate parameters and ground rules, all of us are joined in a common security objective: to reduce the possibility of war which has ravaged the continent of Europe twice in this century.

-- And fourth, CSCE treats every participating state -- no matter how large, no matter where located -- as sovereign and equal. Every state can be a full and individual contributor to the objectives of the Helsinki Final Act.

The words behind CSCE -- Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- reflect what the process involving our 35 separate states represents. They reflect what the United States sees as most valuable in that process. Let me illustrate what I mean by taking three words from that title: Conference, Security, and Cooperation.

The word "Conference" embodies the many-sided nature of the CSCE endeavor:

-- First, Conference implies the texts of the common commitments of CSCE, of which the most important are the Helsinki and Madrid documents. These documents set forth the standards by which we 35 are willing to be judged. They are high standards, and the Vienna Final Document should aspire to no less. It should be balanced, it should be compact, and it should be full of content.

-- Second, the word "Conference" implies meetings of many kinds. Meetings are essential for reviewing the past and present and for setting a course for the future. Between Vienna and the next follow-up meeting this tradition should be continued, provided that the meetings are limited to themes most in need of attention and that their number is relatively small. In my country our giant redwoods and sequoias grow tallest when they have strong trunks but few branches.

-- Third, and most important, the word Conference implies more than just documents and meetings. It implies an ongoing process, in which responsibilities and obligations do not end when the ink on a document is dry or when a meeting is gavelled to a close. The United States puts its prime emphasis on compliance with commitments freely and voluntarily undertaken. If these commitments are not fully and consistently honored, then the whole CSCE process loses credibility, validity, and force.

Many CSCE participants have recognized this essential fact and have put forward proposals containing compliance mechanisms that would operate between Vienna and the next follow-up meeting. Of particular importance is the Western proposal for a Conference on the Human Dimension.

The word "Security" also has important meaning for CSCE and for the Vienna meeting. In the sense of military security, recent advances have been made in the CSCE process but much remains to be done. There is ample room for building upon and expanding the confidence- and security-building measures agreed at Stockholm. Moreover, it is envisaged that the work of the Stockholm Conference will in future stages continue to promote security and cooperation in Europe. Two weeks ago, NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Reykjavik called for conventional stability negotiations among the 23 countries who are members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and whose forces are thus directly concerned. These negotiations would address the enormous conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact in Europe. They would be autonomous and distinct, addressing only the forces of the two alliances. There would be opportunities for the twelve CSCE neutral and non-aligned countries to be informed and to be heard.

Security is more than just a question of the military balance. This is particularly true of CSCE, in which human rights and fundamental freedoms are recognized as an important element of security. Americans believe that peace must be secured as a birthright for our children and all others. That belief is at the heart of President Reagan's untiring efforts to achieve a more secure world through agreements with the Soviet Union on strategic arms, on intermediate-range nuclear forces, and on conventional and chemical weapons.

The humane conduct of a state toward its people is also a necessary component of security. A state which fails to earn the trust of its own citizens can hardly hope to win the trust of those beyond its borders. A powerful state which threatens people within its borders can only be seen as a threat to the world at large. At stake, therefore, in the commendable efforts by the Soviet leadership at "openness" and "restructuring" are both the human rights of the Soviet people and the trust of people everywhere.

In the spirit of openness, let me say a few words about how the United States Government views current developments in the Soviet Union. We welcome the steps forward which have been taken. But we must note that -- even by the standard which the Soviet Union set for itself in signing the Helsinki Final Act -- much remains to be done. We look for significant improvement in the Soviet Union's honoring of human rights commitments. We also look for credible guarantees that the abuses of the past will not be repeated. Reform must be institutionalized if it is to endure.

Thus, we applaud the freeing of 150 political prisoners. But we remain concerned for the 550 whom we know to be still incarcerated for expressing their political views, as well as for the hundreds more whose names we do not know. Restrictions on religious activity, the banning of the Ukrainian Catholic

Church, and the imprisonment of religious believers have also not ceased. The abhorrent use of special psychiatric prisons to incarcerate political prisoners continues. Prisoners of conscience -- including Helsinki Monitors -- are still suffering the particularly torturous conditions of Perm Special Regimen Camp 36. We look forward to the immediate and unconditional release of all these persons, including Ukrainian, Baltic, and other champions of national and minority rights; over 200 religious prisoners, including Russian Orthodox Church Deacon Vladimir Rusak, numerous Baptists and Pentecostalists; and persons imprisoned for exercising their right to freedom of expression, such as Mikhail Kukobaka. And we are waiting for steps to be taken to ensure that in the future people are not imprisoned for activities which would not cost them their freedom in my country or in most of the countries represented here.

We welcome the fact that emigration rates have risen in each of the last three months. But we must ask whether the Soviet Government will guarantee emigration to all those who wish to leave, as it has committed itself to do in international instruments, or -- instead -- whether emigration will continue to be used as an object of political manipulation. Such a guarantee of free emigration would allow ethnic Russians like Serafim Yevsyukov and his family as well as many ethnic Germans, Armenians, and Jews -- including Ida Nudel -- finally to exercise this basic human right.

We are pleased that modest progress has been made in solving bilateral U.S.-USSR family reunification and binational marriage cases. But we cannot understand why all these cases, with direct links to American citizens, cannot be resolved, instead of just some of them. The long struggle of U.S. citizen Anatoly Michelson to be reunited with his wife, Galina Goltzman, from whom he has been separated for 3I years, illustrates both the frustrations of seeking "humanitarian cooperation" with Soviet authorities as well as the strength and perseverance of the individual human beings this Helsinki process was intended to serve.

And while we are pleased with the curtailment of the illegal jamming of the Voice of America and the BBC, we await a similar opening of the air waves to Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, and other stations. And we wonder when Soviet citizens will be told that they, like most citizens of CSCE states, are trusted by their government to draw their own conclusions on the basis of full access to all print and broadcast information from home and abroad.

The balance sheet is thus unsatisfactory. It is with that balance sheet in mind that the United States is examining the Soviet proposals submitted at this Vienna meeting, and in particular whether Moscow is a credible candidate for a conference on humanitarian cooperation. Any prospective host to a CSCE meeting should not only provide the same open conditions -- for delegates, for the press and for non-governmental organizations -- which previous hosts have offered, but should also have an exemplary record in the subject on which the meeting is to be held. While fulfillment of these criteria carries with it no inherent right to host a meeting, failure to fulfill them is certainly disqualifying.

Finally, the word "Cooperation" needs to be stressed, both here in Vienna and in CSCE as a whole. There is a quieter side to the CSCE process which is nevertheless of fundamental importance. I have in mind the myriad East-West contacts on a personal level that take place under a CSCE umbrella. If the barriers that still divide the European continent are ever to be eroded, then it will be because of the millions of personal links which penetrate and weaken them.

The United States Government is committed to enlarging that cooperation. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev resolved at their first meeting in November 1985 to expand greatly our bilateral exchanges. Recently the first American exhibit in the Soviet Union in eight years -- an exhibit on information -- opened in Moscow. It will be seen by 2.5 million Soviet citizens in nine cities; a reciprocal Soviet exhibit will visit six American cities. We are also interested in increasing our cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe, an area where millions of Americans trace their roots. I have visited most of the Eastern European countries, and have conveyed to their leaders the high value President Reagan places on our bilateral ties, as well as on our shared Helsinki commitments in the fields of human rights, military security, economics, and science.

To summarize, in the view of the United States, the words "Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe," applied to the context of the Vienna meeting, should mean:

-- That compliance with today's commitments, more than new words or meetings, is the key to the vitality of CSCE.

-- That the Vienna final document should promote better compliance, by focusing on the most important issues both in its text and in its follow-up provisions.

-- That urgent work is necessary in the human dimension, where compliance is weakest.

- That in the area of military security, important challenges remain which should be treated within the framework of the CSCE process.

- And that cooperation continues to be a vital element of this CSCE process.

CSCE should be seen as an evolving program of joint action. Like the Helsinki process as a whole, the Vienna Meeting has reflected East-West problems and can provide answers to them. Here in Vienna we must seek to advance the Helsinki plan for a Europe where the human rights of the citizen and the sovereign rights of the state are secured and respected. Forty years ago this month, in the Marshall Plan, America reinforced its commitment to Europe. That commitment still stands today, and it will still stand tomorrow.

Thank you.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Meeting

July 10, 1987
Vienna, Austria

The military security proposal introduced today by our Portuguese colleague, Ambassador Barros, provides a practical and constructive framework in which to build upon the Helsinki Final Act and to continue the important work conceived at Madrid and launched at Stockholm. The proposal is co-sponsored by the United States and its 15 allies; it has our full and continuing support. It is the most important Western proposal in the military security area to be introduced at a CSCE follow-up meeting since 1980.

The elements of this proposal reflect the decisions taken by the Foreign Ministers of the Atlantic Alliance in December 1986, and more recently in Reykjavik. The Brussels Declaration proposed that two distinct negotiations take place, one to continue the work begun at Stockholm on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), the other to establish conventional stability. The Reykjavik Communique further expressed our view that these two distinct negotiations "should take place within the framework of the CSCE process, with the conventional stability negotiations retaining autonomy as regards subject matter, participation and procedures."

The proposal introduced today translates these objectives into an innovative, logical, and practical framework. It provides, in our view, the best opportunity of reaching our common aim of making significant advances on security questions within the CSCE process. We have made important strides since the first confidence building measures were adopted in the Helsinki Final Act. Initial experience with the first few months of implementation of the Stockholm confidence- and security-building measures has been generally encouraging despite some difficulties. But more remains to be done if we are to lay a solid and secure foundation in this area among the 35 participating states.

The proposal calls for efforts to build upon and expand the results already achieved at Stockholm on CSBMs. There is room for improvement, in both the language of the Document and in implementation, in order to strengthen and solidify the progress we have made thus far. Moreover, the possibilities for taking our work on CSBMs further are far from exhausted.

Development of a further set of CSBMs, on the basis of the criteria set forth in the Madrid Mandate, is essential to achieve our aim of increasing cooperation and security in Europe.

Efforts aimed at building confidence and at establishing stability complement each other. Thus, in addition to our initiative on CSBMs, we intend to launch a distinct negotiation among the 23 countries of the two Alliances to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces and, as a priority, eliminate disparities prejudicial to security. We envisage this negotiation taking place within the framework of the CSCE process, but retaining autonomy as regards subject matter, participation, and procedures.

There is no question of taking disarmament out of the CSCE process, or of putting it in for that matter. Nothing has been added to or subtracted from the commitments we have undertaken within the Helsinki process. The Madrid Mandate remains intact. The question is how to give it new life.

The United States believes that the best hope for achieving greater conventional stability lies in a negotiation between those states whose forces bear most directly on the essential security relationship in Europe, namely the 23 states which--while participants in CSCE--are also members of the two Alliances. The forces of those states constitute the greater part of the military capabilities in Europe. It is those states which should make the difficult decisions on measures to be applied to their forces.

Autonomy is thus an essential requirement for the conventional stability negotiation. It means that decisions with regard to subject matter, participation, and procedures must be taken by those states which participate in the negotiation and not by states which do not. It also means that the results of the negotiation are the sole responsibility of the twenty-three. The mandate developed by the 23 states concerned, a summary of which we propose to include in our Vienna concluding document, will not be susceptible to amendment by the thirty-five.

This essential autonomy does not mean that no role is envisaged for the 12 participating states of the CSCE which are not members of alliances. The negotiations are complementary and should take place within the framework of the CSCE process. Moreover, the relationship between the negotiations--one at 23, one at 35--is an essential part of our proposal. We envisage their taking place in the same city. The key element of that relationship is the provision in our proposal which states that "the participants in the conventional stability negotiation will arrange for meetings with the other CSCE participating states periodically to exchange views and information." These exchanges will allow for the security interests of all to be fully and candidly expressed and to be taken into account.

In addition, future CSCE Follow-up Meetings will be informed of the work of the conventional stability negotiation and its possible results. This does not mean, however, that the regular CSCE follow-up meeting in any way constitutes deadlines or can create obligations for results within the negotiation on conventional stability.

Mr. Chairman, for some months now, the United States and its Allies have engaged in intensive deliberations on what course might best advance the objectives we all share. The proposal before you represents the results of these deliberations. It is a thoughtful, well-considered and unified approach. The United States believes it can point the way to a major reduction of the threat posed by conventional arms, a threat which has led twice in this century to wars which have ravaged the continent of Europe and decimated the population of most of the states represented here.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Human Dimension Proposals

Plenary Session
Vienna, Austria
July 17, 1987

In his opening remarks before our conference last November, Secretary Shultz said that "escape from the violation of existing commitments cannot be found in the flight to new commitments." New commitments, therefore, should be a credible incentive to improved implementation, not a substitute for it.

This view has been the hallmark of the approach of the United States delegation from the very beginning of the Vienna meeting. It has served as a guide throughout for our work here, especially in our consideration of proposals. It is particularly important in the human dimension, where implementation of the Helsinki and Madrid commitments is weakest. The proposals which we have sponsored and which we support are designed to strengthen existing CSCE commitments through improved performance. They contain clear and concrete measures which build upon provisions of the Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document. Their adoption, followed by their immediate implementation, would be a major contribution to the success of this meeting and indeed to the CSCE process as a whole.

This morning I plan to survey the Western proposals in the human dimension -- that is, in Principles and in Basket III -- with a view to providing interested delegations and in particular our neutral and non-aligned colleagues with an up-to-date picture of the view of the United States. While many important proposals have been introduced in Principles and Basket III, I will concentrate on those which my delegation considers to be of paramount importance. I begin with Principles.

The U.S. delegation has probably spent the greatest proportion of its time and efforts in documenting and seeking redress for cases in which the rights of individuals and families to freedom of movement have been abridged. As "Pravda" might say, eto ne sluchayno -- this is not accidental. There are few greater sources of needless human suffering than the arbitrary denial of the right of the individual to move freely within his own country, to depart freely from any country, and to return to his own. Restrictions on this right deprive people of the ability to choose the place where they will live and work, to maintain contact with friends, and to live with or visit their families and loved ones. Our implementation debate documented hundreds of such individual human tragedies. There are thousands more whose stories we could have told.

The real tragedy with respect to freedom of movement in some participating states is that it takes almost no effort to respect this right. Little or no governmental action is required to allow individuals to travel freely. It does take efforts to construct a state's administrative or bureaucratic apparatus which restricts the travel of its citizens. In the countries where these efforts are still going on, they should be abandoned.

The U.S. delegation is thus proud to sponsor a proposal, WT-22, which provides a comprehensive commitment to freedom of movement and concrete steps to permit individuals freer enjoyment of this right. The proposal goes well beyond previous CSCE language in spelling out specifically how the participating states, through action or more often inaction, can ensure that their citizens are able to take advantage of all the benefits inherent in freedom to travel. It is of overriding importance that any Vienna Concluding Document clearly, unequivocally, and comprehensively reiterate the commitment of the participating states in the Final Act to freedom of movement. We have language before us; it must be reflected in our concluding document.

In the area of Principles, other basic, related questions which are vitally important to my delegation are the ability of the individual to know and act upon his rights, and the role of independent individuals and groups, particularly as this role relates to the CSCE process. We devoted considerable attention to the plight of Helsinki Monitors in a number of participating states, many of whom have received long jail terms for such crimes as anti-state activity. The only offense of which these individuals are really guilty is that they took seriously the pledges which their governments made in 1975 at Helsinki.

Twelve years after Helsinki many individuals and groups in some participating states are still prevented from engaging in activities which would inform their fellow-countrymen about their rights and freedoms or would redress violations and abridgments of those rights. The vast majority of these activities are not aimed at disrupting or destroying the existing social, economic or political systems, as some allege, but in making these systems better, fairer, and more humane.

There is a key western proposal before this meeting, WT-38, of which my country is a sponsor, which would defend and enhance the role of independent individuals and groups and the ability of individuals to know and act upon their rights. As with freedom of movement, this proposal envisions minimal action from governments. Instead, it calls on governments to refrain from actions which inhibit, harass or suppress independent activity. My delegation attaches the utmost value to the role of independent individuals and groups, and we expect to see language relecting the importance of their role, particularly the role of Helsinki Monitors, in our Vienna Document.

A third issue which has consistently been of great concern to the U.S. government is the question of political prisoners. We have spoken repeatedly here at Vienna in defense of those who have been confined or exiled, whether in prisons, labor camps, or psychiatric hospitals, merely for attempting to exercise their basic human rights, for example in the expression of unpopular or critical opinions. The transformation of freedom of thought and expression into a criminal offense is one of the most egregious violations of basic human rights in the world today. Unfortunately, it is still common practice in some of the participating states here.

Proposal WT-39 deals with these key concerns. Beginning from the standpoint of the inherent dignity of the individual, this initiative calls for an end to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and exile. It mandates an end to the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes. Finally, it offers concrete, effective remedies to correct such abuses where they exist and to prevent them in the future. It, too, is at the top of our list of priorities.

Freedom of conscience or religion is another of those fundamental rights which is central to modern civilization, and is prominently enshrined in all CSCE documents. Yet this freedom is even now severely abridged or denied in several participating states. Western and neutral delegations submitted several proposals dedicated to the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief. Recently western delegations, including my own, submitted a non-paper combining the best features of all these proposals, features which we hope to see reflected in our concluding document.

Discrimination or persecution of members of national minorities is also a serious problem in several participating states. My delegation was glad to join in sponsoring WT-27, on protection of the rights of members of national minorities, since we represent a country made up of representatives of literally hundreds of different nationalities. This proposal has already found broad support from various groups represented at this meeting, and we would hope the Vienna Concluding Document will include a renewed commitment on this score.

I turn now to Basket III. Mr. Chairman, this basket also contains essential proposals in the area of freedom of movement. Among them is WT-23, which enjoys widespread support. It contains provisions designed to streamline application procedures for those desiring to travel abroad for purposes outlined in Basket III. WT-23 provides for approval of such applications within one month. It also calls for the review of all outstanding applications and the establishment of a mechanism to avoid backlogs in the future. We have also incorporated important elements of a neutral proposal, WT-9, into a non-paper which the U.S. delegation introduced on June 22. This non-paper calls upon all participating states to decide favorably within two months of the conclusion of the Vienna Meeting on all pending applications for travel abroad for the purpose of family reunification and for other purposes related to the aims of the Final Act. We are all too familiar with those who have been caught up in the arduous application process. Some have realized their dream of reunification only after many years. Some have died while clinging to this dream. Others have given up all hope of ever seeing their loved ones again. There is no need to continue this senseless human suffering.

Another key provision of WT-23 calls upon authorities to provide a clear written explanation of any denials. Such a measure would ensure that applicants have some recourse against arbitrary decisions. It must be ensured that all applications are handled in a responsible and timely manner.

A second essential proposal in Basket III is the processing of applications in cases of an urgent humanitarian nature. The element of time is a particularly critical factor in such cases. Included in this category are: the aged, those with urgent medical needs, those traveling to visit seriously ill or dying family members, and those wishing to participate in important family occasions such as births, weddings, and funerals. Proposal WT-24 calls for the expeditious handling of applications of an urgent humanitarian nature. The time has come to build upon existing language in this important area.

Mr. Chairman, together, WT-23 and WT-24, along with WT-22, form the framework for the resolution of many existing problems in the field of freedom of movement. They are of the highest level of importance to my delegation.

Another major area of concern to the U.S. delegation in the third basket is the continued jamming of foreign radio broadcasts. While we have recently seen some improvement in this field, programs of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Deutsche Welle, Radio Israel, and others continue to be jammed. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that the simple throwing of a switch can turn silent jammers back on. This happened just this week with Radio Israel's transmissions to the Soviet Union. The principle that jamming is wrong, already accepted in international law, must be clearly enunciated in our Vienna document. WT-56, sponsored by my delegation, calls for the "unimpeded reception of broadcasts across frontiers...."

An additional key element of WT-56 concerns the working conditions of journalists. This proposal also calls upon the participating states to ensure, subject to the normal rules of residence, that foreign journalists are not hindered in the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity. A concluding document should include unambiguous language on these matters.

In addition, we attach great importance to WT-74 on the subject of postal and telephonic communications. These means of communications form an important link between our peoples. For some, it is the only means of maintaining contact with relatives and friends. Despite international agreements on the privacy and integrity of these forms of communications government interference continues. WT-74 addresses these abuses through a series of specific concrete measures designed to ensure the rapid and unhindered delivery of personal mail. This proposal also provides for the expansion of the lines of communications including the development of direct dialing systems.

Finally, I mention two proposals for follow-up activities. The Conference on the Human Dimension, from proposal WT-19, for the moment is being considered in Basket I, although we envision its mandate as also including elements from the third basket. Western proposal WT-45 calls for convening an information forum. Of all of the follow-up activities involving the human dimension, my delegation attaches the highest priority to these two. They must both appear in our concluding document.

While we are concerned about issues in other areas of the human dimension, the proposals which I have discussed this morning are of greatest importance from the American point of view.

I trust that this statement of U.S. priorities will assist the work of the Neutral and Non-Aligned delegations and others, by making more specifically what we consider essential for our concluding document. We invite our Eastern colleagues to come forward with comparable clarifications.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Alleged Political Prisoners in the United States

Vienna, Austria
Plenary Session July 21, 1987

Several weeks ago Ambassador Kashlev raised the cases of a number of alleged political prisoners in the United States, largely drawn from an article which appeared in "Pravda" in mid-June. The thrust of his allegations was that the United States arrests people for their political views and imprisons them for long sentences despite their innocence of any real crime.

Since many of these cases were not familiar to me, I requested information from my authorities on all of them. Today I would like to share what I have learned about these individuals, all of them cited specifically by Ambassador Kashlev. The reality, it will be clear, is somewhat different from what has been charged.

Four of the alleged political prisoners, Father Dexter Lanctot, Father Thomas McGann, Greg Boertje, and Lynn Romano were arrested for breaking into the Willow Grove Naval Air Station in Pennsylvania on January 8, 1987. Several aircraft were damaged in the break-in. These individuals were to go on trial for the third time on July 13, since the first two prosecutions ended in mistrials. All are free while awaiting trial.

John Harris is on death row in Alabama's Holman Prison. In 1970 he was convicted of rape and robbery, and given five life sentences. During a 1974 prison riot a guard was killed and Harris was later convicted of that murder. The conviction was overturned, but he was tried and convicted again on the same charge in 1983. Under Alabama law the death penalty is automatic for anyone convicted of murder while serving a prison sentence. Harris is appealing the death sentence. The Soviet Union claims Harris is a prominent civil rights activist who was sentenced to life imprisonment on a fake theft charge.

Ann Montgomery, Elmer Maas, Molly Rush, Dean Hammer, John Shuchard, Carl Kabat and the Berrigan brothers (the so-called "Plowshares Eight") were convicted of burglary and conspiracy after entering a General Electric Plant in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, in September, 1980. The group broke into the plant, used hammers to damage missile nose cone housings, and spilled human blood. The defendants were convicted in March, 1981, and sentenced to terms of up to 10 years. The case is still under appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, and the defendants were freed pending resolution of this appeal.

Carl and Paul Kabat, Larry Cloud-Morgan and Helen Woodson are currently serving sentences for destruction of government property after an attack on a missile site near Kansas City, Missouri, in November, 1984. When police arrived at the site they found Carl Kabat using a 90-pound jackhammer to enter a missile silo. For these actions Carl Kabat received 18 years, Paul Kabat 10 years, and Larry Cloud-Morgan 8 years. Ms. Woodson did not join her codefendants in an appeal for reduction of sentence, but the judge reduced her original term of 18 years to 12 years. She reportedly wrote the judge that immediately upon release she would return to the missile site, jackhammer in hand.

"The Lexington Three" are Alejandrina Torres, Susan Rosenberg, and Silvia Baraldini. They are all currently in prison in Lexington, Kentucky. On October 4, 1985, Torres and three others (all members of the so-called Puerto Rican national liberation organization FALN) were sentenced to thirty five years for plotting to blow up military installations in the Chicago area. Rosenberg is serving a 58-year sentence for conspiracy to possess unregistered firearms, unlawful use of false identification, and possession of unregistered destructive devices (that is, bombs). She also faces charges from her alleged role as the getaway car driver in the famous 1981 Brinks' armored car robbery in Nyack, New York, in which two policemen and the driver of the armored car were killed.

Baraldini is serving 40 years for her role in the 1979 jail break of Black Liberation Army leader Joanne Chesimard. She was also convicted of the attempted hold-up of an armored car in Danbury, Connecticut. Baraldini acknowledged being a member of the "May 19th Communist Organization," a group considered to be an ally of several terrorist groups, including the FALN. In April, 1984, she was also sentenced to three years for refusing to testify before a New York Grand Jury on the activities of the FALN.

Christine Rico, Julie Nalibov, Steven Burke, and Sandra Roland are members or former members of the "John Brown Anti-Klan Committee." The four were found in contempt of court in Washington, DC, in February, 1985, for refusing to testify before a grand jury about bombings at the U.S. Capitol and other federal buildings. The bombings occurred at the Washington Navy Yard (August, 1983), the Capitol (November, 1983), and the Navy Yard Officers' Club (April, 1984). Fortunately, there were no injuries. Before refusing to be sworn in or testify, the four read a statement in which they said they regarded bombings as a legitimate form of resistance to alleged U.S. militarism. Since there was no evidence that the group had actually engaged in any bombings, all four were released by court order in late 1985.

I have already discussed the case of Leonard Peltier at some length in an earlier plenary session; he is serving a life sentence for the murder of two FBI agents. At the invitation of the U.S. Government, a team of Soviet ophthalmologists examined him several weeks ago. Dennis Banks is another American Indian activist who was convicted in 1975 in South Dakota on charges of arson, riot and assault stemming from a 1973 clash with police in Custer, South Dakota. In 1976, Mr. Banks fled to California while released on bail. In 1978, the Supreme Court of California held that the refusal of the Governor of California to extradite Mr. Banks to South Dakota was constitutional. Today Mr. Banks is free.

Stacy Merkt, a sanctuary movement activist, was sentenced to 179 days in prison for conspiring to transport and for transporting undocumented aliens. Ms. Merkt was adopted by Amnesty International as the first "prisoner of conscience" in the United States since 1979. However, Amnesty International does not question that Merkt was duly convicted of violations of U.S. immigration laws, with appropriate guarantees of due process and the right of appeal. According to Amnesty's own statement, "its conclusion that Stacy Merkt is a prisoner of conscience is based on its belief that when she assisted the Salvadorans these refugees could have been in danger of human rights violations of concern to the organization." Thus it is clear that the quarrel here is with U.S. asylum policy and our assessment of the situation in El Salvador. I can provide interested delegates with detailed information on U.S. asylum policies and practices, which I believe are generous and justified. The fact remains that Ms. Merkt was convicted not for expressing her political beliefs, but for an action clearly in violation of the law.

Dr. Benjamin Spock is well known to generations of American parents, who raised their children based on his advice. Dr. Spock is also well known for his long-time activism in the anti-war movement. I believe "Pravda" is correct in reporting that Dr. Spock was arrested early this year in conjunction with a protest at an American military base in Florida. What "Pravda" fails to report, however, is that Dr. Spock and other protesters were not arrested until they had climbed over a high chain-link fence, into a clearly marked restricted area. I also believe that most of the protesters received token punishments -- fines and suspended sentences, rather than jail terms.

Finally, the "Pravda" article on which Ambassador Kashlev based his remarks mentions a Richard Miller, but does not further identify him or what he is alleged to have done. This is a very common name in the U.S., and we have been unable to identify a Richard Miller to whom the Soviet report might refer. Similarly, we have been unable to develop information about Professor Ernest Dubeau, perhaps because it is not clear from the Russian transliteration how his name is spelled in English. If the Soviet delegation can offer clarification on these cases, we will be happy to respond here, too.

As for "USA Political Prisoners Day," which was allegedly proclaimed last April 15, I have learned the following. The "Association for Defense of Legal Rights of Americans" is an organization headed by a woman named Susan Fry. My authorities have been unable to locate this organization in any of the many directories of organizations and groups in the United States. According to TASS, Ms. Fry declared April 15 to be this political prisoners day, and named many of the individuals cited by Ambassador Kashlev as examples of such prisoners. As far as I am aware, only TASS and "Pravda" reported this declaration.

I want to point out a couple of things about all these alleged political prisoners whom Ambassador Kashlev has cited. Most were accused either of participating in or having knowledge of incidents involving violence, personal injury or death, or damage to property. We are talking about crimes like murder, robbery, assault, and bombings. Several of the crimes involve breaking into and doing damage to sensitive national security installations. Yet all of these individuals have had full recourse to the judicial process, including a number of appeals. Some of the sentences have been relatively severe; some have been relatively lenient; and several of these individuals are free.

In contrast, what are the accusations against the individuals in the Soviet Union about whom my delegation has expressed concern? In most cases the formal charges are "anti-Soviet activity," "anti-Soviet slander," or "hooliganism." What these individuals really did was to write books and articles, to speak critically of their own society, to demonstrate peacefully in public places, to practice their religion, to teach Hebrew to young children, or to pass their critical writings or statements to foreigners. They killed no one, set off no bombs, robbed no armored cars, illegally entered no military installations.

There is a basic difference here. It used to be that expressions of concern about political prisoners in the Soviet Union were labelled by Soviet representatives as interference in the USSR's internal affairs. Now Soviet authorities seem to judge the best response to be countercharges on alleged political prisoners in the United States. These countercharges deserve examination, which is why I have taken the time of this plenary meeting to show what they really amount to. In the interest of full disclosure, the U.S. Delegation remains ready to research and to answer any further charges. Meanwhile we will not cease to call attention to real, rather than merely alleged, abuses of human rights. The best way to stop western delegations from expressing concern about Soviet political prisoners is to stop putting people in prison for things which would not be considered crimes in the vast majority of the states represented here. It's as simple as that.

Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Soviet Proposal for a Moscow Conference on Humanitarian Cooperation

Plenary Session

Vienna, Austria
July 28, 1987

At our last plenary session on July 24, Soviet Ambassador Kashlev provided some overdue but welcome detail on WT-2, the proposal "on the calling of a conference of the participating states of the CSCE on the development of humanitarian cooperation." He expressed the hope that this additional information would lead to substantive discussion of the proposal. My remarks today are intended as an initial contribution to such a discussion.

On several occasions before this plenary, the United States has set forth two necessary criteria which we believe the Soviet Union must meet before it can become a credible contender to host a conference on a subject of such vital importance to the Helsinki process as human rights and humanitarian cooperation. The first criterion was not addressed in Ambassador Kashlev's intervention. The second was addressed but in a way which caused as many questions as it answered.

Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead, in his address to this Vienna meeting June 23, said that any prospective host to a CSCE meeting "should not only provide the same open conditions - for delegates, for the press, and for non-governmental organizations - which previous hosts have offered, but should also have an exemplary record in the subject on which the meeting is to be held."

I do not know whether - when our meeting comes to decide on post-Vienna activities - the Soviet Union will have an exemplary record on human rights and humanitarian cooperation or not. I do know that, as of today - only days before this Vienna meeting was originally expected to end - few delegations here would claim that the Soviet Union possesses such an exemplary record. For the United States, let me state as categorically as I can that, were we deciding today on post-Vienna meetings, the Soviet proposal for a Moscow conference would fail to qualify on that criterion alone. This does not mean that the Soviet human rights performance can never meet that standard; after all, most of the states represented here in Vienna already meet it. It does mean, however, that the Soviet Union has a long way to go.

The other criterion for a Moscow conference, as noted by Deputy Secretary Whitehead, was examined by Ambassador Kashlev on July 24. He said that the Soviet Union would be guided by the practices and standards that have been established in the CSCE framework as regards access by non-governmental organizations, journalists, groups, and individuals. This is certainly a step in the right direction and we welcome it. But it raises a host of questions about the specific practices that would actually be followed by the Soviet authorities during a Moscow conference. These questions, and others which may occur to other delegations, require an answer before appropriate conclusions can be drawn about the practical consequences of Ambassador Kashlev's promises of openness and access.

-- First, will the Soviet Union guarantee entry and exit to all interested individuals and non-governmental organizations which desire to attend the meeting? Will this include persons born in the USSR, irrespective of where they now live and whether they have been deprived of or have renounced Soviet citizenship? Soviet authorities recently refused to grant a visa to Ms. Alia Sonsev, an American teacher of the Russian language, who emigrated from the USSR many years ago. Ms. Sonsev was to accompany a group of American high school students to a U.S.-Soviet educational exchange. If her presence in the USSR with these students constituted a problem for Soviet authorities, how can we expect these same authorities to react to visa applications from dozens of individuals of similar background, many of whom hold views critical of current Soviet policy?

-- Second, what about free movement within the USSR for Soviet citizens who wish to attend the Moscow Conference? Will Soviet authorities permit Soviet citizens to be registered for residence in Moscow during the Conference? I recall that individuals like Vladimir Skvirskiy, who were released from prison or labor camp as recently as this spring, were subsequently denied work and residence permits in Moscow, even if it was their home before they were sent to prison. How can we be sure that "inconvenient" individuals will not simply have their Moscow residence permits revoked, and face arrest and exile if they choose to remain during the conference?

-- Third, it is particularly incumbent on the host to facilitate the attendance of concerned individuals in the Soviet Union who have monitored the development and implementation of the Helsinki process. Virtually all of them have been persecuted for these activities; many of them are still in labor camp or internal exile. Will they be freed so that they can attend this meeting on issues for which they have sacrificed their freedom? And what of those Helsinki Monitors living abroad? Will they be welcomed, regardless of what country they began their activity in or where they are now? CSCE meetings have traditionally presented an opportunity for Helsinki monitors from a variety of participating states to gather, meet delegates and each other and compare notes. Any meeting in Moscow should be no less.

-- Fourth, will there be lodging enough for everyone, Soviet citizens and foreigners, who wishes to attend the conference? There should be no restrictions on where people stay, or any other use of lodging as a pretext for preventing interested individuals and groups from attending the meeting. For example, will foreigners be allowed to stay with friends or relatives, if they have them, or will they be forced to apply for hotel accommodations, with no assurance that a room will be available?

-- Fifth, will delegates and visitors to the conference be free to contact anyone they wish, whether Soviet citizens or foreigners, permanent residents or visitors to the USSR? We are particularly disturbed by recent developments on this score. The Soviet press has recently denounced our Moscow Embassy's human rights officer, Ms. Kathleen Kavalec, for maintaining contacts with "undesirable elements," specifically refuseniks. We have heard this kind of accusation before in the Soviet press -- in fact, I myself was the target of such stories a few years ago. However, this is not the sort of thing one expects to hear from proponents of "new thinking." Furthermore, the Soviet press accounts did not accuse Ms. Kavalec of doing anything illegal. If an accredited diplomat in Moscow is attacked for maintaining legitimate contacts with free citizens of the state to which she is accredited, how would delegates and visitors to a Moscow conference be treated?

-- Sixth, once all the delegates, interested individuals, and non-governmental organizations arrive in Moscow, will they be able to organize public and private meetings and activiites, such as demonstrations, book fairs, press conferences, displays, and so forth? We hope the answer to this is an unequivocal, categorical yes. Where there are reasonable limitations, such as on press conferences by non-governmental organizations at the conference site here in Vienna, there must also be -- as there are in Vienna -- other sites available for holding such activities. Can we assume that no demonstrations or meetings will be prevented because they are allegedly "anti-Soviet?" We hope the demonstration on Red Square this past weekend by Crimean Tatars urging redress for their persecution is a hopeful sign, since for nearly 24 hours they were allowed to enjoy what is called in my country "right of peaceful assembly."

-- Seventh, will there be free access for private citizens, whether foreigners or Soviets, to the conference site? The Austrian authorities have kept a responsible, commendable balance between the needs of physical security and accessibility in this Vienna meeting. Can we be sure that physical security will not be used as a pretext at a Moscow conference to keep away interested Soviets who are critical of their own society?

In addition, we wonder whether there will be free access for all visitors, Soviet or foreign, to delegation, non-governmental organizations, journalist and other offices. If foreign visitors are housed in compounds surrounded by fences and guarded by uniformed militia - as foreign residents are housed - will these guards have firm instructions not to stop visitors and not to intimidate or turn away guests? Better yet, we trust that delegates and visitors to the conference will have a wide choice of lodging and office space around town, and that there will not be any restrictions on who visits them, or what they do there. For example, will Soviet hotels desist from demanding identification and a pass from every casual visitor to a guest in the hotel, thus inhibiting contacts with delegates and visitors to the conference?

-- Eighth, will there be office or work space available to journalists, non-governmental organizations, and others who wish to attend the conference and for one reason or another need to prepare or reproduce materials, or do other office work? Will authorities be flexible enough to allow such individuals and groups to use private residences, hotel suites, or other facilities for offices, if there is a demand which genuinely exceeds the supply available?

Moreover, will journalists, non-governmental organizations, and other individuals be able to bring in typewriters, radios, tape recorders, books and magazines, and other literature and work materials which they need? Can we be sure that a great deal of this literature will not be seized as allegedly "anti-Soviet" and the equipment also refused entry on pretexts which have often been used in the past? After all, it is no secret that some of the individuals and non-governmental organizations desiring to attend will hold opinions which are not popular with Soviet authorities. Diversity of opinion is one of the glories of the Helsinki process. If these individuals conduct themselves peacefully and engage only in advocacy of their point of view, we would expect any host state to permit them to enter the country and bring with them any materials they might need.

-- Ninth, will all reporters and journalists be allowed to attend the conference, to cover it freely, and to send out their reports, whatever their content, without hindrance? The opening of plenary sessions to the press and public is a welcome gesture, but the problem is much deeper. The major world and national news organizations are already represented in Moscow. However, many reporters from the ethnic press, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty, among others, will also wish to cover the Moscow Conference. Will they be allowed to attend? Will there be no last-minute problems with their visas? Will they have no difficulty in finding lodging and office space in ample time to prepare their coverage? And will their reports and their broadcasts - unhindered and unjammed - be freely available to the Soviet people so that they have all the relevant information for making up their own minds about this conference taking place in their country?

-- And tenth, will non-governmental organizations, individuals, reporters and delegates be able to conduct all their activities, including public meetings and demonstrations, without being subjected to official, officially sanctioned, or unofficial harassment, whether from the police themselves or alleged "concerned citizens." For example, at the Jurmala conference last summer, several ethnic Latvian participants were threatened by local authorities. More recently, in Moscow itself - the proposed site of the conference - demonstrators on behalf of Josef Begun were beaten by ruffians while uniformed policemen stood by idly and watched.

Of course, no one is asking for visitors to have the right in Moscow to engage in disruptive behavior. However, previous CSCE meetings have all weathered the activities of energetic visitors and vocal demonstrators with no ill effects. In fact, the CSCE process is stronger, more vibrant and more promising because of the extensive involvement of private individuals and groups such as we have witnessed here in the meetings and demonstrations in Vienna.

These are some of the questions surrounding a CSCE meeting which any country should be obliged to resolve before being seriously considered as host. They do not apply solely to the Soviet Union, although I have pointed out several areas where we have particular cause for concern. The list may seem long. It could be longer still, and rightly so. I raise these questions not to be unreasonable; previous CSCE hosts have not found them unreasonable and have resolved them all affirmatively. I raise them because of a consistent and disturbing pattern of past Soviet behavior, a pattern which must change. The openness and accessibility which have been a hallmark of the CSCE process since the very beginning are too important for us, the participating states, to settle for anything less.

Later this week, when we adjourn this meeting until September, I hope that the Soviet delegation will carry home with it two simple messages regarding the Moscow conference. The first message is that much remains to be done to elevate

Soviet human rights performance to a level which justifies the credibility of Soviet candidacy for hosting a conference involving human rights. The second message is that general promises, positive as they may be, must be supplemented by specific and credible guarantees regarding openness and access. It was the choice of the Soviet Union to propose such a conference. It is now the responsibility of the Soviet Union to prove to the rest of us that a conference could actually take place in Moscow according to the practices and standards of openness that have characterized previous CSCE meetings.

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Statement by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann
Chairman of the United States Delegation
to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Meeting

Plenary Session

Vienna, Austria
July 31, 1987

My purpose today is to take a leaf from Dickens' "Christmas Carol" and examine (1) what has been accomplished in the 13 weeks since our return to Vienna in May, (2) where we are today, and (3) what we should expect when we come back in the fall - Vienna Past, Vienna Present, and Vienna Yet to Come.

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By the yardstick of performance, which remains the most important and the most revealing measure of accomplishment in the Helsinki process, the past three months have been mixed.

For many who have spoken out on behalf of their rights and the rights of others it has been a disappointing period. In the Soviet Union, despite a much publicized amnesty, we are not able to document a significant increase in the release of prisoners of conscience. At the beginning of this round, we could count 131 releases of political prisoners. Since then the numbers have risen, but - as far as we can determine - have not yet reached 200, thus leaving nearly 500 known prisoners of conscience still incarcerated. Moreover, Soviet authorities took repressive action against a new Latvian monitoring group, Helsinki 86; its leader Linards Grantins was arrested and is still being held.

There have been, however, some important releases of prisoners in recent weeks. Two human rights activists, who had been imprisoned in the notorious Perm Camp Number 36-1, the Ukrainian Mikhail Horyn and the Russian Leonid Borodin, are now free. So is trade union activist Aleksandr Skobov, who had been held in a Leningrad psychiatric hospital. So also are writers and religious activists Feliks Svetov and Zoya Krakhmalnikova, Russian Orthodox activist Nikolay Serebrennikov, Lithuanian rights advocate Edita Abrutiene, and writer Nizamedtin Akhmetov.

Unfortunately, many of those who are benefitting from amnesty are having difficulty in returning to normal life.

Aleksandr Ogorodnikov, who served eight years in a labor camp for his activism in behalf of Christian Orthodoxy, has been unable to get a permit to live in the Moscow region and has thus been separated from his ten-year-old son.

Soviet citizens continue to speak out for their rights. A demonstration in Riga June 14 on behalf of Latvian rights drew a much bigger crowd than either the organizers, Helsinki 86, or even the authorities expected. And just last weekend in Moscow a courageous group of Crimean Tatars held - and were allowed to continue for an unprecedented length of time - a demonstration calling for reversal of the forced deportation of their people from the Crimea during World War II. It is encouraging that the group was received by President Gromyko and that a commission has been formed to consider their grievances. What will really count, however, is whether the Soviet government restores to this embattled people the rights that were so disgracefully taken from them by Stalin.

Elsewhere, too, there have been disappointments for those who have spoken out. In Czechoslovakia one imprisoned member of the Jazz Section, Vladimir Kouřil, was freed upon completing his sentence. However, Karel Srp remains in jail, his appeal for reduction of sentence denied. In Romania recent evidence indicates that over 20 persons are being held in harsh conditions in Aiud Prison for political offenses. The German Democratic Republic, by contrast, has announced an amnesty which, if carried through, would lead to a major release of political prisoners.

The emigration picture remains one of unfulfilled promise. Jewish - as well as German - emigration from the Soviet Union continues at an increased rate. Still, it is a rate which would only yield by year's end a Jewish emigration figure less than half the annual average for the whole decade of the 1970's. Hidden in these figures are some isolated triumphs of the human spirit. Next week, Vladimir Feltsman will arrive in Vienna on his way to the United States to pursue an unfettered career as a concert pianist - a product of his own virtuosity and of the Russian culture where his musical talent took root.

It remains inexplicable that others who desire to leave should not be free to do so. It is a major concern of the United States and many other countries that, once the backlog of pending cases of refuseniks is exhausted, Soviet practice may revert to the restrictive tradition of the recent past. Why can't such people as Ida Nudel, Naum Meiman, Vladimir Slepak, Aleksandr Lerner, and Lev Elbert exercise their right to emigrate? Why can't Benjamin Charny, who suffers from cancer, join his brother in America? The answer given by the authorities is that they all had access to state secrets - in most cases more than a decade ago, in Naum Meiman's case more than three decades ago.

This travesty of protecting Soviet security convinces nobody, including, I suspect, those who invoke it as a pretext to deny emigration. It must come to an end. Today the United States and other delegations are introducing a new proposal to end this shameful charade of toying with people's lives for bogus reasons of security. The proposal calls on participating states to refrain from abusing the right of the individual to leave his own country. It states that if, in exceptional circumstances, a state deems it necessary to curtail this right, it will ensure that the period of curtailment be as short as possible and in no case more than one year. Acceptance of this proposal would fully accord with the principles of glasnost.

In the area of family reunification, in the three months since we reconvened in Vienna, little progress is discernible in cases involving the United States. In fact, since April, there have been five denials of exit visas to Soviet spouses of American citizens. All were on grounds of secrecy - another use and misuse of this baleful administrative measure. As a result, Yuri Balovlenkov has still not seen his four year-old child in Baltimore, Maryland. Pyatras Pakenas of Lithuania suffers from a heart condition, but has been refused permission seventeen times to join his wife in Florida. Svetlana Braun, 24 years old, has been married since 1984 to a young Detroit lawyer Keith Braun. Yet she has repeatedly been denied permission, the last time in June of this year, to join him in the United States. The grounds for denial are secrets in a job her father left when she was only 15 years old - another abuse which the U.S. proposal on secrecy would eliminate. Matvey Finkel and Susan Graham were married in 1979, but Matvey still cannot travel with his wife and child to her home in America because of alleged secrets he learned while a draftee in the army in 1972-73.

With regard to freedom of information, there is some positive progress to report. We have watched with sympathetic interest the partial opening up of the Soviet Union to genuine debate about its present and its past. Thanks to Ambassador Kashlev and the Soviet delegation, a number of delegations were able to see a remarkable Soviet film, "Repentance," and to hear its director speak candidly about the Stalinist years it described. We have also welcomed during this round the cessation of jamming of the Voice of America and have expressed the hope that this long overdue action can be extended to all radios which broadcast to the Soviet Union.

Finally, I must note a subject which has not received much recent comment here but which is nevertheless central to the objectives of the Helsinki Final Act. Every day we have been meeting in Vienna, Afghan citizens have died as a direct result of the invasion of their sovereign country by the Soviet Union. One hears claims by Soviet officials of a desire to withdraw and plans for doing so. I don't know if these claims and plans are sincere or not. But there is only one real test of their sincerity: whether they result in actual withdrawal of the Soviet invasion force. Unless and until that happens, the Soviet Union is in egregious violation of virtually every principle of the Helsinki document.

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Now what of our present situation at the Vienna meeting? I believe we are well positioned to move rapidly into concentrated negotiating work in September. All major proposals from all sides are on the table. The capstone in the Western edifice of proposals was put into place by the introduction July 10 of WT-129, the key NATO proposal in the military security area. This proposal takes into account not only the views of all 16 member states of the Alliance but also Eastern positions as expressed here in Vienna and at Warsaw Pact meetings in Budapest and East Berlin. Moreover, I believe it is fully responsive to the emphasis of the foreign ministers of the neutral and non-aligned countries at Limassol, Cyprus, on the need for "a structure which will allow all participating states to safeguard their national security interests."

Our proposal (1) calls for building upon and expanding the Stockholm Confidence- and Security-Building Measures among the 35 and (2) provides for the first time for an understanding that a distinct negotiation on conventional stability will be pursued within the framework of the CSCE process. In the first area there is a full role for all 35 CSCE participants in continuing the important work of Stockholm. In the second area - the autonomous negotiation among 23 - we have proposed arrangements to ensure that the 12 CSCE states not participating in this negotiation will have access to information and will be able to express their views. The key point is the provision that "the participants in the conventional stability negotiation will arrange for meetings with the other CSCE participating states periodically to exchange views and information." This exchange should fully safeguard the national security interests of the neutral and non-aligned countries.

In other areas as well, proposals have been defined, debated, and disputed. We Western delegations have worked hard to make our priorities clear.

-- In the human dimension, the United States assigns its top priority to proposals which advance freedom of movement (WT-22, 23 and 24); enhance the role of individuals and groups (WT-38); protect people from arbitrary arrest, imprisonment, or exile (WT-39); reject the jamming of radio broadcasts (WT-56); and uphold freedom of conscience and religion, the rights of minorities (WT-27 and 62), and freedom of communication (WT-74).

-- In the economic area, the United States gives primary emphasis to proposals which encourage an open economic environment and eliminate impediments to commercial exchanges. Specifically, I have in mind WT-115 on the elimination of problems caused by compensation trade, WT-117 on the improvement of business contacts and WT-118 on the exchange of market and statistical data. Beyond the economic area, we attach great importance to the expansion of direct contacts among individual scientists as proposed in WT-105, the improvement of conditions for tourism as expressed in WT-101, and the protection of the ozone layer as spelled out in WT-89 and WT-118.

-- Regarding post-Vienna follow-up, my delegation foresees three major events: the development of military security negotiations as envisioned in WT-129, the Conference on the Human Dimension (WT-19), and an Information Forum (WT-45). Other follow-up meetings may also be desirable, provided the number is not large.

I would have liked to record that Eastern proposals have matched these Western initiatives in comprehensiveness, relevance to problems, and seriousness of purpose. But manifestly they have not. In fact, some of us who were at the Madrid CSCE meeting six years ago feel transported back there when we read Eastern texts which are often declaratory, superfluous, banal, trivial - and numerous. What are we to think of proposals like WT-77, entitled "The Historical Responsibility of Persons Engaged in Cultural and Artistic Activities for the Fate of Peace and Progress and Their Contribution to the Strengthening of Mutual Understanding and Mutual Respect Among Peoples and to the Development of a Peace-loving Way of Thinking and Acting"? Or how are we to assess the relevance for our meeting of WT-108, which calls on the participating states inter alia "to recognize the special status and social significance of motherhood and to take special measures for its protection"?

There is a Soviet proposal, WT-84, which proclaims "the need for new thinking on security questions." I sense a need for "new thinking" on all the questions with which we are dealing here in Vienna, and most urgently on the human questions. In fact, "new thinking" is most needed by the Soviet Union and some of its allies. The positive if still limited steps which the Soviet government has taken within its country are nowhere reflected in Soviet proposals here in Vienna. I profoundly hope that the Soviet Union, during our recess, will take action to eliminate this striking disparity.

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Now a final word about our future work. When we return to Vienna in the fall, we should lose no time in moving rapidly into drafting. The United States delegation is ready for any negotiating mechanisms which will advance that objective. There is no reason why we should not be able to finish the Vienna meeting with a significant, substantial and balanced result by the end of this year. We look forward to an important contribution by the neutral and non-aligned delegations in playing their traditional CSCE role as an engine of progress. In that regard my delegation welcomes the introduction yesterday of a comprehensive non-paper by two neutral delegations, Austria and Switzerland, dealing with the important issues in the work of the Basket III drafting group. We have not yet had time to study the substance and will give it our close attention during the recess. But let me say now that initiatives of this kind can only give a positive impulse to our drafting work when we return.

What results should we aim for at Vienna?

-- First and most important, there must be a significant improvement in compliance with Helsinki and Madrid commitments, particularly in the human dimension. The true test of glasnost, as far as the Vienna meeting is concerned, is whether the Soviet Union can continue and increase the positive trends we have observed, and can give them institutional stability. Why not, for example, eliminate the security provision as a bar to emigration, annul those articles in the criminal code which are used for political arrests, close down the police-run psychiatric hospitals that imprison sane but critical individuals, and abolish jamming and dismantle the jamming equipment?

-- Second, there must be a substantive final document dealing candidly and constructively with the major problems between East and West, not with motherhood.

-- And third, there should be a limited number of post-Vienna meetings devoted to major issues.

I have never been pessimistic about the Helsinki process, and I am not pessimistic about this Vienna meeting. But much remains to be done. If I were to suggest a closing word to the Soviet authorities who will be preparing for the next and, I hope, last round, I would say this:

-- Liberate your prisoners of conscience.

-- Liberate those who want to exercise their right to leave your country.

-- Liberate those who want to exercise their right to stay and work for their human rights and those of others.

-- Liberate your citizens who would like to hear what the foreign radios have to say.

-- And liberate your Vienna delegation so that it can offer proposals that give reality to the positive promises of glasnost.

Tomorrow, August 1, marks the 12th anniversary of the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. In honor of that anniversary and of the great objectives of the Helsinki document, President Reagan has proclaimed August 1 "Helsinki Human Rights Day" in the United States. Looking back, I believe it is fitting to conclude with the words spoken by President Gerald Ford in the Finlandia House in Helsinki in 1975, words that are as true today as when they were spoken.

> "History will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow -- not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep."

BASKET I STATEMENTS

Ambassador Robert H. Frowick
Deputy Chairman, U.S. Delegation

Statement to the "S" Group
on
U.S. Implementation of
Some Aspects of Stockholm CSBMs

June 1, 1987

Mr. Chairman,

My Delegation is encouraged by recent assessments in this body of initial experience with implementation of provisions of the Stockholm Document. Only through open and candid discussions here can we properly assess progress achieved since those provisions became binding. And only through a thorough assessment of that progress can we determine how best to go forward toward building upon and expanding the work begun in Stockholm.

In that context, my Delegation welcomes constructive criticism based on our early experiences with the new confidence and security-building measures. Addressing deficiencies in implementation or identifying elements which might be improved upon or added is healthy and can only contribute to the process of enhancing confidence and security in Europe. We note with satisfaction that others here share that point of view.

Only last week, the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia stated that "to reach new agreements, it is essential to use experiences gained through the application of previously agreed measures." And on 5 May, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic provided us with a detailed account of a GDR observation program which he said "took into account lessons learned from previous observation programs." But, not only does the state hosting an observation program or conducting an on-site inspection learn lessons and gain experiences, so too do other participating states, whether providing their own observers or receiving a second hand account of results of on-site inspection.

Today, I want to share with others two recent experiences the United States has had with implementing provisions of the

Stockholm Document. The first deals with "no-notice activities;" the second with changes to the annual forecast.

No-Notice Activity

The initial U.S. notification of a "no-notice activity" was made on 20 May. That notification, we believe, reflects the foresight of drafters of the Stockholm Document calling for notification of "no-notice activities", above agreed thresholds, at the time when troops involved commence those activities. The document stipulates that observers need not be invited to "no-notice activities," unless they have a duration of more than 72 hours. The logic behind both of these provisions is sound and clear, especially when one considers the principal objective of testing troops' ability to respond quickly to "no-notice activities" and how prior notification would likely deny that objective.

The recent U.S. "no-notice activity" began at 0400 on 21 May and ended at 2400 the same day. Because of the early hour at which the activity was scheduled to begin and recognizing that many foreign ministries at that time of morning are ill-equipped to deal with diplomatic notes, my authorities decided that, on a strictly voluntary basis and for the convenience of all concerned, our notifications would be delivered on the evening preceding commencement of the no-notice activity. The FRG, on whose territory the activity was going to take place and was consequently obliged to give notification, followed the same general notification procedure.

Because of an unforeseeable problem on 20 May with our communications net, we were not able to notify the GDR of the activity until after it had got underway the next morning. We regret that delay. However, the GDR was notified of the "no-notice activity" on the preceding evening by the FRG. Consequently, all participating states in fact did receive notification of the "no-notice activity" before it actually commenced and, we can report, without jeopardizing that activity's training objective. Since duration of the activity was only 20 hours, observers were not invited.

Changes in Annual Calendar

Mr. Chairman, I mentioned that we also wanted to share our experience in introducing some changes to our annual calendar. Drafters of the Stockholm Document recognized that an annual forecast was just that -- a forecast or prediction of events based on available information. They had the foresight to realize that annual forecasts would be subject to change. They thus included a provision in the document to deal with those changes.

Last week, the United States announced changes to exercises COMPASS POINT 87 and IRON FORGE 87, two activities which had been included in the U.S. 1987 annual calendar. These changes were delivered to all participating states in compliance with paragraph 57 of the Stockholm Document, which stipulates "should changes regarding the military activities in the annual calendar prove necessary, they will be communicated to all other participating states no later than in the appropriate notification."

In both COMPASS POINT and IRON FORGE, force participation levels have been scaled back to below 13,000 troops, one of the threshold criteria for prior notification. Nevertheless, in a spirit of openness, the United States intends to provide voluntary notification of both of these activities no later than 42 days in advance of their start. In the case of COMPASS POINT, the date of the activity was also pushed back a week. We believe that either of these changes, which impact on questions as to whether and when an activity is notified, justifies a special announcement reporting changes as soon as they are confirmed. In the event the size of an activity is substantially increased, in our view that change also should be announced as soon as possible in order that the confidence-building effect of the Stockholm Document not be undercut. Of course, minor changes to an annual calendar would only be made in prior notification of a forecast activity.

Initially, COMPASS POINT 87 had been forecast with a troop participation level of some 19,500, above the 17,000 troop threshold requiring invitation of observers. Since troop participation subsequently was scaled down to only 12,000, well below the observation threshold, my authorities decided not to host an observation program. Had troop levels fallen to only a thousand or two below that requiring invitation of observers, we would have been inclined to press ahead with an observation program.

Mr. Chairman, since the provisions of the Stockholm Document have taken effect, there have been several prior notifications of military activities and a few accounts of exercise observation programs. In our view, they have all been useful and have had a positive influence on the work that confronts us. My statement today is intended to share two other kinds of implementation experiences as well as draw attention to the rationale behind the approach taken by the United States in each case. My Delegation looks forward to learning more about similar early implementation experiences of others. Only when we have a thorough and complete assessment of the progress achieved at Stockholm will we be in a position to decide where we should go into the future.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Statement by Ambassador Robert H. Frowick
Deputy Chairman, U.S. Delegation

"S" Group
June 4, 1987

Mr. Chairman,

In response to remarks by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria at our last meeting and to comments this morning by the distinguished representative of Poland, I would like to clarify once again the United States' views on the status of our work in the "S" Group.

Ambassador Zimmermann in a recent plenary session spoke about the United States position. And I would invite my colleagues' attention once more to my own statement at the end of Round II on 7 April.

The United States has repeatedly said from the outset of our debate last November that an important aspect of our work here would center on assessing the progress achieved on CSCE military security questions at the Stockholm Conference. We have often indicated, in this regard, that it would be important to monitor closely our experience with on-the-ground implementation of the new confidence- and security-building measures agreed at Stockholm.

Some assessments have indeed been presented to the "S" Group regarding initial experience with the CSBMs. I agree with the statement of the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia this morning that our early experience is encouraging. Our view is that this process is necessary not simply to determine what we really achieved through our mutual diplomatic efforts at Stockholm -- only implementation experience will reveal what progress we are making -- but we also need to take stock in order to decide what further commitments would be justified.

This does not mean that we do not intend to talk about future steps. As everyone here well knows, we are approaching a time when the United States and its Allies will be in a position to present explicit proposals for further steps, along-side the proposals already before us. Doubtless it will take some time thereafter for all concerned to negotiate a final understanding on where we should be headed following the Vienna meeting. My Delegation will be prepared to take an active role in that forthcoming process. But we will simultaneously continue to keep a close eye on implementation experiences with the Stockholm CSBMs, which will supplement our earlier rather disappointing experiences with implementation of the Confidence Building Measures of the Final Act.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, U.S. CSCE DELEGATION
TO THE "S" GROUP ON JUNE 15, 1987

Mr. Chairman,

We note that all concerned are taking careful account of the Communique issued by the North Atlantic Alliance Foreign Ministers in Reykjavik on 12 June, which reaffirms and follows up initiatives taken in the Brussels Declaration of last December. We expect that results of the Reykjavik meeting which relate to our work here will be fleshed out by the Alliance in Brussels in order to permit us to table a concrete proposal here in due course.

Today, however, let me turn my attention to recent comments on the subjects of assessing progress achieved at Stockholm and initial experiences with CSBMs implementation. The extent of concordance in the views expressed in this group has been encouraging. Our task of reaching a common position on these issues should thus not be a particularly difficult one. I would like today to share our current thoughts on these subjects with you, but perhaps I could approach them from a slightly different direction.

Our work in recent days in the "S" Group on military security has given us time to reflect on parameters of what we want to achieve when we start work on drafting. The approach of the U.S. -- and perhaps other delegations as well -- will be guided by the following basic thoughts.

First of all, we should keep in mind that a good, solid basis for our work has been provided in previous documents: the Helsinki Final Act, the Madrid Concluding Document and the Stockholm Document. We are not here to rewrite those papers, to cull from them selectively and thus skew the focus of our efforts, or to reopen old compromises painstakingly achieved. Our foremost goal should be to ensure that existing commitments are fully and effectively implemented. What we need most, therefore, is effective action to fulfil the pledges we have already made.

Secondly, all participating states, both individually and collectively, have had occasion to express detailed views on the broad range of subjects relating to military security. The record of these views, for example in speeches or communiques, is an important testament and is no doubt studied carefully by all concerned. The Reykjavik Communique issued by Alliance Foreign Ministers will likely receive close attention in this regard. Despite the fact that the Communique has some specific relevance to our work here, it is not our intention to try to incorporate that text, or a summary of it, in the Vienna Concluding Document. Such an attempt, in our view, would be a fruitless endeavor by any participating state or group of states.

We need to keep our work here focused on practical tasks at hand in order to draw up a section on military security for the Final Document, which is concise, concrete and to the point. As I have said earlier in this group, we see no positive value -- in fact, we see negative value -- in resounding declarations or resolutions on security issues. Our commitment to taking effective steps to strengthen security and cooperation in Europe is clearly recorded in CSCE documents. Our publics will judge results of our work not by the number of new pledges we devise, but by our record of implementing those undertaken.

This is particularly true for matters which, for one reason or another, are manifestly beyond the scope of our deliberations. We all recognize that negotiations are underway and that proposals have been made elsewhere, for example on nuclear and chemical weapons, which are not within the purview of this meeting. To avoid squandering the time remaining to us, we urge that this group keep its attention focused on those matters which clearly concern us and which are susceptible to resolution by consensus.

We have heard encouraging remarks on the need for a balanced concluding document here in Vienna. Some have suggested that this would require a "weighty" and "substantive" section on military security. I agree with that suggestion and do not find it inconsistent with our view that the military security section should be concrete, concise and to the point. I would only add that our work toward a balanced document must be viewed in the context of our abiding objective of achieving and maintaining overall balance in the CSCE process.

Our mutual undertakings in the Madrid Mandate and the progress achieved at Stockholm represent significant progress along the spectrum of CSCE security activity and have thus given security issues an unprecedented emphasis in the CSCE process. Current developments seem destined to add to this trend of events.

In our view, the Madrid Concluding Document provides a good model on which to base our work on the military security section of the Vienna final document, both in structure and content. Our first requirement remains a thorough assessment of the progress achieved at Stockholm. The significance of the Stockholm document is that it moved beyond simple declaratory pledges of good will to measures that have concrete effect and are verifiable by all participating states. A comparision of Final Act and Stockholm measures vividly illustrates how far we have come.

-- In Stockholm, we made a politically binding commitment to comply with all the measures adopted, whereas many of the Helsinki measures were voluntary.

-- CDE covers the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, recognizing that the security concerns of all states are interrelated, while Final Act measures excluded significant parts of Europe.

-- Stockholm marked an important first step in verification within the CSCE framework with a verification section including inspection, with no right of refusal, while the Final Act provided no effective means to resolve doubts about compliance.

-- The annual calendars and constraining provisions adopted at Stockholm -- also historic provisions -- commit us to inform one another one year or, in specific cases, two years in advance about our plans for significant military activities.

-- Lower thresholds and details of the notification and observation measures ensure that the Stockholm regime will subject more military activities to scrutiny than was the case under the Final Act, thus enhancing transparency.

In principle, therefore, my Government acknowledges that the Stockholm Conference achieved a great deal. But only complete and thorough implementation will allow us to judge the full significance and effectiveness of the measures adopted. As I have said before, our initial experiences have been encouraging, but they have also uncovered some problems ranging from purely technical questions to problems which could directly affect the objectives we sought to achieve. Many of those problems have been identified and commented upon in this group. In most cases, lessons learned through early experiences in implementation were applied to subsequent implementation experiences with positive results. But we should acknowledge out that not all the Stockholm measures have yet been implemented. Also, as our experience with the record of implementing Final Act CBMs has shown, compliance can vary greatly over time.

I might add that our assessment at the Vienna Meeting of compliance with Final Act measures should not be overlooked in our concluding document, as some have appeared to suggest. We have had a full and frank exchange of our record on implementing the CBMs, which were far less stringent and exacting than the measures adopted at Stockholm. The overall record of participating states with the Final Act measures thus provides an important benchmark from which to judge the progress we make with regard to the more ambitious provisions adopted at Stockholm.

We will have to reach consensus on ways to continue the important work conceived at Madrid and launched at Stockholm. This will no doubt be the heart of the matter with regard to the military security section of the Vienna Concluding Document. Our decisions on CDE follow-up, together with the assessments mentioned above, will provide the weight and substance -- in clear, concise terms -- that we shall seek on security issues.

Mr. Chairman, as we proceed with this important agenda, my Delegation wishes to reiterate in strongest terms the need for all of us to work toward a balanced outcome in Vienna -- within the Concluding Document, but far more importantly within the overall CSCE process. Recent and prospective advances in the security dimension of that process must be matched by significant improvements in the other dimensions, in particular as regards our commitments concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

INTERVENTION BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, U.S. DELEGATION

'S' GROUP

June 18, 1987

Mr. Chairman, I agree with the remark by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union that we should have respect for one another, but I must take exception to his lengthy, sometimes heated exposition in defense of declaratory and rhetorical positions -- for example like those in WT/S.1 -- about which the distinguished representative of Spain spoke today. I wonder how the Soviet statement reflects respect for Spanish views. My delegation supports the views of Spain and Canada on these questions. As I noted on 7 April, my delegation also agrees with the analysis of Spain that the Madrid mandate -- I stress mandate -- on questions relating to confidence and security building has not been exhausted.

Mr. Chairman, we have no mandate, guideline, or -- as far as my delegation is concerned -- intention to deal here in great detail with nuclear weapons, whether strategic, intermediate, or shorter range INF. Nor do we intend to negotiate positions relating, for example, to chemical weapons, outer space, or other such questions. We have plenty of work ahead of us on preeminently CSCE military security activities. We don't need to be diverted toward subjects that are being dealt with comprehensively in other very important negotiations elsewhere.

Hopefully, the world is headed toward positive results before long stemming from those other negotiating fora. But we do not need to go into outer space here. We should, as our colleague from Spain has argued, keep our feet on the ground right here in Vienna on our real CSCE agenda.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Robert H. Frowick
Deputy Chairman, U.S. Delegation

"S" Group Statement - June 25, 1987

In Response to CSSR Statement of June 16 on U.S. Implementation of the Stockholm Document

Mr. Chairman:

Many delegations have spoken in recent days and, indeed, over past months about progress achieved in Stockholm as well as about early experiences with implementation of the Stockholm Document. This has been necessary work. Such implementation relates to both the interpretation of, and subsequent application of, the obligations we undertook -- those subscribed to in the Madrid Concluding Document and subsequently in the Stockholm Document. Numerous statements were made on these subjects in last Thursday's "S" Group meeting.

It is in accordance with the Madrid Mandate that we have been assessing progress achieved in Stockholm and looking at early implementation experiences. In this connection, it is important to recall that our job here is not to replace the comprehensive review of implementation results that will, of necessity, be required at our next follow-up meeting. Implementation can be judged only over time, based on a thorough assessment of sustained action in meeting the requirements of the Stockholm Document. Early experiences should facilitate improvements in understanding and in application of the requirements. They cannot substitute for the confidence which should result from practical experience. The Stockholm Document, in paragraph 99, records the collective understanding of the 35 participating States that only implementation of the measures will contribute to the objectives of the Document itself. Only through experience, and a sustained pattern of implementation, will we be able to judge whether we have fulfilled those objectives.

In this context, Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to comments made by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia in plenary on June 16. Although many of the questions raised by Ambassador Kadnar were covered explicitly in my remarks on this subject in "S" Group on June 1 and in previous interventions, it seems essential to address them once again in order to set the record straight.

Questions were raised by Ambassador Kadnar regarding amendments to the U.S. annual calendar. First, let me stress that the decision of U.S. authorities to change exercise plans originally set forth in our annual calendar has been carried out entirely within the letter and spirit of the Stockholm Document

It is simply incorrect to infer that the U.S. made a decision to remove IRON FORGE from observation by lowering the number of participants. The exercise IRON FORGE forecast in the U.S. Annual Calendar on 15 December 1986, paragraph E, subparagraph 56.6, at 13,400 troops, would not, under para 38.4 of the Stockholm Document have required invitation of observers. The only U.S. exercise which did drop below the observation threshold, COMPASS POINT, is not a NATO exercise. It is a U.S. Fifth Corps exercise. You will note that we are voluntarily giving information on command and control--a procedure that was resisted by Warsaw Pact representatives in Stockholm and is routinely denied to Western observers at Eastern exercises. The majority of U.S. exercises are not at Army corps level, but are at the division level or below. Also, while it is true that exercises are planned far in advance of their execution, it is not true that changes cannot be made. One of the virtues of our system -- a feature that was persuasively discussed by the distinguished representative of Switzerland on June 18 -- is the flexibility given to the field commander to increase, decrease, or otherwise change his exercise based upon the dictates of his mission.

The Stockholm Document was not designed to drive commanders into one way of doing business, but rather to ensure that whatever actions were taken were properly notified and if applicable, observed in accordance with agreed provisions.

Accordingly, I categorically reject any inference that changes have been made by the United States deliberately to "evade" implementing any provisions of the Stockholm Document. A variety of actions can change exercise plans. A command's exercise budget can be changed by higher headquarters after the Annual Calendar is published. A new commander can reassess his unit's readiness capabilities and redirect training and exercising without being locked into the decisions or plans of his predecessor. Weather and climatic changes and possible maneuver damage to the countryside are factors. Also, coordination with host-nation governments can play a role in changing annual plans.

The fact that exercises and plans do change was the very reason we negotiated in Stockholm a provision for reflecting changes and for communicating them to all other participants.

Specifically, paragraph 57 of the Stockholm Document requires that such changes be communicated not later than in the appropriate notification. At this point, I would like to associate myself with remarks made by several colleagues on June 18 that reductions or eliminations of planned exercises are permissible.

The United States was also criticized because the voluntary notification of a no-notice exercise, one whose duration did not require observation, was delayed slightly due to technical shortcomings. While I pointed out this problem earlier this month in a frank attempt to share our own problems with initial implementation efforts, I in no way considered or referred to this delay as an "infringement" of Stockholm requirements.

The distinguished head of the delegation of Czechoslovakia further stated that U.S. Exercise CARAVAN GUARD should have been notified under the Stockholm provisions; that it was subject to notification under all relevant parameters. Failure to do so, he contended, was a U.S. breach of the Stockholm Document. The U.S. explained its approach to this exercise many weeks ago, but let me reiterate one central poiint. It is that CARAVAN GUARD was not necessarily subject to notification. The Chairman's Statement in Annex II of the Stockholm Document was clear in dealing with exercises falling within the first 42 days of calendar year 1987. That statement holds explicitly that such exercises are subject to provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. Thus, notification of CARAVAN GUARD was not required, though we acknowledge that in such cases CSCE participant states may make voluntary notification under the new Stockholm provisions.

In closing, I wish to emphasize that the United States has honored both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm Document, and we shall continue to do so.

Statement by Ambassador Samuel Wise
Deputy Chairman, U.S. Delegation
"S" Group, Thursday, July 9, 1987

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN LITHUANIA

I would like to take a few minutes to focus on some of the difficulties faced by the nearly 4 million Lithuanian Roman Catholics who celebrate the 600th anniversary of the Christianization of their country this year.

Priests associated with the Catholic Committee to Defend the Rights of Believers and supporters of the Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church have been systematically persecuted by the authorities. In 1983, Father Alfonsas Svarinskas was arrested and charged with "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" in connection with his activities on behalf of believers and sentenced to 7 years strict regimen camp plus 3 years exile. Others, including Father Sigitas Tamkevicius and Father Jonas Matulionis, have shared Svarinskas' fate.

The training of clergy remains a serious problem in Lithuania. Soviet officials continue to place restrictions on the number of students at the official seminary. As a result there are 144 Catholic churches without their own priests. There are also restrictions on religious instruction for children, the prodction and distribution of religious literature, and use of church buildings. Despite these and other forms of harassment by Soviet authorities, the church in Lithuania continues to flourish.

A resolution was recently introduced in the United States Congress calling upon my delegation to "continue to speak out forcefully against violations of the religious liberty everywhere and specifically in Lithuania during this anniversary year...." This resolution demonstrates the genuine concern of the Congress and the American people over these violations and underscores the need for remedial action to be taken at this meeting in Vienna. We believe that our Western proposal WT.21 on religion best meets this need.

TALKING POINTS FOR USE IN "S" GROUP INFORMAL DEBATE JULY 21, 1987

Ambassador Robert H. Frowick
Deputy Chairman, U.S. Delegation

Mr. Co-ordinator, like a number of my colleagues, I would like to comment on some of the key concerns expressed here in reaction to our Alliance's proposal WT. 129. It is necessary to take time to answer such concerns and thereby clarify the intent of WT. 129.

I would like to offer some U.S. thoughts on three questions: first of all, what is meant by "the framework of the CSCE process"? Secondly, are the Allies attempting to revise the Madrid mandate? Also, have the Allies consulted the NNA states and taken their interests into account?

The Framework of the CSCE Process

-- I was happy on 16 July to notice that Mr. Elmer quoted the entirety of this phrase -- framework of the CSCE process. Not just the "framework of CSCE", but the "framework of the CSCE process.

-- Within CSCE per se, specifically within the Conference on Confidence and Security Building & Disarmament in Europe (CDE), we foresee further work to build upon and expand CSBM's. This work, like earlier efforts on CBM's and the Final Act, is manifestly part and parcel of CSCE itself, not just the CSCE "process", which seems to me a broader and more general term of reference.

-- The conventional stability talks would be distinct from the CDE negotiations. Conventional stability negotiations would take place within the overall framework of the CSCE process. But they would remain autonomous as regards participation, procedures, and subject matter.

-- Now what is the kind of general framework or structure that we have in mind? My own structural image is of a large CSCE geodesic dome a la Buckminster Fuller in which all CSCE activities take place. CSBM's would be discussed within the CDE meeting room of this large structure. The new conventional stability talks I visualize taking place in a smaller structure, distinct and separate from the larger one but linked to it with a conduit permitting a flow of information. Of course, this is an unusual arrangement. There is nothing like it between CSCE and any other arms control forum whether extant or anticipated. The idea is that we would have linkage between conventional stability talks and CSCE, but those talks would not be integrated within CSCE as such.

Madrid Mandate Revision?

-- The question has arisen whether WT. 129 somehow represents an attempt to revise the Madrid mandate.

-- I strongly agree with the reasoning of Jonathan Powell and the statement of Jose Ripoll on July 16 in their emphasizing that there are no grounds whatever for alleging such an attempt to revise.

-- Regarding CSBM's, virtually all of us have indicated a readiness to work on further measures, to "build upon and expand" the measures agreed at Stockholm, as we and our Allies put it.

-- Under terms of the Madrid mandate, we are to assess here in Vienna the progress achieved at Stockholm. I am confident, like Jonathan Powell, that this subject will begin soon to command very close attention. It is a question that we have already discussed at some length.

-- With regard to the mandate formulation on reviewing the results, I repeat results, of the first stage, this seems to us a formulation for an ex post appraisal to be made after the first stage has clearly come to a conclusion. During our Vienna meeting, we have scarcely seen the beginning of the implementation of the Stockholm measures. Annual calendars have been exchanged, and in some cases revised; some activities have been notified; and some initial observation has taken place. But we have not, for example, made any use at all of inspection provisions. It does seem proper, even necessary, to take stock of initial experience. But we must keep a sense of perspective regarding the totality of work under stage one. Only after further CSBM's are developed and we have a wealth of experience with them as well as the Stockholm CSBM's should we logically come to the point where we would consider a review of results of stage one. This is a task, therefore, not for Vienna but for a future CSCE follow-up meeting. And this is the way the matter is expressed in the Madrid mandate.

-- With regard to the durability of the Madrid mandate, I concur with the points of emphasis of General Van der Graaf today. However, I do generally agree with General Tatarnikov's emphasis that we need not consider the Madrid mandate forever immutable. Perhaps, at some point we might collectively agree to a revision of that mandate. But for now it still stands. We have a precise mandate. And our Alliance honors it.

NNA Interests Taken Into Account?

-- Mr. Vukovic has questioned what we have meant on this side of the table in noting that various members of our

Alliance have consulted with NNA officials and have taken careful note of NNA concerns in the formulation of WT. 129.

-- Speaking for the United States, I would note that American representatives have had many consultations with NNA representatives over the past year. Here in Vienna we have sometimes had intensive contacts, both formal and informal. Moreover, we have had numerous in-depth consultations in NNA capitals. In some cases, we have made two or three trips to such capitals.

-- Throughout our work in Vienna we and our Allies have taken careful note of the legitimate and understandable interest of the NNA to be kept informed of the evolution of the conventional stability talks. We are fully prepared to maintain an effective exchange of views with the NNA in the future. We believe that WT. 129 is a most realistic and pragmatic proposal, not only because it represents a solid synthesis of views within our own Alliance, but precisely because it takes into account views expressed by all participating states represented around this table, including the heterogeneous views of the Neutral and Non-Aligned states.

Statement by

Dr. Ronald L. Hatchett

Secretary of Defense Representative

to the "S" Working Group

July 23, 1987

Mr. Coordinator, at our last meeting, in the context of our general discussion on WT.129, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, General Tatarnikov, implied that this proposal seeks to "divorce disarmament from the CSCE." Moreover, in what I assume was a reference to the Madrid Mandate, he went on to admonish that "we must respect what we all jointly gave life to."

I want to assure the General, and all other colleagues here today, that the United States in no way views its co-sponsoring of WT.129 as an attempt to separate disarmament from the CSCE or renege on agreements reached in Madrid. On the contrary, we believe that WT.129 is entirely consistent with both the letter and spirit of the Helsinki process in general, and the Madrid Mandate in particular. As Ambassador Zimmermann has pointed out in plenary, WT.129 neither adds nor subtracts anything to or from the Madrid Mandate. It is simply a realistic, pragmatic proposal on what is possible at this time.

Mr. Coordinator, the security section of all CSCE documents from Helsinki to Madrid has included both statements of broad goals, and specific measures for moving toward them. Over the years since Helsinki, the security goals have remained relatively constant, but in each follow-up conference the participants have tried to adopt ever more substantial measures for moving toward these goals. In each case, we have moved incrementally, by adopting measures reflecting what could be achieved by concensus at that time.

In Madrid the participating states agreed to initiate a process designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament in Europe. The Madrid delegations realized that there was little prospect of reaching consensus then on measures allowing full attainment of all aspects of the declared goal. Therefore, they agreed that the process would proceed in stages, the first of which would be devoted to the negotiation and adoption of a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. Stockholm made significant progress toward this end, but at least 16 states participating in this conference believe there is more work to do in the field of confidence- and security-building measures. In addition, these 16 states also want to see this conference make as much progress toward the goal of achieving disarmament as it can, given the varying national views which determine the consensus possible at this time.

We are all aware of the difference of views among our 35 states on how to proceed at this time in the disarmament field. Some states profess readiness to engage now in full disarmament negotiations with all other CSCE states. Other states say they have no desire to reduce or limit their forces at this time. And still others are willing to negotiate reductions and limitations on their forces but only in the context of creating a more stable and secure balance of forces between the two major military alliances in Europe. And as most of you know, some states in this latter category would prefer to see this balance established without any role at all for non-alliance states or organizations.

The 16 sponsors of WT.129 have carefully considered all these viewpoints and have included in their proposal the most ambitious step in the disarmament field capable of receiving consensus at this time. Our proposal was painstakingly crafted to reflect a balance among the varying national views around this table. None of us will get 100 percent of what we want from the WT.129 provisions. But WT.129 provides the best basis for making progress in the near term toward our common security goals. Extremely grave problems for our work would be created if the careful balance of interests represented here were upset.

So in the coming days of debate, my delegation would encourage all to avoid hyperboles such as "removing disarmament from the CSCE," "reneging on the Madrid Mandate," and so on. Instead, let us reflect pragmatically on what is possible at this time, given the well-known divergence of views around this table and my delegation believes that the move we have joined in co-sponsoring, is a significant one.

I would remind you that there are not now, nor have there ever been, any disarmament negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process. WT.129 provides for such negotiations. Surely this would be a positive step in the staged approach to security we embarked on in Madrid.

INFORMAL REMARKS BY
AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. FROWICK
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, U.S. CSCE DELEGATION
TO THE "S" GROUP ON JULY 28, 1987

NON-PAPER ON THE ASSESSMENT OF STOCKHOLM

Mr. Coordinator, I would like to draw the attention of this group to the non-paper I have asked you to circulate today on behalf of the U.S. Delegation, regarding an assessment of the progress achieved during the Stockholm Conference.

A number of my colleagues here have questioned the absence of such language in proposal WT.129, recently tabled by the U.S. and its Allies. As we have previously explained, this was neither an oversight nor an exclusion.

In the past few months, we have had an extended and productive discussion on this subject, and my delegation has been encouraged by the relative convergence of views in this forum. It should not be a difficult task to reach agreement on this subject.

As I have indicated before, the United States is determined to work toward a compact but substantive Concluding Document. Assessing the progress achieved at Stockholm is one of the required tasks of the Vienna Meeting, as set out in the Madrid Concluding Document. We believe this non-paper fully addresses the substance at hand.

The Stockholm assessment must receive careful treatment in our concluding document, together with our decisions on the continuation of the work begun at Stockholm in accordance with the terms of the Madrid mandate. We thus envisage this text's appearing at the beginning of the section on military security in the Vienna Concluding Document, to precede attention to the issues dealt with in proposal WT.129 concerning the continuation of our work.

The individual elements of the non-paper should come as no surprise. They reflect the assessment of the United States and many other delegations that the set of mutually complementary CSBMs adopted in Stockholm fully conforms to the criteria set forth in the Madrid mandate. Furthermore, the CSBMs constitute a substantial improvement and extension of the confidence-building measures adopted in the Helsinki Final Act.

Each one of us has welcomed the fact that, on paper at least, we have come some distance in our efforts to promote more transparency and increase confidence and security in Europe. The ultimate significance of our achievement, however, -- as is true for all commitments undertaken in CSCE, -- will depend decisively on rigorous and thorough compliance with the provisions we have adopted.

As I have indicated on previous occasions, the United States is generally encouraged by initial experience with implementing the measures adopted in Stockholm. As evidenced by our discussions here, however, these early experiences have uncovered a number of problems and difficulties which further efforts at implementation should help to clarify and hopefully resolve. Moreover, extended experience with implementation is required for a full and well-informed assessment. The next CSCE follow-up meeting will provide us the initial opportunity for a comprehensive review of implementation.

Despite progress achieved to date, I believe there is general agreement that further work remains to be done in the field of CSBMs designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. As proposal WT.129 sets out, our efforts should continue to build upon and expand the set of mutually complementary CSBMs adopted in Stockholm. Moreover, we should undertake to elaborate a further set of CSBMs which conforms to the criteria set out in the Madrid mandate. As indicated in WT.129, our priorities in this regard will include arrangements for a verification regime including comprehensive exchanges of information and on-site inspection going beyond those provided in the Stockholm Document.

With the tabling of this non-paper, Mr. Coordinator, it seems to us that we now have all the basic elements in place to get on with our work in a productive fashion when negotiations resume in September.

BASKET II STATEMENTS

U.S. STATEMENT
BY
DELEGATE ROBERT HAND
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
DG-E
MAY 12, 1987

Mr. Chairman, the statements made here this morning clearly indicate a desire to move forward in our work. The U.S. Delegation shares this desire, and I would like to make a few comments on how we can make genuine progress and ultimately achieve the best results from our efforts in drafting group "E."

First, I would like to thank the delegate of Norway for his statement regarding informal meetings, which we fully support. The United States agrees that such meetings could facilitate a more direct and informal exchange of views on specific proposals. This, in turn, will serve as a catalyst to our finding agreement, hopefully by 31 July. The U.S. Delegation will work in this group as elsewhere in the Vienna Meeting to achieve that end.

As we proceed, however, I think it is important to keep in mind that we should avoid moving forward in a way that would sacrifice the quality of our work. For example, some delegations have suggested that we should work first on proposals in areas where quick and easy agreement is likely. It seems to me that this approach creates a real possibility that we will achieve a result quickly but without doing much if anything to solve the many problems in economic, scientific and environmental cooperation which were the focus of our implementation review.

Our goal is not just to find consensus among ourselves on some words but to move the CSCE process forward with a concluding document of substance, one that will lead to results well after the Vienna Meeting has ended. As a first step toward this goal, it is best to move away from labelling some proposals "difficult" and others "easy." Furthermore, we should not focus solely on areas where we could probably reach agreement with relative ease while ignoring more difficult areas. Instead, we should ensure that all of the topics covered by Basket II are examined, one by one, before we reach any agreement. The U.S. Delegation will stress proposals that best enhance the commitments already made in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document in each of these topics. If considerable disagreement exists regarding some of these proposals, then our job is to make every effort to overcome that disagreement.

As we move deeper into this phase of the meeting, Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is also important for us to keep in mind the relevance of our work to those on the outside. The acceptance of proposals into a concluding document will not in itself encourage the development of cooperation between the participating States in the fields of economics, of science and technology, and of the environment. Ultimately, it is implementation that will move the CSCE process forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. STATEMENT IN INFORMAL DRAFTING GROUP "E" ON AIR POLLUTION

MAY 21, 1987

THE IMPORTANCE WHICH WE ALL ATTACH TO THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT HAS BEEN UNDERLINED BY THE NUMBER OF PROPOSALS TABLED IN THIS AREA. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE AREA OF AIR POLLUTION. THE VARIETY OF PROPOSALS DEALING WITH AIR POLLUTION REQUIRES US TO COMPARE THE WAY THEY ADDRESS SIMILAR ISSUES, SUCH AS REDUCING EMISSIONS OF VARIOUS AIR POLLUTANTS OR PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER.

AS WE DO SO, HOWEVER, IT IS USEFUL TO KEEP IN MIND WHAT A VIENNA CONCLUDING DOCUMENT MAY LOOK LIKE. I THINK THAT WE SHOULD LOOK FOR SOMETHING IN THE AREA OF AIR POLLUTION THAT MOVES US AS FAR FORWARD AS IS POSSIBLE AND PRACTICAL. THIS MEANS THAT WE SHOULD NOT FOCUS ON DECLARATORY LANGUAGE WHICH MAY SOUND NOBLE BUT DOES NOT COMMIT US TO ANY SPECIFIC ACTIONS. IT ALSO MEANS THAT WE SHOULD NOT DELAY ACCEPTING SUCH COMMITMENTS BY PUTTING THEIR DISCUSSION OFF TO YET ANOTHER MEETING. AS MR. JESSEN HAS NOTED, OUR CONCERN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT MUST BE REFLECTED IN THE RESULTS WE ACHIEVE HERE IN VIENNA, NOT IN THE POSSIBLE RESULTS OF A FUTURE MEETING. WE WANT TO SEE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE ENVIRONMENT, NOT A PROLIFERATION OF MEETINGS TO TALK ABOUT THE PROBLEMS.

IN ADDITION, WE MUST WORK FOR LANGUAGE IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT THAT IS REALISTIC. DESPITE OUR COMMON CONCERN FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, WE MUST REALIZE THAT WE ARE EACH EXAMINING THE ISSUE FROM DIFFERENT VANTAGE POINTS. FOR EXAMPLE, SOME STATES ALREADY HAVE TAKEN MANY MEASURES TO CLEAN THE ENVIRONMENT YEARS AHEAD OF MOST OTHER STATES. ON THE OTHER HAND, SOME STATES HAVE ONLY RECENTLY SEEN THE DANGERS THE DETERIORATION OF OUR ENVIRONMENT POSES AND ARE ONLY NOW BEGINNING TO TAKE SIGNIFICANT MEASURES. THIS IS WHY IT IS IMPORTANT TO AGREE TO REALISTIC COMMITMENTS FOR SOLVING THESE PROBLEMS.

THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF THE MANY POLLUTANTS PUT INTO THE AIR DAILY CAN BE DEALT WITH ONLY THROUGH COMPREHENSIVE EFFORTS ON OUR PART. THIS IS WHY WE FEEL THAT THE PROPOSAL ON THE ENVIRONMENT (WT.89) NEEDS TO BE EXAMINED CLOSELY HERE IN OUR GROUP.

WT.89 IS ITSELF COMPREHENSIVE AND CALLS FOR ACTION. FOR EXAMPLE, IT RECOMMENDS THAT THOSE STATES WHO HAVE SIGNED THE 1985 HELSINKI PROTOCOL ON THE REDUCTION OF SULFUR EMISSIONS RATIFY IT SO THAT THE PROTOCOL CAN ENTER INTO FORCE. IT ALSO RECOMMENDS THAT THOSE WHO HAVE NOT SIGNED THE PROTOCOL SHOULD DO SO AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

BECAUSE IT IS A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL, IT RECOGNIZES THE EFFORTS OF THOSE STATES WHO HAVE ALREADY REDUCED THEIR EMISSIONS AND CALLS ON THEM TO CONTINUE CONTROLLING THOSE EMISSIONS. IN ALL OF THESE CASES IT CALLS FOR ACTION; AND WE MUST REMAIN COMMITTED TO ACTION.

IN ADDITION TO SULFUR EMISSIONS, WT.89 ACKNOWLEDGES THE DESIRABILITY OF DRAFTING A PROTOCOL, IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE LONG-RANGE TRANSBOUNDARY AIR POLLUTION CONVENTION, FOR THE REDUCTION OF NITROGEN OXIDE EMISSIONS OR THEIR TRANSBOUNDARY FLUXES. IT ALSO RECOGNIZES THE NEED TO CONSIDER, WITHIN APPROPRIATE FORA, SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REDUCTION OF OTHER AIR POLLUTANTS SUCH AS HYDROCARBONS, OZONE AND OTHER PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS.

THE PROPOSAL ENCOURAGES EFFORTS UNDERWAY IN OTHER FORA -- IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE AT THE CSCE NOT ASK FOR DUPLICATIVE EFFORTS -- TO REDUCE POLLUTANTS. WT.89 CALLS ON THE PARTICIPATING STATES TO AGREE TO ACTIVELY PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE EMISSION OF FULLY HALOGENATED CHLOROFLUORCARBONS AND OTHER OZONE-MODIFYING SUBSTANCES UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM. WHERE WORK IS UNDERWAY, IN THIS CASE ON THE OZONE LAYER, WE SHOULD ACTIVELY SUPPORT IT.

FINALLY, THE PROPOSAL RECOMMENDS THE BROADENING OF THE CO-OPERATIVE PROGRAM FOR MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE LONG-RANGE TRANSMISSION OF AIR POLLUTANTS SET UP IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EMEP PROTOCOL SO AS TO INCLUDE NITROGEN OXIDES, HYDROCARBONS, OZONE AND OTHER PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDANTS. WT.89 ALSO CALLS FOR THE PROMPT RATIFICATION OF THE EMEP PROTOCOL ON LONG-TERM FINANCING TO ENSURE SUCH FINANCING.

AS I NOTED EARLIER, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER PROPOSALS WHICH DEAL WITH AIR POLLUTION. WT.8, FOR EXAMPLE, ADDRESSES AIR POLLUTION AND THE DECAY OF FORESTS. SEVERAL TOPICS (REDUCTION OF AIR POLLUTANTS AND EMEP) HAVE THE SAME THRUST AS WT.89 AND COULD BE COMBINED WITH IT. HOWEVER, WE QUESTION THE NEED FOR A SYMPOSIUM; AGAIN, WE ARE LOOKING FOR ACTION.

WT.16 ALSO CONTAINS A NUMBER OF SIMILAR ELEMENTS. THERE APPEARS TO BE A BASIS FOR FINDING AGREED LANGUAGE ON THE HELSINKI PROTOCOL, EMEP, AND THE NEED TO REDUCE OTHER POLLUTANTS. HOWEVER, IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT WE BE REALISTIC AND NOT ATTEMPT TO COMMIT OURSELVES TO GOALS WHICH CANNOT BE FULFILLED.

FINALLY, THE PROPOSAL ON THE OZONE LAYER (WT.18) ALSO HAS A NUMBER OF ELEMENTS WHICH COULD BE COMBINED WITH A COMPREHENSIVE TEXT ON AIR POLLUTION AND THE ENVIRONMENT.

IN SUM, WE FEEL THAT A COMPREHENSIVE, ACTION-ORIENTED TEXT ON AIR POLLUTION SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN A CONCLUDING DOCUMENT.

U.S. STATEMENT
ON
WT.115: COMPENSATION TRANSACTIONS IN ALL THEIR FORMS
INFORMAL BASKET II DISCUSSIONS
June 16, 1987
by
Robert A. Hand

Thank you Mr. Coordinator.

This morning our delegation would like to continue the discussion of last Thursday on the subject of countertrade. Many interesting remarks were made on WT.115, a proposal designed to introduce a little more maturity and common sense to the conduct of East-West trade. Unfortunately, not all of the remarks were positive. Mr. Ornatsky was particularly candid in expressing his difficulties with it. We do not believe, however, that his remarks properly addressed WT.115. The points he made did not make the problems identified in the proposal any less true or the suggested ways of solving these problems any less necessary. In that Mr. Ornatsky has stated on several occasions a desire to see our work move forward, I assume that his statement was only the result of a continued misunderstanding about what WT.115 does and does not do. Therefore, it would be useful to examine some of the arguments made against WT.115 last week and to explain further why this proposal is necessary.

The general thrust of Mr. Ornatsky's statement was that compensation transactions are not bad. In fact, he argues that they are good. He notes, as he has done several times in the past, that the participating States recognized in the Madrid Concluding Document that "a useful role can be played by such transactions, concluded on a mutually acceptable basis." He says that WT.115 ignores and, in fact, contradicts this point. However, the proposal clearly states that, if compensation is sought, it should be based on the free acceptance by both sides of a commercial transaction of its usefulness in light of specific circumstances surrounding the deal. In other words, WT.115 specifies when a particular countertrade deal can be useful, building upon the language so frequently quoted in our earlier discussions of the topic. Furthermore, even in those cases when countertrade might be considered useful, it nevertheless may cause some problems at both the micro- and macro-economic level. These problems and the need to solve them were the major concerns of the participating States in Madrid, who never in fact sought to encourage countertrade.

In regard to the arguement that a distinction should be made between long-term industrial compensation deals and short-term counterpurchase transactions, it is true that short-term deals may cause some problems not normally found in long-term deals, but this does not mean that both types do not have common problems or that long-term deals do not have their own, unique problems. Long-term deals, for example, can lead to a greater bilateralism in trade and may not be able to adopt to market forces which are changing over time. Prices stipulated in contracts may vary from fluctuating world prices and must be renegotiated. Specified quantities of resultant product to be delivered may create excess supply and disrupt markets. WT.115 correctly takes these problems into account as well as those associated with short-term counterpurchase transactions.

We agree with the assertion that Western firms are not under any formal obligation to accept the terms of a countertrade deal. At the same time, when we speak of countertrade in East-West trade we are not usually speaking of instances where it is in both sides' best interest to mutually exchange goods. Instead, we are speaking about demands for countertrade being imposed by one side on the other, often close to the conclusion of business negotiations. This quite often places Western firms in a position of accepting less than desirable terms. It seems that those who manage non-market economies, frustrated by not being able to produce a sufficient amount of goods that are competitive in Western markets, find relief in the fact that their foreign trade monopolies are, in fact, also monopsonies, permitting them to play competing Western firms against each other in order to obtain higher counterpurchase ratios. Their ability to do so does not mean that this is the way Western firms -- even those who conclude countertrade deals -- prefer to do business.

When our discussions have turned to the subject of countertrade, some delegations have been quick to point to specific countertrade deals as examples which demonstrate how successful such deals seem to be. Among other things, the long-term benefits and increased business contacts which can evolve from them have been noted. Yes, many Western firms -- some of them American -- have learned to cope with Soviet and East European countertrade demands. Some indeed have even been able to take advantage of the situation by becoming clearing houses of sorts for goods received as payment. This fact, however, does not demonstrate the benefits of engaging in countertrade but rather ability of market forces to create some business opportunities even when faced with trading methods which directly oppose them. And despite this ability, countertrade increases the risk of participating in trade without providing any advantages relative to regular trading methods. While we hear statements claiming that countertrade is not the problem we say it is, we have not been provided with any reasons for why it is a better way to trade.

Moreover, the examples of countertrade deals are the exceptions rather than the rule. While one may cite a few Western firms who have engaged in countertrade with their Eastern counterparts, we do not know how many others have been denied the opportunity to take advantage of potential sales because of excessive countertrade demands. In addition, there likely exists a whole host of companies that took the countertrade course, only to find themselves importing unsalable goods or otherwise bound to contracts which have particularly unfavorable terms. In such cases, it is likely that they will try to avoid such deals in the future. This is especially true in the case of small- and medium-sized firms. Although such firms can "piggy-back" on larger companies in their dealings, as was suggested at the last meeting, why should they not be able to develop their own relationships with their Eastern counterparts? The intent of the Basket II section on commercial exchanges was to broaden contacts and expand trade activity by all those involved, with a special reference made to solving the problems which particularly burden small- and medium-sized enterprises. We should not be so content with having their role in East-West trade limited to that of a sub-contractor for a larger company.

Last Thursday, Western firms were claimed to have imposed countertrade on their Eastern counterparts. That is simply incorrect. We do know, however, that some Amercian companies have proposed countertrade deals to Romanian foreign trade organizations. We do not know the specific reasons why they do this. It may be that they know heavy demands for compensation will be made by their Romanian counterparts during the course of negotiations and believe it is therefore better to make an initiative in order to achieve a more agreeable result in terms of the products they receive. The Romanian response has been to refuse these initiatives, insisting on hard currency payment for the purchase of Romanian goods. In other Eastern countries, attempts by Western firms to pick the goods received as payment receive similar responses as the foreign trade organizations are willing to offer only what they cannot market in the West for hard currency themselves. This one-sidedness is indicative of what Western firms engaged in East-West trade commonly face and what WT.115 is trying to correct.

Last Thursday we also heard the argument that countertrade is a phenomenon in trade throughout the world and is not unique in East-West trade. Again, this may be true, but it is also a distortion of reality. While countertrade does exist in trade in many regions of the world, U.S. Government sources have estimated that the share of countertrade in East-West trade may be almost three times higher than it is for world trade. Furthermore, it is more entrenched in East-West trade than elsewehere, and the ability of Eastern trading partners to impose countertrade on Western firms has made the difficulties of this trade larger.

Now that we have explained some of the general points, it is appropriate to take a slightly closer look at what WT.115 says. After noting some of the problems caused by compensation transactions in all their forms, the proposal suggests that these transactions be replaced whenever possible by forms of trade more compatible with the traditional framework of international trade relations. It then makes recommendations for how to deal with remaining demands. These recommendations are very reasonable, and it is difficult to understand how some delegations could oppose them. For example, why should demands for compensation not be minimized to allow the conditions of a traditional commercial transaction to apply as far as possible? Do those who oppose WT.115 feel that it is better to impose such demands on partners? What is wrong with making demands for countertrade clear from the start of business negotiations, with allowing a wide choice of products from a variety of product sectors, with balancing the rights and obligations between both partners, or with treating counter-products in the same way as products sold under normal trading methods? In other words, what is wrong with making demands for countertrade more flexible?

Assuming that business deals should be concluded on a mutually acceptable basis, which hopefully everyone here agrees should be the case, the inclusion of WT.115 into a Vienna concluding document followed by its effective implementation would lead to an expansion of trade. The increased flexibility it offers would attract those Western firms who would like to engage in trade in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union but are now discouraged from doing so by the additional costs created by countertrade.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that these additional costs are not only incurred by the Western firm. In order for a Western firm to realize an acceptable profit in a countertrade deal, it may raise the cost of the product it is selling in order to cover the additional costs and risks of marketing the product received as payment. A further cost to both sides comes about as a result of the additional length and complexity of trade negotiations which must deal with demands for compensation. Thus, the elimination of burdensome compensation transactions would give potential partners in both the East and the West greater opportunities to trade.

In the longer term, limiting the utilization of compensation transactions would also increase trade by making it necessary for enterprises to produce goods that are more competitive in Western markets. The lack of competitivity of these products has made it impossible for the non-market economy countries, which lack a hard currency of their own, from generating sufficient hard-currency reserves through the export of these products. Resorting to demands for compensation in business deals only perpetuates this situation and will restrict the expansion and diversification of East-West trade.

Thus, Mr. Coordinator, if the delegations represented here want to facilitate the expansion of trade, a more reasonable approach to WT.115 is needed. As a start, delegations should not claim it does things that it clearly doesn't do, such as taking steps backward or restricting the expansion of trade. In addition, we should not adopt an attitude of benign neglect toward a method of trade that is imposed by one side of a business deal on the other side under increasingly onerous conditions. Countertrade practices clearly have trade-distorting effects and unnecessarily create additional complications and risks that are not countered by any significant advantages relative to traditional trading practices.

As a final thought, I would like to note that Mr. Ornatsky admitted in his statement that compensation transactions did cause problems. He seemed to indicate, however, a desire to avoid addressing these problems. We believe that our purpose here at the Vienna Meeting is to address problems in a frank and open way; ignoring them will not make them go away. This is true in regard to countertrade as it is to business conditions or any other topic our delegations discuss.

Thank you, Mr. Coordinator.

U.S. STATEMENT BY ROBERT HAND
ON
PROPOSALS CONCERNING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION
INFORMAL BASKET II MEETING
JUNE 18, 1987

THANK YOU, MR. COORDINATOR.

THIS MORNING WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE STATEMENT REGARDING INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION. THE STATEMENT AT LAST TUESDAY'S MEETING BY MR. REICHEL AND THE ONE TODAY BY MR. POIRIER ACCURATELY REFLECT THE PROBLEMS THAT EXIST IN THIS AREA. I WILL BE VERY BRIEF SO AS NOT TO BE REPETITIVE.

ALTHOUGH INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAS EXISTED FOR A LONG TIME NOW, IT STILL SUFFERS FROM MANY SHORTCOMINGS. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT AND MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT ADDRESSED SOME OF THESE PROBLEMS, BUT THE CONDITIONS FOR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION HAVE NOT IMPROVED SIGNIFICANTLY AS A RESULT. WESTERN FIRMS, THEREFORE, CONTINUE TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES, MANY OF WHICH ARE THE SAME AS THOSE FACING WESTERN FIRMS INVOLVED IN EAST-WEST TRADE GENERALLY. FOR EXAMPLE, SUITABLE BUSINESS FACILITIES, BETTER BUSINESS CONTACTS AND SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION ARE AS NECESSARY FOR INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AS THEY ARE FOR COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES. BECAUSE OF THE LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS BUSINESS REPRESENTRATIVES SOMETIMES MUST MAKE IN AN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJECT, THESE ISSUES CAN BECOME EVEN MORE NECESSARY.

FOR THIS REASON, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO CONSIDER THE CONTENTS OF WT.117, WT.118 AS RELEVANT TO INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION AS WELL AS TO COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES. PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT ARE THE PROVISIONS OF WT.117 WHICH CALL FOR DIRECT CONTACTS BETWEEN BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES AND POTENTIAL BUYERS AND END-USERS AT ALL STAGES OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, INCLUDING THE NEGOTIATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTRACTS. THEY ALSO CALL FOR ACCESS APPROPRIATE TO THE BUSINESS INTENDED OR BEING TRANSACTED, TO SITES AND PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN THAT BUSINESS. WHEN OUR IMPLEMENTATION REVIEW FOCUSED ON INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION, WE NOTED THAT THE FLOW OF INFORMATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NECESSARY CONTACTS IS PARTICULARLY RESTRICTED AT THE WORKING-LEVEL IN SEVERAL EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THERE EXIST LAWS AND REGULATIONS PROHIBITING THE TRANSMISSION TO A FOREIGNER OF EVEN RUDIMENTARY ECONOMIC INFORMATION. FOREIGN BUSINESS REPRESENTATIVES HAVE EITHER LIMITED OR NO ACCESS TO SITES IN THESE SAME COUNTRIES.

IN ADDITION TO THESE ISSUES, THE INCREASED COMPLEXITY OF INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION MAKES NECESSARY ADDITIONAL MEASURES IF PROSPECTIVE DEALS ARE TO BECOME REALITIES. WE ALL KNOW THAT, IN TODAY'S WORLD ECONOMY, COMPETITION IS FIERCE. INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION PROJECTS, THEREFORE, MUST BE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND GIVE A HIGH PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS FOR THE PARTNERS INVOLVED IF THEY ARE TO BE ATTRACTIVE. THEY MUST MEET THE TEST OF ECONOMIC RATIONALITY, BEING BOTH FEASIBLE AND PROFITABLE. EXTREMELY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD ARE ISSUES SUCH AS GUARANTEES AGAINST EXPROPRIATION, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION, AND THE REPATRIATION OF PROFITS. ALSO IMPORTANT ARE THE PERCENTAGE SHARE A FOREIGN FIRM MAY HOLD IN A VENTURE, AND THE ABILITY OF THAT FIRM TO PARTICIPATE IN THE MANAGEMENT OF A VENTURE.

WT.63, A PROPOSAL ON JOINT ENTERPRISES AND PRODUCTION COOPERATION, HARDLY COVERS SUCH ISSUES. INSTEAD, IT SEEKS TO OBTAIN GOVERNMENTAL ENDORSEMENT AND PROMOTION OF JOINT ENTERPRISES AND PRODUCTION COOPERATION. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS, AT LEAST IN THE WESTERN WORLD, HOWEVER, IS LIMITED IN THIS RESPECT. IT IS FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR TO DECIDE IF PROJECTS ARE VIABLE OR EVEN PROMISING. FOR THIS REASON, THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE IN WT.63 THAT IS USEFUL OR APPROPRIATE.

WT/E.1, SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATION OF HUNGARY, ALSO FOCUSES ON INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION. WE ARE NOT SURE, HOWEVER, HOW IT WILL MOVE US BEYOND WHERE WE ALREADY ARE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT SAYS THAT THE PARTICIPATING STATES "WILL SEARCH FOR METHODS CAPABLE OF ENHANCING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS BETWEEN ECONMOMIC PARTNERS POTENTIALLY INTERESTED IN INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION." THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED, BUT WHY NOT SIMPLY ALLOW DIRECT CONTACTS INSTEAD OF SEARCH FOR METHODS CAPABLE OF ENHANCING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACTS?

MR. COORDINATOR, WHILE WE FEEL THAT INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION OFFERS THE POTENTIAL FOR EXPANDED DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS, WE CONTINUE TO BE CAUTIOUS. UNFAVORABLE BUSINESS CONDITIONS, A POOR ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MANY NON-MARKET ECONOMY COUNTRIES AND THE LACK OF A PROPER, SUFFICIENTLY ATTRACTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK, NOTABLY IN REGARD TO MANAGEMENT AND REPATRIATION OF PROFITS FOR JOINT VENTURES, WILL INHIBIT FURTHER GROWTH. CLARIFYING EXISTING LAWS AND ADOPTING NEW LAWS WHICH ALLOW INCREASED FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF SOME EASTERN STATES WOULD BE INSTRUMENTAL IN IMPROVING THE CURRENT SITUATION. BETTER IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE PROVISIONS REGARDING COMMERCIAL EXCHANGES WOULD BE HELPFUL AS WELL. THE INCORPORATION INTO A VIENNA CONCLUDING DOCUMENT OF THE PROPOSALS RELEVANT TO INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION SUBMITTED BY EASTERN DELEGATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD DO LITTLE TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION AND COULD MOVE US IN THE WRONG DIRECTION.

THANK YOU, MR. COORDINATOR.

U.S. STATEMENT
BY
DELEGATE THOMAS TURQMAN
VIENNA CSCE FORMAL "E" GROUP MEETING
JUNE 18, 1987

Mr. Chairman, during last Tuesday's meeting, this delegation at least, felt like it was in a time capsule, shifting between two periods of time. Yugoslavia, supported by a number of Eastern delegates spoke in favor of WT.26, which at its best is a well intentioned effort to address serious and complex economic issues. But what confused us, we time travellers, was the use of what this delegation calls U.N.-Speak by the supporters of this proposal in the harkening back to the dark ages of the New International Order, commonly known as NIEO in support of WT.26. Mr. Chairman, WT.26 has enough trouble on its own merits to gain credibility for its approach to complex economic problems. But to buttress calls for WT.26 with reference to the NIEO--a concept that has even been abandoned in all but name by many of the same developing countries that pulled the idea out of what I suspect is the grandfather of the rabbit hat mentioned earlier in our discussion--is to demonstrate a lack of seriousness. Mr. Chairman, this is an important forum and to raise NIEO in the midst of what has been for the most part a serious economic discussion on East-West issues, is to signal to this delegation, at least, that some of the delegations supporting this proposal could not resist the opportunity to fall back in time to the kind of rhetoric that dominates UNCTAD and UNGA type discussions.

The record of the U.N. General Assembly is full of U.S. demurrals to NIEO when it was first presented. Certainly some of you--and I know there are some--who have been assigned to second committee affairs at the General Assembly in New York know the U.S. position. So let me state clearly that the representatives here should avoid getting bogged down in NIEO concepts and all it implies. It is only in the General Assembly that one can spend weeks, months and even years in debating the difference between the article "a" and "the" before an expression. And if this is the level of discussion our colleagues who have resorted to NIEO seek, then I suggest this is the wrong forum.

Perhaps it is not surprising that some of our colleagues reach to the NIEO for support of WT.26--for WT.26 like WT.63 and WT.El suffers from over simplification. My colleague will address the latter proposals in more detail later. Let me say only that these proposals seem to suggest that governments can wave wands over the complex dynamics of world economic relations and all problems will be resolved: banks will continue to lend money to economies that will not modernize; small businesses will risk participation in unsecured ventures and the market will absorb indefinitely overpriced and lower quality goods as part of counter trade deals. That kind of reasoning reflects approaches common to those economies which are centrally controlled. It reflects the world of closely managed economies and not the reality of the market place.

One of our colleagues said last Tuesday in support of WT.26, "We have to take into account what is going on in the outside world." Well, let's look at the outside world for a minute in terms of WT.26. There is not a serious economist in debtor or creditor countries who does not recognize that there can be no long term improvement in the economies of debtor countries without major structural adjustments. And in fact, a number of debtor developing countries have made and are making the hard political decisions to undertake these changes. But nowhere in WT.26 is the need for structural change emphasized or even identified. Instead the emphasis is on an improved external environment alone. This is simply not realistic. No amount of improvement in the external environment will generate improvement in economies, for example, that are dependent on commodities which are being overtaken by advances in technology. Certainly the African Special Session which was directly concerned with these issues recognized this problem in its forward thinking and far reaching concluding document.

The issues of debt, money and trade moreover are being engaged where this can be most effectively done; namely, in the Bretton Woods Organizations and the GATT. We simply don't need superficial proposals like this one in the CSCE process, when these very issues are the focus of the major economic powers and are being dealt with where improvement and change can be implemented. This is seen, for example, in the Venice Economic Summit Declaration: the Declaration endorsed the wide range of approaches to the problems of debt of countries. It also makes a clear distinction between low and middle income debtor nations. Debtor countries cannot simply be thrown into one large group as WT.26 attempts to do. And frankly, we would like to know along what lines the General Assembly resolution cited in WT.26 changes or proposes changes in the current debt strategy. We are not aware of anything new it adds to the discussion on debt. That being the case, why should we insert a U.N. resolution in the Basket II process?

Let me return however to the Venice Summit and the real outside world. For the poorest countries undertaking adjustment efforts, the Vienna Summit proposed the possibility of lower interest rates to existing debt and longer repayment and grace periods. For the middle income debtors, the present growth oriented case by case strategy will apply, but with an ever growing range of options or menus as referred to in debt discussion. We have also seen some innovative approaches to debt problems through the use of "equity swaps", where the economic and political environment supports such ventures.

Let me quote from the Vienna Summit to give you some measure of the approach of world economic leaders to the essential issue raised in WT.26; namely, economic growth. "We shall play our part by helping to sustain growth and expand trade. A number of debt agreements have allowed some resumption of growth, restrengthened the creditworthiness of some countries. But some still lack adequate policies for structural adjustment and growth designed to encourage the efficient use of domestic savings, the repatriation of flight capital, increased flows of foreign direct investment and in particular reforms of financial markets."

Let me close, Mr. Chairman, by assuring you and the delegations present here that the United States certainly shares the objectives of WT.26. As many of you are aware, the United States for example has taken 65% of the increase in exports from the developing world over the last two or three years. But it is our belief that growth will be achieved by expanding the world economy, this will be advanced through the measures proposed in WT.115, WT.117 and WT.118. These proposals should be the focus of our discussion. We should avoid a transfer of language from the halls of the U.N. General Assembly to our debate here in "E" Group as WT.26 does.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. STATEMENT
BY
DELEGATE ROBERT HAND
VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING
DG-E
JUNE 23, 1987

I would like to make a few additional comments on WT.26 as well. Last week the U.S. Delegation questioned this proposal, not because we necessarily object to its stated purpose but because it and the statements supporting it resemble what we find in the U.N. system, being designed to make political points rather than to solve problems.

In addition, as is typical when discussing U.N.-type resolutions, we heard contentious discussion over aid to the developing world, as well as arms and related ODA policies. In particular, the question of Soviet aid was addressed. We would like to pick up that discussion. Let me review some facts about Soviet aid:

* The Soviet Union delivers more arms to the African continent in a single year than it has given in development assistance to that region in the last twenty years.

* Despite the urgent needs in the region, the Soviet Union has provided almost no emergency relief assistance, particularly food aid, to the African countries. For example, the USSR has provided on average less than 5 million dollars annually in total relief assistance since 1954.

* In 1984 Western countries contributed over 450 million dollars to the emergency relief work of the United Nations. The Soviet Union did not contribute a single kopek.

* Even with the world's attention focussed on the severe economic crisis in Ethiopia -- a staunch Soviet ally -- the USSR provided only 6 million dollars in food and medical assistance during the crisis, compared with 950 million dollars from Western sources.

* Over 90 percent of Soviet aid has been in the form of credits repayable over 10 to 12 years at two to five percent interest, often in hard currency. In comparison, almost half of Western assistance comes in the form of grants, and most Western credits are repayable over 30 years at 3 percent interest.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, if we are to look at the real world, as the Soviet delegate suggests, we should to an objective look, noting where the real source of efforts to help the developing world exist. This being said, I hope we can continue our discussions on Basket II issues in a constructive manner.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RIGHT-OF-REPLY BY
U.S. DELEGATE THOMAS T. TURQMAN
DG-E
JUNE 25, 1987

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I found the remarks of the distinguished representative from the Soviet Union, in response to criticism of East Bloc aid to the developing countries quite interesting. Obviously, having nothing substantial to say about the amount of aid his country provides, he chose instead to ascribe the economic problems of developing countries to the West, in an attempt to deflect the major issue at hand--Soviet aid. He also criticized the United States for shortfalls in its contributions to UNIDO. Since he raised this U.N. organization, let's look at the East Bloc's role in UN development aid. I will return to UNIDO later. But first let me remind our distinguished colleague, as I mentioned last week during our discussion on debt, that in the past two or three years the United States alone has absorbed 65% of the increase in developing country exports. This kind of support, given at some cost to the U.S. economy, is only one of the many western initiatives contributing to the long term growth of developing countries.

But we should return to the major issue at hand, Soviet and East Bloc aid. To address this issue, let's look at a U.N. document which is about as objective as we can get. I will cite from document A/42/207. Let me repeat that for I know my colleagues from the Soviet Union will want to check its accuracy. According to the report from the Secretary-General dated 28 April 1987 on the operational activities of the United Nations system, the development activities of the United Nations system are almost entirely supported by the developed market economy countries and the developing countries. The Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe provide only one percent of the voluntary contributions made by all countries to United Nations multilateral assistance efforts.

Document A/42/207 also states that Western countries contributed over $485 million to United Nations refugee, humanitarian, special economic and disaster relief activities in 1985, and $451 million in 1984. It also shows that the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe did not contribute anything to these activities. Document A/42/207 further indicates the extent to which developing countries are contributing to United Nations multilateral assistance efforts, often at extreme sacrifice due to their low level of economic development. Lets look at this closely: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, China, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia contributed 73.8 million dollars. Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainians SSR and the USSR contributed 9.9 million dollars.

Mr. Chairman, the Soviet Union gives less than five million dollars in voluntary contributions to the development assistance efforts of the United Nations. The Western countries as a whole provide over one billion dollars a year. The United States provides the largest share (253 million dollars), and our contribution amounts to 50 times the Soviet contribution.

Let's return to UNIDO. The distinguished delegate from the Soviet Union knows full well that United States shortfalls to that organization are not occasioned by an intent to reduce development assistance, but by U.S. Congressional intent to implement reform--an objective the Soviet Union shares--in the budgetary processes of that and other U.N. organizations. It is misleading to cite this reduction, as Mr. Ornatsky has done, to imply a lack of support for UNIDO objectives.

I too would like to get back to the work of this conference and hope that now that the record is clear, we can do this.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

U.S. STATEMENT
ON
WT.101: THE PROMOTION OF TOURISM
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS
DG-E
JULY 9, 1987

Mr. Coordinator, at last Thursday's informal meeting we began to discuss WT.101, which is devoted to the promotion of tourism among the participating States of the CSCE. That the discusssion continues today can be viewed as a good sign; for this proposal focusses on the very essence of the process we are all dedicated to; namely, to facilitate the ability of people from one country to visit other countries. If we are to lose any opportunity to strengthen this access under any of the areas of concern to us, the result is to weaken pledges we have made under the CSCE process. Thus it was with dismay that we heard arguments from our Soviet colleagues, supported by other eastern delegations, that the issues dealt with in WT.101 should be addressed in other international organizations, the World Tourism Organization specifically.

There are clearly basic principles involved here that militate against any suggestion that we ignore questions of tourism in Basket II. But in addition to the argument of principle which should be in itself a persuasive force in favor of dealing with concepts of WT.101 here and now, there are also clear and rational reasons to address WT.101 in this group. Let's review some of those, although some have been mentioned in earlier intervention:

In several previous statements, both formal and informal, the economic potential of expanding tourism has been noted. For these reasons, most if not all of the States participating in the CSCE seek to encourage tourism in one way or another, especially inbound tourism. Tourism is a form of international trade that certainly brings significant economic benefits at relatively low cost.

These economic advantages can be easily overlooked. It is important to keep the economic advantages of tourism continually in mind when we consider WT.101 and its relationship to Basket II. These same advantages should make it acceptable to everyone. Those who do not see the utility of WT.101 should note the fact that they are, in fact, opposing a fairly easy way to obtain benefits to the national economy, especially increased foreign currency reserves, new investment and employment providing management skills. These benefits seem to be exactly what many of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union both need and want. It is therefore very difficult to understand the positions presented by their representatives here in Vienna.

Of all the arguments made against WT.101, the one which probably holds the distinction of being the most erroneous is that the issues the proposal addresses are more relevant to

Basket III than to Basket II. The United States had hoped that its previous statements, as well as those of the Delegation of the Netherlands and other speakers, would have put an end to such argumentation. Thus, the concluding comments of the Soviet Union last Thursday, which claimed that the discussion of certain parts of WT.101 in Basket II could not be justified, were as disappointing as they were suprising. An examination of the Basket II provisions on the promotion of tourism and the text of WT.101, in our view, reveals that they cover similar issues. For example, Basket II expresses the intention of the participating States to encourage the improvement of the tourist infrastructure. That is what the specific suggestions contained in WT.101 intend to do: to improve the tourist infrastructure by eliminating many of the rigidities currently inhibiting people from travelling from one country to another. Basket II also urges the participating States to deal in a positive spirit with questions connected with formalities--such as financial arrangements--of tourist travel abroad. WT.101 makes suggestions in that regard as well.

Of course, there is also what has been called the "human-side" of tourism, which is what the opponents of WT.101 use to argue that much of its content more adequately belongs in Basket III discussions. What many of us would like to know is how one can separate promoting the economic aspects of tourism from the humanitarian aspects. How can one actually expect tourism to increase without contacts as well? Do not current limitations and controls on contacts between peoples of different participating States act to discourage tourism? Any examination of trends and patterns of tourist travel reveals that the answer is most definitely "yes."

Thus, if the participating States are to promote tourism, as they committed themselves to do in Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act, they must address the problems prospective tourists face which make them go to some destinations and avoid--either by their own choice or by the controls of the state--other destinations. This reflects for the tourist sector what are the larger aims in Basket II: to make it easier for individuals, as actors in our national economies, to make decisions in pursuit of their economic interests. Just as restrictions on contacts between prospective business partners and limitations on economic and commercial information make Western firms take most of their business elsewhere, so will controls on the activities of tourists and members of the local population in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union convince prospective Western tourists to travel elsewhere. Are not the question of access in our debates on business information and contacts virtually the same? Certainly, there is no suggestion to move these subjects to another basket.

Of course, in reality, there already exists a certain level of tourist travel between East and West. Furthermore, as we have already discussed, a few East European countries have made it easier for the tourist industry to grow in recent years. These changes have led to substantial increases in tourism and the resultant economic benefits tourism brings without causing any difficulties significant enough to justify a reversal of these trends. At the same time, there is a considerable amount of room for improvement if the participating States are to take greater advantage of the potential for increased tourism and this economic growth among them. There are developments in some Eastern countries that could give us cause for modest optimism in this regard. Certainly, those who represent these countries here should be equally ready and flexible to recognize the economic impacts even these first steps will have.

Much has been said, Mr. Coordinator, about the World Tourism Organization (WTO) and international documents that cover issues similar to those contained in WT.101. It appears that they do cover some similar issues, but this is not an adequate reason to object to WT.101. The commitments some States already have made do not seem to have been sufficient to bring about the changes needed to make tourism easier. Furthermore, while WT.101 might cover some issues that may also be covered to varying degrees elsewhere, it puts these issues in a much clearer context and focuses on East-West problems in tourism, which is appropriate to this venue. We consider it useful to address these issues in the specific framework of the CSCE, because they can promote the security and cooperation in Europe which the participating States seek through the Helsinki process. If some delegations feel that their commitments in other documents are relevant and important, they should certainly be willing to have them reenforced by similar commitments in CSCE.

In conclusion, Mr. Coordinator, WT.101 is a natural and positive development of the Basket II section of the Helsinki Final Act. It is unclear exactly what the Soviet delegate meant when he referred to the proposal as declaratory, but we believe that the language is clear and concrete, focusing on actions that need to be taken. There is no doubt that its adoption and implementation by the participating States would lessen the influences of man-made obstacles which artificially distort where tourists prefer to travel. This would act to increase the overall level of tourism to the benefit of all our economies. Finally, as was noted in Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act and by many speakers here, international tourism will contribute to the development of mutual understanding among peoples, to increased knowledge of other countries achievements in various fields, as well as to economic, social and cultural progress. Thank you, Mr. Coordinator.

STATEMENT BY U.S. DELEGATE THOMAS TURQMAN
ON
PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE U.N. ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS
DG-E
JULY 9, 1987

Mr. Coordinator, we would like to take this opportunity to comment briefly on the proposals having a relevance to the work of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Although some ECE activities already have been discussed, as they are mentioned in several proposals dealing with the various fields of cooperation in Basket II, it is perhaps useful to take stock of how the various suggestions in these proposals add-up and how the ECE should be considered more generally here in Vienna.

Since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, the ECE has acted upon a number of Basket II provisions of a multilateral nature. The Madrid CSCE Follow-Up Meeting reaffirmed and expanded the ECE's role as a major forum for cooperative work on many Basket II topics. With its economic focus and a membership almost identical to that of the CSCE, the ECE was, and continues to be, ideally suited for this task.

The United States has attached considerable importance to the practical and specialized work of the ECE. Under its auspices, meetings of experts from the member states to discuss specific topics, facilitated by detailed documents prepared by the ECE Secretariat, have often been found to be very useful. A substantial number of U.S. Government departments and agencies participate in these meetings.

While we therefore welcome ECE contributions to the cooperation envisioned by the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document, we nevertheless must keep in mind several points as we consider what should be included in a concluding document of the Vienna Meeting related to future ECE activities.

First, and perhaps most important, we must not relegate discussion of problems to the ECE in place of undertaking commitments to take the unilateral actions necessary to solve those problems. Participating States should not call for more multilateral meetings in the ECE as a way to avoid taking actions at a national level. While there may be a utility to further multilateral discussions of some topics, implementation is first and foremost the responsibility of individual states, and we must concentrate our efforts accordingly. This point, by the way, is very relevant to CSCE follow-up activities in Basket II as well.

Second, we cannot ignore the simple fact that our proposals regarding ECE activities imply financial commitments. We are all aware of the current difficulties the ECE faces in this regard, and it would be unrealistic and irresponsible of us to flood the ECE with recommendations as it seeks to focus its work and make that work more efficient.

Third, it is important to remember that, while the ECE has made important contributions in several Basket II fields, the ECE is a distinct, U.N. body, responsible to its member states and not to the CSCE. Although its work frequently coincides with the aims and goals of the CSCE process, the ECE is not synonomous with Basket II. They are different things entirely, and it is necessary to maintain the separateness between them if they are to remain useful and dynamic instruments for solving the problems they were created to solve.

It was with these thoughts in mind that the United States supports certain proposals with practical suggestions for further ECE activities. WT.115, for example, focuses on the unilateral actions necessary to solve the problems created by countertrade, but it also recommends that the ECE intensify its work in this area. There are also references to ECE activities related to environmental protection in WT.89. The suggestions contained in these proposals are realistic as well as important, and we hope that they will be agreeable to all delegations.

One proposal which focuses exclusively on the ECE is WT.55, submitted by the delegations of the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. We seriously question the appropriateness of this proposal. The open ended commitment it seeks to give the ECE certainly does not reflect the careful and balanced approach to the budget and work program of the ECE that the representatives of the states sponsoring this proposal shared with our delegation to the plenary meeting of the ECE in Geneva this past spring our soviet colleague mentioned that we should not upset the restructuring effort under way in the ece. It is precisely our concern that the broad mandate of wt.35 will do exactly that. If we are to keep the ECE as an effective organization and give its new and highly capable leadership an opportunity to strengthen the organization's structure, finances and operations within the budget limitations it now has, we need to tailor recommendations for the ECE only to clear priorities and work programs and ensure that they do not upset the ECE's efforts to establish a well-balanced and productive work program.

Let me say that I was struck by the similarity of approach between our Soviet colleague and this delegation in our comments on the ECE. This suggests that we seek the same objectives. Perhaps with more discussion on this issue, we can reach agreement on wording in the final document which will serve to strengthen the long term operations of the ECE. Certainly this delegation is ready to work with all of the delegations here for that purpose.

I hope that these few comments will be useful as we now begin the new phase of our informal discussions. Thank you, Mr. Coordinator.

INTERVENTION BY U.S. DELEGATE JANE S. FISHER
E-GROUP
JULY 30, 1987

Mr. Coordinator, our delegation would like to comment on the Non-Paper covering a mandate for a follow-up conference on economic cooperation in Europe submitted by one of my colleagues. The U.S. Delegation did not support WT.58 proposing an economic conference, and we question as well the tabling of a non-paper dealing with a mandate for this meeting.

As you are aware Mr. Coordinator, this delegation has questioned the ongoing reference to follow-up activities in Basket II. It should be clear, however, that this concern is not driven by any overall opposition to post-Vienna meetings. To the contrary, the head of our delegation clearly indicated last session that the U.S. Delegation envisages the need for follow-up activities in the CSCE process--Basket II was not excluded. We are concerned, however, that to focus on follow-up activities in the economic area before we have resolved outstanding differences on key economic issues would weaken both our resolve and ability to address these issues in a final document. In the final analysis, it is the textual language that establishes the historical record of our deliberations here and this should be the focus of our efforts.

The CSCE process should be a springboard for meaningful follow-up meetings and it should not be, as premature discussion of a mandate would suggest, the other way around. As we are witnessing in our deliberations on trade and industrial cooperation, there is a wide gap in our perceptions of what should be included in textual language in the economic area. Therefore, how can we consider a mandate for a meeting on economic cooperation or even examine the potential effectiveness of such a meeting, unless and until we have resolved differences over the principles which must form the basis for an eventual follow-up activity?

Mr. Coordinator, let us press our energies to the long road we have ahead to develop a meaningful final document in the Basket II area. When we determine that we have agreement on the key economic issues that are under discussion, and that we need further structures to help implement such agreements, that will be the time to examine the possibility that follow-up meetings offer us in the economic area for strengthening our commitment to the CSCE process. At that time we will also be able to see whether the overall balance of the Vienna meeting warrants such major attention to follow-up events in Basket II, but to address a mandate in the economic area, which must emerge from agreement on principles we are still debating, may not only prove futile if consensus on key issues is not reached, but it will also consume valuable time which should be dedicated to the hard negotiations on critical economic issues which we still have ahead of us.

Mr. Coordinator, we consider it of major importance to the success of our negotiations here to keep our focus on the economic issues that now lie before us and we cannot, therefore, support this Non-Paper. Thank you.

BASKET III SPEECHES

Statement by William H. Hill,
U.S. CSCE Delegation
to Drafting Group "M"
Thursday, April 9, 1987

Mr. Chairman:

Today I would like to address the proposals before our Drafting Group on the Mediterranean. There are two of these, WT-40 and WT-50, both calling for follow-up activities, the first a general meeting on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean, the second an experts' meeting on Mediterranean ecosystems.

Mr. Chairman, in his statement to the Friday, April 3 plenary session of this meeting, the head of my delegation made clear what we think should be the criteria for activities between this meeting and the next Follow-up Meeting, wherever and whenever that may be. I will not repeat these criteria at any length here, but I would like to emphasize that the U.S. delegation will evaluate all proposals for follow-up activities from the standpoint of how they can enhance the implementation and realization of our CSCE commitments. We feel especially strongly that meetings should not be substituted for implementation, should offer the prospect of meaningful results, and should not be held simply for their own sake.

With these criteria in mind, I would like to offer a few comments on the proposals before us. First, as to WT-40, submitted by the delegations of Malta, Yugoslavia, and Cyprus, we fully understand the concerns and aspirations which motivated this proposal. I think that the stage of implementation review made clear that we all here share concerns for peace and stability in the region. However, the implementation review also made clear that we do not all agree on the sources of the problems that worry us or how to address them.

First, to address the security aspects of this proposal. Questions of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean are indeed part of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. These questions are important to the United States, as they are to all the participating states. However, Mediterranean security questions are also extremely diverse, and involve a wide variety of different contiguous areas, disparate non-participating states, and very different issues or questions. Thus it seems that a meeting which attempts to address all of these areas and questions, without specification or distinction, is not only unrealistic but also might even be counterproductive.

This is not to suggest that the United States is against conferences or meetings on these subjects per se. Secretary of State Shultz has recently stated, for example, that a conference on the continuing troubled situation in the Middle East might be useful if it led to direct negotiations between the states involved. In this and earlier administrations the United States has facilitated and acted as go-between in negotiations in this region, in some cases with positive results. However, such negotiations are not appropriate in the CSCE, which has a different focus.

I would add that in the CSCE context it also seems to us that security questions will be best addressed in a unified, systematic manner in Drafting Group "S". Progress was made at the Stockholm CDE, which is now being implemented, and possible further steps in building confidence and security in Europe will be addressed in that working body. It seems to us that concentration of our discussions on security in group "S" offers the most realistic chance of movement forward. The past CSCE track record certainly supports that contention.

On the non-security aspects of proposal WT-40, I note that here, too, the final three tirets on developing friendly relations, economic development, and wider cooperation seem so vague as to preclude organized, concrete discussion which would lead to tangible results. These are all desirable goals, but one needs more than general statements in their support in order to attain them.

For all of these reasons, Mr. Chairman, a conference such as that proposed in WT-40 does not seem to fit the criteria for a successful follow-up activity. Let me contrast it, for example, with proposal WT-50, offered by Spain and a number of other delegations. WT-50 concerns an important subject, the quality of the environment, in particular, the ecosystems of the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the proposal is concrete, specific and sensibly limited in what it intends to be discussed during the time-frame envisioned. Moreover, the subject is unique and particularly appropriate to its area. Finally, because of this proposed organization and agenda, the proposal does not exclude the possibility of real progress. My delegation intends to study this proposal in light of these preliminary considerations and our overall criteria for such meetings.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE IN THE SUBSIDIARY WORKING BODY ON COOPERATION IN HUMANITARIAN AND OTHER FIELDS
MAY 6, 1987

Mr. Chairman,

Yesterday in plenary my head of delegation examined recent developments in the human dimension of the Helsinki Final Act, welcoming recent positive developments in the Soviet Union but also recognizing problem areas that still exist. I would like to elaborate on some of these developments, both positive and negative, which have taken place in the human contacts sphere since we last assembled in Vienna. These continuing problems have a direct bearing on many of the proposals which my delegation and other delegations have submitted for adoption at this meeting.

Perhaps the most striking positive development has been in the numbers of Soviet Jews, Germans and Armenians permitted to leave the Soviet Union in the month of April-- the highest monthly figure in some time. Jewish emigration for April totaled 717--the highest for any month since July 1981. Indeed, so far this year, 1,431 Jews have emigrated, the largest number in any single year since 1982. We welcome this significant increase and hope that it continues. Nevertheless, we cannot fail to remember that Soviet emigration continues to be heavily restricted for Jews, Germans and Armenians, and virtually impossible for Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians and others who seek to emigrate.

Without first-degree relatives abroad, family reunification approval is extremely difficult--if not impossible.

This is particularly the case in the application of the secrecy provision, which apparently continues to be a key hurdle in the attempts of many who have been applying to emigrate.

Leonid Yusefovich and his pregnant wife have been refused for seven years on the grounds of having had access to state secrets. They wish to join his wife's parents in Israel. His wife badly needs medical care and the support of her parents. Thirteen years ago, Leonid served in the Soviet Army where he dealt with anti-aircraft equipment based on an obsolete lamp system not even in use presently.

An even more striking example of refusals based on security grounds is the case of Lea Akkerman. Several weeks ago, Lea was refused again--and told she could not even reapply until 1993--on the grounds that her husband, Naum, who died in 1985, had access to state secrets. It is cases such as these which point to the need for proposals advanced by Western delegations, such as WT. 22, which guarantees the fundamental right of every person to leave his or her country and to return to it, and WT. 23, which provides specific measures intended to remove barriers to family reunification.

The need for acceptance of WT. 24 concerning the expeditious processing of an urgent humanitarian character continues to exist, as illustrated by the cases of Benjamin Charny, Sophia Bravve , Elisaveta Geishis, Fayina Kogan, Sheina Schwartz, and Yuri Shpeizman, all of whom suffer from cancer and who have been denied permission for over five years to travel to the West to seek treatment.

While I am pleased to acknowledge the recent resolution of several U.S.-Soviet binational marriage cases, I must note that 11 divided spouse cases that have been refused on at least two occasions remain unresolved. Petras Pakenas has unsuccessfully tried join his wife, Galina Vileshina, in the United States, since 1980 but has been denied an exit visa sixteen times. No reason has been given for the denials. Petras is no longer allowed to practice law and is now working in a meat factory. This painful case clearly points to the need for proposal WT.23, which would not only allow persons denied permission to join their family members to appeal denials of their applications more expeditiously, but would provide for a periodic review of outstanding cases, which hopefully would give impetus for favorable action on many of them.

A pointed example for the need for acceptance of WT. 53, specifically its paragraph on possible prejudicial treatment of applicants based on the circumstances in which a family member may have left the Soviet Union is seen in the tragic case of Anatoly Michelson. Mr. Michelson, a U.S. citizen, left the Soviet Union and chose not to return against his government's wishes in 1956. His wife, Galina Goltzman, has been denied permission to emigrate for thirty years. Even criminals convicted of serious crimes are often not subjected to punishment for that long a period of time.This couple is elderly and in ill health and we remain extremely hard pressed to understand any justification for their continued separation.

In the area of travel, particularly for family visits, we welcome several positive steps, including an increase in the number of Soviet citizens being permitted to visit their relatives in the United States as well as reports that some Americans previously denied permission to visit the Soviet Union are now being permitted to do so. This forward movement is right in line with proposals designed to facilitate travel for family matters and special occasions, as called for by WT.23. Too many unresolved family visit cases remain, however. They include that of Sofija Vietriniene of Kaunas, Lithuania, who has been refused permission to visit her 93-year-old blind and bedridden Chicago resident mother at least fifteen times, and Nina Hryhorash from the village of Delatyn in western Ukraine, who has been denied permission on four occasions and has not seen her sister in the United States since World War II.

Finally, in our assessment of recent developments, we would like to note the April 7 announced resolution of 137 Soviet divided family and family visit cases, many of which have been resoloved since the opening of the Vienna Meeting last fall. These cases, as well as 59 of the 71 resolved cases presented to Secretary Shultz during his recent visit to Moscow, were among 442 cases presented to the Soviet delegation here in Vienna in November by Congressman Steny Hoyer and Senator Dennis DeConcini, Vice-Chairmen of our delegation and Chairman and Cochairman, respectively, of the U.S. Helsinki Commission. We welcome this positive move forward and hope that this is an indication that the Soviet Government is intent also on resolving all the remaining cases. In the view of my government, such a development would represent a significant advance and would make a contribution to our efforts here in Vienna to draft a concluding document which will move the Helsinki process forward.

STATEMENT BY LYNNE A. DAVIDSON
OF THE
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

H Group
May 14, 1987

Mr. Chairman:

I would like to return to the subject of how we are to proceed with our work in drafting group H. A number of delegations, most recently the Bulgarian and Soviet, have stated that their preference is to begin with topics other than human contacts because culture, information and education pose fewer problems and present more possible points of convergence. My delegation also seeks common ground and a solution to practical problems arising in the Third Basket.

However, we do not agree that human contacts necessarily should be any more difficult a subject on which to draft than any other before our group. The vast majority of countries around this table do not find it at all difficult to implement Final Act and Madrid commitments in the human contacts field, nor would it be difficult for most of us to accept additional Third Basket commitments stemming from the fundamental right to freedom of movement. The human contacts proposals put forward by Western and Neutral countries all are grounded on this basic precept.

In the Third Basket, Human Contacts undeniably is the area of primary interest to my and other Western delegations. For our part, what the U.S. delegation would find difficult would be to agree on cultural and other purportedly "easy" subjects if it becomes apparent that there is no possibility to reach consensus in the pressing area of human contacts, where implementation problems have been the keenest felt.

Human Contacts are the starting point for all other means of humanitarian cooperation. Without human contacts and freedom of movement, how can normal cultural and educational exchanges occur or the freer flow of information of all kinds take place? Culture, education and the communication of information are essentially vehicles for people-to-people contact between East and West. Without the freer movement of people and unhampered communication, the flow of ideas and information, and ultimately understanding, is impeded and distorted. Human society derives spiritual, aesthetic and intellectual nourishment through a free exchange of people, ideas and information, that is to say human interaction, human contacts.

Finally, the subject of human contacts is pressing because delay in addressing human contacts problems can have direct and dire human consequences. Only last week in this group, in the context of Western proposal WT. 24, my delegation mentioned the case of an eight-year refusenik Yuri Shpeizman of Leningrad, who was in precarious health. We urged the resolution of his case on humanitarian grounds. On May 10, he and his wife Nella flew to Vienna from Moscow, and we would have been pleased to acknowledge the successful resolution of the case at this meeting. But, Shpeizman tragically died of a heart attack on May 10 here in Vienna before he could fly on to Israel and a new life. To have been able to make the trip eight years earlier when he first applied to emigrate would have given Shpeizman some good years of health and happiness in Israel.

Human contacts, human separations, human choices and human concerns. Poignant and pressing issues. They have an immediacy unlike the important and interesting problems arising in the fields of culture, education and information.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would repeat that my delegation too is looking for common ground, but not a lowest common denominator. I would urge our Eastern colleagues to consider again the implications of our human contacts work for the credibility of this process. If the millions of people of East and West were ordering our work program for the Third Basket, I am sure that they would place human contacts first on our agenda. And so should we.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE
VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE
H Group
May 21, 1987

Mr. Coordinator:

Upon my return to Vienna, imagine my surprise, on hearing that H group's informal talks this week have ranged from the subject of silviculture, to the propriety of hat-wearing and the configuration of restaurant menus to respective customs of bethrothal and marriage! I take it that what we actually were discussing in so evocative a manner was the development of the CSCE process, the question of preambular language and the prospects for negotiation on the basis of common themes.

Today, I would like to make a few general observations. I understand that our Swiss colleague, Mr. Stoudmann, spoke on Tuesday about priorities. First things must come first. As my Western colleagues have said repeatedly over the course of the last several days and months, our Western proposals give primacy to improved implementation. Our proposals in the Third Basket proceed from fundamental principles: freedom of movement, freedom of expression and freedom to disseminate information of all kinds in the cultural, educational and other fields.

Unless and until these basic principles, principles that are enshrined in the Final Act and other international instruments, are fully recognized and respected, cooperative measures that could perhaps be agreed here among us, can have only a very marginal effect on the serious problems of implementation that we face.

Our first goal is action in the here and now. This will require political will and concrete steps, not political declarations that have no result in practice. I agree with colleagues, who have stated that proposals which incorporate implementation measures to be taken immediately as well as procedural improvements that would extend implementation into the future, make the most practical sense. Western proposals belong to the same conceptual framework.

During our discussions this week, delegations have offered some views on where possible points of convergence exist, where "marriages" could be contracted. I would only observe that for my delegation, empty marriages of convenience are not our purpose. Marriages are only genuine, meaningful and lasting if the union is based on common values and clear understanding. My government would be hesitant to engage in an embrace of ambitious cultural initiatives on a government-to-government basis with states that, by their present actions, demonstrate that they do not permit independent cultural activity. To do so would be to endorse an unbalanced and artificial relationship between creation, dissemination and cooperation in the field of culture.

Mr. Coordinator, metaphors are simplistic. In the complex and sobering world of East-West relations, in the intricate process of negotiation, we must walk before we can run. By adopting the Final Act and its Third Basket, we set our course. Steps toward implementation have been too few and too hesitant. And, too often, participating States have backstepped. Leaps ahead into the realm of spacebridges have been made, but steps to dismantle jamming towers have not. Is this balanced progress? Are we to defer important matters to post-Vienna meetings when it is possible and necessary to undertake meaningful actions and commitments here in Vienna? To us, balanced progress means, first and foremost, action to implement the Final Act in every basket.

In closing, let me repeat my delegation's view that a substantive and balanced Vienna document must be more than verbal compromises on paper. In our document, if we are to retain our credibility, tone should not be mistaken for substance, optics for reality, words for deeds, declarations for actions or promises for practice.

STATEMENT OF LYNNE A. DAVIDSON
U.S. DELEGATE TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING
OF THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

H Group
May 25, 1987

ON WESTERN HUMAN CONTACTS PROPOSAL WT. 24

Mr. Coordinator:

As a co-sponsor of WT. 24, my delegation associates itself fully with the comments of the Norway, Netherlands and Belgian delegations. The expeditious solution of the kinds of cases highlighted in WT. 24 is in keeping with the commitments contained in the CSCE Third Basket and with the Universal Declaration's right to freedom of movement. The number of travel cases of an urgent humanitarian character, as has repeatedly pointed out, would not be large in number if governments routinely would abide by their existing commitments.

That members of a family, who so desire, should be able to travel together for family reasons seems so obvious a proposition that thirty-five governments should not have to deliberate for months and reach a momentous political decision in order to make it possible. That we are here doing just that, and what is even more remarkable, that we are hearing counter-arguments against WT. 24's provision on the subject, is graphic evidence of the great distance this process itself must travel.

Similarly, the idea that governments should have any problem providing exit documents in order to reunite minor children with their parents is extraordinary. Yet, government bureaucrats actually resist our proposal to that effect.

Mr. Coordinator, due to failures on the part of some governments to fulfill their Helsinki commitments, children are born and the old or sick die within a broken family circle. Milestones in personal or public life are reached and left behind, the rites and ceremonies that unify families and create a sense of community are held and then pass. When these occasions are missed due to the insensitivity of governments, there are no second chances for the citizens involved. Keenly felt absences--a missing face in the family photograph--or an increasing sense of isolation from the larger European community, are the sad results.

I would therefore again urge the positive consideration of WT. 24. The words and ideas contained in it are straightforward, and, in themselves, unremarkable. What *is* remarkable, is the pressing need for their adoption and implementation twelve years into the CSCE process. Isn't it about time?

STATEMENT BY LYNNE A. DAVIDSON
U.S. DELEGATE TO THE VIENNA FOLLOW-UP MEETING OF THE CSCE

H Group
May 26, 1987

INFORMATION ISSUES

Mr. Chairman:

I associate my delegation completely with the remarks of the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and Norway with respect to the treatment of eight journalists by Romania, journalists representing disparate and influential U.S., Swiss, Austrian, Spanish, Norwegian and U.K. media. Unconvincing and self-contradictory arguments have been made in this body and in the plenary this morning to explain away the regrettable incident in Romania.

As has been pointed out, the applicable visa requirements and circumstances surrounding each journalist's efforts to obtain an entry visa varied widely from individual to individual. Yet, all were detained and seven of the eight journalists ultimately were forced to leave the country. Other direct statements made by Romanian authorities, including that made yesterday by our Romanian colleague here in H Group, indicate that visa procedures and considerations were not the crux of the matter at all. Rather, the content of the journalists' coverage of Romania on previous occasions, deemed by Romania to be inaccurate and presumably unflattering, motivated Romanian action. I would reiterate the statement of my Ambassador this morning in plenary that the Romanian government cannot arrogate to itself the right to determine whether an individual journalist is giving an accurate picture of his country or not. Romania's action, in contravention of its Helsinki commitments regarding journalists, clearly exposes the flawed thinking behind a number of the information proposals put forward at this meeting with which Romania and a number of other Eastern countries are associated.

As to the information proposals supported by the German Democratic Republic, my delegation will view them in light of recent GDR efforts to intimidate a number of Western journalists who in April tried to cover a demonstration by a group called the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights. Fifteen journalists accredited to the GDR reportedly have addressed a protest letter to the Chief of the Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Meyer. It reads, in part: "The journalists accredited here were reporting facts which indisputably occurred. Neither in their conduct nor in their reporting did they violate the Helsinki Final Act. The actions taken by the GDR Foreign Ministry in this affair can only be construed as a useless, albeit deliberate, attempt to intimidate colleagues who in their daily work are promoting the spirit of understanding and good-neighborly cooperation in Europe. We therefore reject the unfounded representations of the GDR Foreign Ministry formally and categorically as a violation of the spirit of Helsinki." My delegation would add, a violation of the letter as well, Mr. Chairman.

Finally, I want to echo the statement of Ambassador Zimmermann this morning in which he welcomed the cessation of Soviet jamming of most if not all of the various language services of the Voice of America broadcasting to the USSR and the Baltic states. As my delegation acknowledges this positive move, we also must protest the continued, and in some cases intensified, jamming of other Western radios by the Soviet Union. We encourage the Soviet Union and other Eastern countries signatory to the Final Act to cease jamming altogether. Furthermore, we encourage them to take steps unilaterally and within the context of this meeting to ensure that politically-motivated radio interference does not occur in the future.

STATEMENT BY LYNNE A. DAVIDSON
U.S. DELEGATE TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE
H Group, May 28, 1987

CULTURAL ISSUES

Mr. Coordinator:

Today, I would like to discuss what in my delegation's view is the central element of Western cultural proposal WT. 29. It can be found especially in the proposal's last paragraph, but it also finds reflection in WT. 29's first and fourth paragraphs. WT. 29 proceeds from the premise that a vigorous cultural life cannot exist absent freedom of expression and an environment in which individuals, institutions and organizations creatively can interact free from state interference.

Paragraph one provides that the initiatives of official institutes, non-governmental organizations and individuals in the cultural field are to be encouraged, facilitated or supported, as appropriate, by states in such a manner as to ensure that there is no censorship by the state of artistic materials nor attempts made by the state to restrict participation in cultural events.

Paragraph four addresses a longstanding problem. It provides that individuals and groups engaged in culture must be free to travel abroad. Further, a state must not act to replace cultural personalities who have been invited to travel to other participating States without prior consultation.

Mr. Coordinator, I would now like to make a few comments about WT. 29's last paragraph and contrast it with Eastern proposal WT. 77, which we see as its reverse image. Paragraph six of WT. 29 makes the connection between freedom of cultural expression and the building of international confidence. WT. 77 contends that there is an historical responsibility of persons engaged in Art and Culture for the fate of peace and progress.

There is a relationship between culture and the larger aims of the FInal Act. When artists, as well as their publics, are free to exercise fundamental freedoms of thought, expression and movement--when artists can engage freely in the creative dynamics of their media--it is then that the Muses become the natural conduits of human values which transcend geographic boundaries, it is then that they contribute to understanding among our peoples. The Muses require no prompting from the State--nor proposals from us here in CSCE--to do so.

Mr. Coordinator, Art is debased when the Muses are made to serve the state as political handmaidens. WT. 77 is an attempt to justify the use of Art and Culture by governments for political ends, and therefore it is unacceptable to my delegation.

REMARKS OF AMBASSADOR SAMUEL G. WISE
U.S. DELEGATION TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE

H Group, June 1, 1987

REPLY TO EASTERN COMMENTS ON U.S. INFORMATION PERFORMANCE

Mr. Coordinator:

I would like to return today to the subject of information and respond to comments and inquiries put to my delegation on May 26.

First, the Soviet, Polish and Bulgarian delegations referred to new regulations adopted by the U.S. Department of State affecting journalists from their countries. On May 15, 1987, the U.S. Department of State advised the embassies of the Soviet Union and East European Warsaw Pact countries via diplomatic note of new regulations governing access of accredited journalists to the State and Defense Departments. As we explained last week, journalists from these countries will continue to have access to press areas of the State Department, but only under escort, outside of press areas and at other times. For the time being, it has been found necessary to apply these regulations to the journalists of only a limited number of countries which pose the greatest security threat.

For interested delegations, such as Bulgaria, I have here copies of the text of the diplomatic note.

I want to emphasize that neither the purpose nor the effect of the new regulations is to bar or unduly to complicate the access of journalists from Warsaw Pact countries to the State Department. The new regulations do not interfere in any significant way with gathering legitimate news. Correspondents may still attend briefings, make appointments, and receive materials.

Crocodile tears have been shed here about the new U.S. regulations, yet I would point out that similar restrictions are imposed in many other countries including all Warsaw Pact countries. Take for example the Soviet Union. The Foreign Ministry press center is not even located in the Foreign Ministry; it is in the Novosti Building where Western journalists are confined to an entrance and a small set of rooms.

Much was made of security considerations last week. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, genuine security considerations should not be taken lightly by any government. At the same time, security should not be used as a convenient and blanket excuse to limit freedom of expression, access or movement as is sadly the case in the some of the countries who have complained here the most about the new regulations. Our new regulations were promulgated in response to a genuine security problem. Correspondents--including those from the Warsaw Pact countries--were free to roam the State Department building at will without escort. The new rules are designed to limit a security threat. Whether we apply them to reporters from other countries is a question we will keep under review.

In the course of our formal discussion last week, Mr. Yevstafiev took my government to task on other points as well:

He claimed that two Soviet journalists, Vladimir Simonov and Boris Korolev, respectively have been refused visas. My delegation checked into the matter and can report that Simonov's request for a visa to the United States for an American Express tour involving 21 other Soviet visitors was denied under Section 212 (A) (29) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Korolev, applying separately for a visa to visit the U.S. at the invitation of the Black Press Institute with two other journalists, was also denied a visa under Section 212 (A) (29). This section of the law is generally invoked for internal security reasons. Aliens are ineligible under Section 212 (A) (29) who: "the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reasonable ground to believe probably would be prohibited by the laws of the United States relating to espionage, sabotage, public disorder, or in other activity subversive to the national security."

Mr. Yevstafiev further complained that Soviet journalists' travel within the United States had been restricted. I would remind Mr. Yevstafiev that such decisions are a matter of reciprocity. The granting or withholding of closed area exceptions for Soviet official personnel and journalists assigned to the U.S. are directly based on Soviet treatment of our official personnel and journalists in the USSR. We will not tolerate a situation wherein the Soviets fully utilize the advantages of our society while subjecting us to all the limitations of their own.

Mr. Yevstafiev also alleged that Soviet journalists are not permitted to White House press conferences and that they are refused normal visiting rights. Soviet journalists have not been blocked from White House press activities and are given exactly the same treatment as all other Washington-based, duly subscribed journalists. The additional allegation that the major network ABC was penalized for broadcasting programs with commentary by Soviet commentator Vladimir Posner is absolutely untrue as far as we can determine.

Finally, Mr. Yevstafiev alleged that a recent U.S.-Soviet telebridge had been censored by U.S. authorities. This according to Georgi Arbatov, head of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada. As is the case with many of Mr. Arbatov's statements, it is highly misleading when not untrue. The telebridge to which the Soviets referred took place on April 25th. This was the first Supreme Soviet/congressional telebridge. By prior agreement both sides had decided not to air it, but to use it instead as a dry-run and model for future telebridges. On the day of the event, it was decided to allow the press free access--even permitting them in the studio--and an open press conference was held afterwards. There was absolutely no censorship. The Soviet side inquired whether the U.S. side would object to the recorded telebridge being aired in the USSR. The U.S. had no objections and the Soviet side did not press the U.S. to air the telebridge reciprocally. The Soviets broadcast the recorded telebridge on May 16. While no U.S. networks have expressed interest in airing this telebridge in its entirety, several have said that they may use portions of it. By prior agreement the first live telebridge to be broadcast simultaneously by both countries will take place on September 23.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken the time to respond to allegations and comments directed toward my delegation in order to contribute to a real dialogue and to set the record straight on information. I repeat my strong support of Western proposal WT. 56 and all of its provisions, to which my delegation is entirely prepared to adhere.

Last week, Mr. Yevstafiev quoted the great poet Yevtushenko as saying that next to "sputnik", "glasnost" is becoming the most internationally known Soviet word. "Glasnost", he stated, had broken through a wall of alienation that had been built up for years, the responsibility for which Mr. Yevstafiev somehow ascribed to my country. Mr. Coordinator, "glasnost", in fact may be running a close second to "sputnik" as a well-known Soviet term, but I would remind my Soviet colleagues that the word "disinformatsia" is not far behind as the largely unfounded allegations against my country concerning information have shown.

STATEMENT BY LYNNE DAVIDSON
U.S. DELEGATE TO THE VIENNA REVIEW MEETING OF THE CSCE

H Group
June 2, 1987

HUMANITARIAN CASES AND WESTERN HUMAN CONTACTS PROPOSAL WT. 24

Mr. Coordinator:

At the close of yesterday's session, when we moved on briefly to the subject of human contacts, Mr. Morozov recalled the discussions concerning Western proposal WT. 24. He reiterated his view that the proposal's definition of urgent travel cases is too broad and said that an adequate description already is contained in the Final Act, that is to say, cases such as those involving the old and ill.

It was not the intention of the sponsors and supporters of WT. 24 to overlook existing Final Act language, only to give it added strength and specificity. My delegation would rest happily on existing human contacts commitments if we saw evidence that they were being honored in daily practice. As I had occasion to remark before, the humanitarian cases streaming in to my delegation every day indicate that existing commitments are not being honored, routine cases are not been routinely resolved and urgent cases are not being given expeditious attention. Given this sad reality, my delegation and other concerned delegations have offerred WT. 24 as a spur to implementation and in recognition of the broad range of human contacts problems that constantly arise.

Even taking the narrow definition of urgent cases favored by Mr. Morozov and others on the opposite side of the table, the implementation record is poor.

In March, a senior State Department official presented a list of individual cases to the Consular Administration of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Among those listed were those of seriously ill people, some of them elderly. Two of the patients have since died -- Yuriy Shpeizman, a cancer patient, and Arkadiy Vovk, a kidney patient. One has received permission to emigrate -- Sheina Swartz.

Others hold on tenuously to life. By Final Act standards regarding the old and ill, by any standard of decency, by Mr. Morozov's standards, the following longstanding cases should be resolved quickly:

Benjamin Charny, a 48 year old cancer patient from Moscow who suffers from malignant melanoma and heart disease which precludes any further operations. His sole surviving relative, his brother Leon, lives in the United States. Charny first applied to emigrate in 1979. When this cancer patient was refused in April he was told not to reapply until 1995.

Mikhail Furman, a 78 year old cancer patient from Leningrad suffering from heart disease.

Faina Kogan, a 73 year old patient from Moscow with melanoma. She and her husband, Naum, first applied in 1975. Their only son emigrated to Israel in 1974.

Naum Kogan, a 40 year old kidney patient from Moscow who has been attempting to emigrate since 1977. His parents and sister live in the United States.

Marina Orshanskaya, a cancer patient from Kiev who suffers from a brain tumor. Her Soviet doctors have told her that they cannot operate. She has been attempting to emigrate since 1981 along with her husband, Grigoriy Grinblat.

Alla Smelyanskaya, a Muscovite who suffers from advanced breast cancer. She and her husband, Emmanuil, have been trying to emigrate to Israel since 1970. Alla's sister lives in Israel.

These and other patients are forced to bear the emotional stress of seperation from their loved ones in the West in addition to the physical pain of their illness. For some permission came too late -- Inna Meiman arrived in the United States and died three week later. Yuriy Shpeizman enjoyed but three brief hours here in Vienna before he died. Others, like Vovk, continued to wait in the U.S.S.R. until their death.

My delegation has just received a demand from nine Leningrad refuseniks dated May 12 and dedicated to the memory of Yuri Speizman "who did not live long enough" to see the Promised Land. A demand and not an appeal, because conscience demands action in cases so compelling and because the right to leave one's country is not something to be allowed by governments. It is to be respected.

The signatories remind us that unless humane action is taken, others may meet Speizman's fate. Boris Radomyslskiy, they report, is dying of cancer. He and his family have been refuseniks for nine years. He seeks only the right to die in Israel. Yet on May 11 he received another refusal.

Human contacts problems have a way of getting more and more complicated and acute over time. Take the case of cancer patient Liliya Fridman. The Fridmans have been refused since 1979 on various bases, at times for "regime considerations", at others, for "insufficiency of kinship". Yet in January, hope was aroused when an OVIR inspector telephoned and suggested that the family apply once more, which they did in March. That same month, Liliya was diagnosed with breast cancer. On March 20, her husband appealed to OVIR with an urgent request for an exit visa to Israel, where non-surgical means unavailable in the Soviet Union are used to treat that type of cancer. On March 23, the Fridmans again were refused for unspecified "regime considerations". Four days later, Liliya Fridman underwent a mastectomy. Her case was both urgent and humanitarian.

What "regime considerations", a familiar reason for refusal, could override the humanitarian considerations--and the Final Act obligations--involved in the cases I have just recounted?

Beyond urgent cases of the old and ill, we have identified other circumstances deserving of humanitarian concern and consideration. Take the Gilbo family. I had the pleasure of meeting a young couple, Olga and Michael Solomon, just a few weeks ago in Vienna. Mrs. Solomon had just been permitted to emigrate from the Soviet Union to join her American husband. Olga had been a refusenik since 1979. She left behind in Leningrad her parents, Yevgeny and Tatyana Gilbo, her grandmother and an uncle. All have been subjected to the harassments attendant on refuseniks. Apparently, the father, Yevgeny, had been refused on grounds of secrecy, grounds which do not appear to hold up logically and which would seem to warrent a review under the terms of the new exit/entry legislation. An appeal filed at the Supreme Soviet Presidium in April still is under review. Olga is pregnant and expects her baby in October.

Babies do not wait for government decisions, Mr. Coordinator. While I am hopeful that our meeting will end by our target date and with the adoption of WT. 24, I would certainly urge the resolution of the Gilbo's family reunification case whether or not the baby's schedule fits our negotiating timetable.

Mr. Coordinator, if there were no problems in the human dimension between East and West, we would not need the Final Act. If Final Act commitments were met we would not need new proposals, such as WT. 24. Clearly, the language of WT. 24 is necessary because the Final Act pledge we all have made to resolve humanitarian problems is not being observed.

Statement on Information
by U.S. Delegate William Hill
Wednesday, June 3, 1987
Drafting Group H

Mr. Chairman:

Since they were just addressed in formal session, I will address the matters raised by the Soviet, Bulgarian, GDR and Polish delegations.

First, my delegation categorically rejects the allegation that the State Department measures regarding access by journalists of Warsaw Pact countries constitute a violation of the Final Act or that they discriminate against the ability of those journalists to conduct legitimate journalistic activities. The measures are directed at other concerns and are part of a larger project involving physical security and access for all, including employees to the State Department's main building. I regret that all the information already provided to the delegations concerned was not sufficient to make it clear what motivated the U.S. decision.

Criticism of the new rules recently introduced for access by Warsaw Pact journalists to the Department of State is indeed far-fetched when one looks at the facts. In the past the State Department was generous to a fault with access, as all reporters could roam the corridors at will. Because of increasing concerns for security and a few regrettable incidents, the entire system of security and access to the Department of State is being altered. I stress this is the entire system, and will eventually affect everyone who enters the building.

As part of this change, we now require that journalists from Warsaw Pact countries will require an escort in the designated press areas. We will provide such escorts. Experience has shown that they are necessary. The new regulations will not affect the ability of journalists from Warsaw Pact states to attend briefings, ask questions, interview officials, or doing anything else which a legitimate journalist needs to do.

In regard to the remarks of my Soviet colleague on the treatment recently accorded CBS correspondent Dan Rather, I would only say that with all due respect to Mr. Rather's prominence and prestige, his success in getting access to sources in the Soviet Union as compared to that of other journalists on this score can be equated with the relative ability of an ice-breaker and a rowboat to navigate polar seas.

My Soviet colleague has just suggested today, as he has done in previous sessions, that my country, among other sponsors of proposal WT-56 on freedom of information, is not suitable to put forth such a proposal. My colleague has tried to leave the impression that the United States places restrictions on the activities of journalists and access to information greater than those that exist in the Soviet Union, restrictions sufficient to make sponsorship of such a proposal allegedl "hypocritical."

Given the previous comments this morning, I would like to set the record straight on the subject of working conditions for journalists, access to information, and a number of other areas which are directly relevant to the substance of WT-56. We do not believe that because of a few highly publicized changes in the way a few top representatives of the Soviet leadership deal with the press, somehow Soviet government and society is now more open, responsive and accomodating to the press than in the United States or other western societies.

Let's take a look at some of the charges and claims, and how things really are in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the East for a working journalist. First take information about government officials and offices. I have right here a Congressional Directory, with the names, offices and phone numbers of all U.S. Congressmen, Senators, their staff, and most of the top and mid-level officials of all agencies and offices of the Executive Branch. I also have a State Department Telephone Book, with the names and numbers of hundreds of officials from the Department of State, U.S. Information Agency, and Agency for International Development, including all of the top officials. If I had a wheelbarrow, I could bring in hundreds more such directories, published by the government and private firms, with names and numbers for state and local governments, agencies, businesses, and so forth. These are all public documents, freely available to any journalist seeking sources or experts on any particular subject.

What is the situation in Moscow? It is possible to get a Moscow telephone directory, but only of you subscribe at the right time. And then, very few of the important government and party offices which are of prime interest to a journalist are in the phone book. There are no directories of the Foreign Ministry, Supreme Soviet, Central Committee and so on, with the phone numbers and office addresses which are available to journalists. One can always call the press offices of the Foreign Ministry, Ministry for Foreign Trade, or other agencies. However, press offices are designed to serve limited functions, and cannot substitute for open, and direct access to officials themselves.

This brings me to the second question. Even if a reporter could get a Moscow telephone directory with all the phone numbers he needed, what sort of access would he have when he called up? In the United States, naturally all officials do not talk all the time to all reporters who call. However, government officials of all levels usually do talk to the press, try to be helpful when they can, and refer the reporters on if they are not able to assist them or answer certain questions.

What is the situation in the USSR? First of all, only a limited handful of officials are available to talk with reporters. It is very fine that people like Mr. Gerasimov and Mr. Lomeiko meet regularly with the press. They are more available and forthcoming that their predecessors, so this is an improvement. However, the situation in Moscow is still several quantum jumps away from the access reporters in Washington have enjoyed for years.

We know from personal experience that most officials in the USSR are simply "unavailable" to reporters. If one calls up, they don't answer the telephone, or they are out. If one just shows up at the office, they are "not in", even when colleagues or subordinates clearly walk into the office to speak with them. Then there is the more insidious practice of granting access, interviews and information only to those reporters who do not report "inconvenient" information. A number of western reporters have been threatened with or suffered a cut-off from official sources when they continued to meet and report on Soviet dissidents and refuseniks.

I am sure that my Soviet colleague will be able to cite a few instances when Soviet reporters have not been able to obtain access or interviews they requested. But I underline, these are a few, isolated instances. They do not constitute a pattern of denial of access and restriction on the activities of journalists, not like the pattern which has existed for years and still exists in the USSR.

How do these regulations compare with those in Moscow? In the USSR journalists do not even enter the Foreign Ministry. The argument that we just heard to the effect that the Ministry is housed in numerous buildings around Moscow is facetious. So is our State Department, which has offices in Washington, D.C., Maryland and Virginia. We are talking about the main buildings here.

The United States has also been criticized for placing restrictions on the travel of Soviet journalists in the United States. Let's make clear who did what to whom. In 1941 the Soviet Union placed restrictions on the internal travel of foreigners in the Soviet Union. Since it was then wartime, we found the move understandable, although perhaps unnecessary. We waited for a considerable period after the end of the war to see when these restrictions on the travel of our diplomat , journalists, and businessmen would be lifted. In 1954, when it became apparent that these restrictions were not going to be abolished, the United States instituted a reciprocal system of travel controls for Soviet diplomats, journalists, and business representatives permanently resident in the United States. We told the Soviet government at that time that we were prepared to abolish these controls whenever they were willing to accord us equal treatment in the USSR. We have renewed this offer numerous times since then. The Soviet Union has yet to reply, and the travel controls in the USSR continue to be applied as in the past.

Of course, in the United States, most other foreigners, including journalists from most of the countries of the world, are free to come and go whenever and wherever they please. In the Soviet Union, not only American journalists and diplomats, but even those from countries allied with the USSR are subject to travel controls and restrictions. As the system operates in practice, we have found that at least 90 percent of the Soviet Union is de facto closed to foreigners, either because of an outright prohibition, or because it is simply impossible to arrange a trip there.

Of course we constantly hear complaints that we do not allow Soviet journalists to travel in the U.S., and thus prevent them from doing their job. Let me recount a couple of colorful incidents to show what the situation really is. Several years ago, after covering a nearby meeting of the U.S. Olympic Committee, a Soviet journalist showed up without prior notification at the front gate of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal. He claimed to be doing a story on the "American War Machine" and demanded access to the facility. It will not surprise anyone here that we did not let him in. Moreover, because he had willfully violated the terms under which he had been granted permission to travel to Colorado, we denied the next couple of trips he applied to make.

What happens when a foreign journalist attempts to travel to a closed area in the USSR? One example is a foreign correspondent who decided that he wanted to see what has become of Kaliningrad, the former Koenigsberg, under Soviet rule. Kaliningrad is now the home of the Soviet Baltic Fleet, and is formally closed to foreigners. When this correspondent was denied permission to visit Kaliningrad, he went anyway. He got his story, but he was detained, declared persona non grata, and expelled from the Soviet Union. As far as I am aware, he did not attempt to visit the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet.

Within those areas of the United States they are allowed to visit, Soviet journalists encounter the same conditions as other reporters. Of course these conditions are not always perfect, but we do not go out of our way to make things difficult for them. This is not the case in the Soviet Union.

I don't want to get into a long recitation of cases, but a few examples are instructive. While visiting legally a Soviet city in the Ukraine, an American reporter was talking openly with Soviet citizens, refuseniks from that city. She was pulled from her taxicab by a group of thugs, manhandled and dragged across one of the main squares of the town. Regrettable hooliganism, we might hear. Why is it such hooliganism appears especially when a reporter wishes to speak with dissidents or refuseniks?

If reporters are not physically intimidated, they may be expelled for the subjects they investigate and what they write about them. This happened several years ago to the correspondent for a major magazine whose reporting was not to Soviet liking. Shortly after a visit to a provincial town, where he spoke with several local officials and newsmen, and then wrote about these conversations, the western correspondent was accused of "improper activities" such as misrepresenting his identity and seeking confidential information. He was then expelled from the USSR, a stark warning to other western correspondents on what could happen to them, too, if they showed too much initiative and independence.

And finally there is the case of Nick Daniloff. The cynical use of a patently falsified case against a legitimate journalist to seek a tradeoff for a Soviet official clearly involved in illegal intelligence activities -- this is the bottom line on working conditions for journalists.

We also believe that our colleague's assertions on alleged restrictions on access to information in the United States, and his comparison of these with the situation in his own country are at best hyperbole. We welcome recent changes we have seen concerning openness and access, and we hope they will continue. However, I think the examples I have cited still reflect the true situation in respect to the conditions in which foreign journalists in the USSR live and work, and the access they have to sources of information. I also think they demonstrate that, despite recent commendable progress, there is still a need for Proposal WT-56.

Statement by Ambassador Samuel Wise
Travel and Contacts Among Scientists
Drafting Group H, Monday, June 29, 1987

Mr. Coordinator, at our last session devoted to education, Mr. Yevstavyev asked about concrete examples of obstacles to travel which would make the provisions of proposal WT-122 necessary. My delegation was pleased to join as a co-sponsor of WT-122, although I am informed that this fact was only registered today. In any case, I am happy to provide Mr. Yevstavyev with a selection of the specific cases which convinced us of the need for this initiative.

Let me state first that I fail to understand what could be the objection to the first paragraph of WT-122. The language calls for removal of "undue obstacles" to travel by scientists. It is thus limited, quite reasonable, and does not require wholesale reworking of any participating state's internal travel system. Furthermore, WT-122 envisions removal of such obstacles only "where they exist."

From the vehemence of my Soviet colleague's objections to this proposal, I can only surmise that such obstacles to travel by scientists do exist in his country, and that these obstacles are undue. Unfortunately, the implementation record, some of which was raised during the implementation review phase of this meeting, makes it clear that this is indeed the case.

I have here three lists prepared by the U.S. organization the Committee of Concerned Scientists. This is an independent organization of prominent American scientists which was formed to monitor violations of the Helsinki accords, and particularly those which affect the life and working conditions of scientists. The first list contains the names of 108 Soviet scientists who have waited for ten years or more for permission to leave the Soviet Union. The second list contains the names of 644 Soviet scientists who have waited between 5 and 10 years for permission to leave their country. The third list is much shorter, containing only 32 Soviet scientists who have waited less than 5 years for permission to leave. These lists are available for inspection by anyone here who desires.

The denial to scientists of the right to choose the country in which they will live and work is a matter of serious concern, and the lists and statistics compiled by the Committee of Concerned Scientists are disquieting in this respect. However, WT-122 addresses impediments to scientific travel and cooperation on a much broader scale.

For example, at our last sesion Mr. Yevstavyev characterized that portion of WT-122 dealing with obstacles to internal travel as a "one-man" proposal, presumably referring to the internal exile of Academician Andrei Sakharov, which fortunately was ended last December. I would argue that if adopting this proposal deters in the future the internal exile of even one scientist of Dr. Sakharov's stature, then it will have been worth it. However, there are unfortunately many more cases of scientists who have been arbitrarily arrested, exiled, and prevented from travelling or maintaining contacts with fellow scientists from their own or other countries.

For example, among those scientists who have been deprive of their employment and then imprisoned are mathematician Iosif Begun, engineer Iosif Berenshtein, computer scientist Simeon Borovinsky, mathematician Vladimir Lifshitz, electrical engineer Mark Nepomnyashchiy, neurologist Aleksandr Pinkhusovich, computer scientist Leonid Volvovskiy, computer scientist Roald Zelichonok, physicist Iosif Zisels, and physicist Zachar Zunshayn. I also have a publication from the Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, dated April 16, 1987, which contains the names of 63 Soviet scientists,health professionals, or students of science who have been imprisoned or incarcerated in pychiatric hospitals for exercising their political and religious rights in accordance with the Final Act, including the right to freedom of movement. I will be happy to make this publication available to anyone who wishes to study it.

A number of these scientists have been released from prison this year. However, there are many who still await release. Moreover, it would be best to provide some sort of insitutional guarantee, so that other scientists are not arbitrarily deprived of their livelihood and liberty in the future.

As for deprivation of livelihood, I have a list here from the Committee of Concerned Scientists of 141 Soviet scientists who were fired or forced to resign from their scientific positions after they or a relative applied for permission to leave the Soviet Union. This list is also available, of course, to anyone who wishes to inspect it.

Simply because they have been forced from their official institute, many Soviet scientists have not been deterred from attempting to continue their scientific work. However, great obstacles have been placed in the way of the freedom of movement and contacts necessary to do independent work. Take for example, Naum Meiman, whose case is well known to everyone in this room. Naum has continued to work in his field, mathematics, even though he has been deprived of his official standing, contacts, and communications. Geneticist Valeriy Soyfer is another scientist who has been fighting an uphill battle to carry on his scientific work despite the severe, arbitrary restrictions placed upon his professional activity. As he stated in his appeal of last February to the delegates of this meeting, Soyfer truly is being punished by the authorities for his "active struggle for emigration from the USSR of all those who wish to leave for family, political, religious, professional or other motives."

The case of Viktor and Irina Brailovskiy is one of the best known and most striking illustrations of obstacles placed by Soviet authorities in the way of travel and contacts by independent scientists. After being denied exit.permission and fired from their jobs in the 1970s, the Brailovskys were instrumental in organizing an independent scientific seminar in Moscow. Dozens of scientists ere intimidated, harassed, detained and even arrested for participating or attempting to participate in these seminars. I will not take time to read the names of all of those scientists, both Soviet and foreign, from Nobel Prize winners to those just beginning their careers, who suffered harassment at the hands of the authorities because of their association with these seminars. The list is too long, and it is already well known.

These scientific seminars have continued into the 1980s, known lately as the "Moscow Scientific Seminars." Although over 100 sessions of these seminars were held from 1982 to 1986, problems still exist, especially for Soviet scientists from outside Moscow and foreign scientists who wish to attend. There are a number of cases where refusenik scientists from Kiev, Leningrad and elsewhere have been prevented from coming to Moscow to meet with visitors or to attend this seminar. I would emphasize, for the benefit of my Soviet colleague, that these are cases of internal travel, to be performed by persons who have not been adjudged criminals, nor who have been the subject of any formal or informal judicial proceeding. In addition, many foreigners, including a number of prominent American scientists, have been denied Soviet visas solely because they attended this seminar in the past, or wished to attend it during their stay in the USSR. I have a full list, for anyone who may be interested.

As for foreign travel and contacts, the record is hardly any better here. Dozens, perhaps hundreds, of Soviet scientists are prevented from accepting invitations from foreign colleagues to attend conferences or to teach and do research at foreign institutions. I have a list here, which I shall not read in its entirety, (three pages long), of Soviet scientists who have not been allowed to attend international conferences in their field, although invited by well-known foreign colleagues. In the case of cyberneticist Aleksandr Lerner, he was even prevented from participating in a symposium which was held in Moscow in 1982! Lerner has also been prevented from accepting an offer of a faculty post at Brown University. He currently has an invitation for a one year appointment as a regents' professor of mathematics at the University of California at Berkeley for 1987-88. Yet Soviet authorities have refused either to let Dr. Lerner depart the USSR or to let him work in his field. Just this year Soviet biochemist Erlina Matlina was denied permission to participate in the 6th

International Catecholamine Symposium in Jerusalem. Dr. Matlina went on a hunger strike during the three-day confernece.

There are many other Soviet scientists who are in the same position as these. Take for example Igor Uspenskiy and Inna Ioffe, husband and wife, and colleagues at the Moscow Institute of Medical Parasitology. Drs. Uspenskiy and Ioffe were fired from their institute as soon as they applied to emigrate in 1979. They were also refused exit permission on the grounds that the work they did was "secret." Yet their research at the institute was partially funded by the World Health Organization (WHO), which has a rule that any institution which receives its funding cannot conduct secret or classified military research. Drs. Ioffe and Uspenskiy continue to be unable to accept invitations to work abroad or to work in their own country, all because of alleged "secrecy." However, the Moscow Institute of Medical Parasitology continues to receive WHO funds. Something is dreadfully wrong here.

Mr. Coordinator, I could go on at considerable length with specific citations of cases in which Soviet scientists have been denied permission to travel, work in their field, have contact with Soviet or foreign colleagues, and otherwise enjoy many of the rights guaranteed to them under the Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document. I could go on, but I think I have already enumerated enough cases to establish that there is a pattern here, a pattern which needs to be remedied by adoption and implementation of the provisions of WT-122.

I will be happy to make available to any interested delegates the full text of the report by the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Committee of Concerned Scientists. I just want to make clear that these reports, these data come from just such a group -- concerned scientists. They are not politicians or diplomats seeking to make debating points. They are real people, intimately and daily concerned with the issues we are discussing here. My delegation strongly advocates that we listen to their concerns, and act upon them to provide full implementation and compliance with our CSCE commitments to greater contacts and cooperation in science and education.

Statement by Ambassador Samuel Wise
Deputy Chairman of the United States Delegation
On Radio Broadcasts and the Free Flow of Information

Drafting Group H

Vienna, Austria
July 30, 1987

The Soviet Union took a positive step when it ceased its illegal jamming of a number of western radio broadcasts, including most vernacular VOA broadcasts. That is welcome movement towards implementing the important CSCE goals of openness and improved communication between peoples. I must continue to point out, though, that all jamming, including that of RFE/RL, is illegal and should cease.

At the same time that the USSR took the positive step of ceasing jamming of some broadcasts into the soviet union, it began activities which cause considerable interference with domestic u.s. medium-wave radio broadcasts; in effect, jamming. On May 23, a program identified as the North American Service Of Radio Moscow began weekend broadcasts in English to the United States from a transmitter in Cuba. These broadcasts, by preempting U.S. domestic medium-wave frequencies, cause serious interference to a number of U.S. stations.

I wish to make very clear that the United States government has no objection to the principle of Soviet broadcasts to our public. We do not interfere with Soviet short-wave broadcasts to the U.S., and have emphasized in CSCE the principle that all peoples have the right to listen to whatever broadcasts and information sources they so choose. The U.S. is, as it has many times made clear to the Soviet authorities, ready to discuss ways to improve communication between our publics, including mutual access to radio broadcasts. We stand by that offer.

However, broadcasts that interfere with existing U.S. domestic stations deprive our public of freedom of choice, and run counter to the purpose of improving communication and understanding among peoples. The broadcasts, in fact, cause resentment among segments of the American public which, instead of being offered a greater variety of information sources to choose from, are denied access to a familiar source. This negates much of the good will and improved understanding derived from the cessation of some Soviet jamming.

The goal of improved communication among our peoples is not served by broadcasts from Cuba, Soviet or Cuban, that disrupt U.S. stations. I wish to urge the USSR to follow up on the positive action it took in halting some jamming, by bringing to an end not only its remaining jamming, but also the medium-wave broadcasts from Cuba that are interfering with U.S. domestic stations. We, for our part, remain prepared to discuss improving mutual access through radio broadcasts to our respective publics.

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